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Compelling research in international relations and international political economy on global 
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much stronger compliance mechanism than those currently found in the Kyoto Protocol. In 
other words, global warming raises the prospect that we need a global form of political au-
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This in turn suggests that any serious effort to mitigate climate change will entail new limits 
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
 
Global warming and global ties  
If we are born free and equal then we are all born unavoidably bound up 
with other people. If having freedom means that others should not interfere 
with our life plans, then each individual’s status as free is dependent on oth-
ers respecting their freedom. Freedom as a moral idea is tightly entwined 
with limits on what each of us can justifiably do. The declaration that we are 
all born as equals binds us together because each individual’s status as equal 
is only realised if others treat them as their equal, whatever that entails. Con-
ceptually, freedom and equality must lead to a set of moral claims individu-
als can legitimately make on others and standards of behaviour that we have 
moral reasons to accept.1 However, the main reason for thinking that striving 
for individual freedom and equality creates a strong connection between 
people is not conceptual but based in facts about how we are dependent on 
each other and about the kinds of effects we can have on each other.  
We begin life wholly reliant on others and achieving any human goods 
requires that we are protected, fed, and educated. More broadly we are 
bound up with other people because of the ways in which humans can help 
or hurt each other. We can steal from, injure, and kill each other, but we can 
also protect each other and trade and create with others. A central point of 
departure in the history of political thought, communicated particularly ef-
fectively by Thomas Hobbes, is that in the absence of extensive human co-
operation the best we can hope for is basic and probably unpleasant survival 
over a short life.2 As Hobbes makes clear, in conditions where we cannot 
rely on others to cooperate with us we are faced with the combined hardships 
                               
1 This conceptual necessity does not of course tell us what these claims and standards should 
be.  
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 86-90.  
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of not being able to trade and work together effectively and of having to be 
relentlessly on guard for the threat that others’ interests will conflict with our 
own wellbeing.3  
Achieving basic human goods such as collective security and reliable wel-
fare, along with the more developed goods of the modern sciences and arts, 
can only be achieved in a society that is ordered in some way. Individuals 
are limited in their ability to provide for themselves, protect themselves and 
their property, and in their ability to enforce the arrangements they make 
with others. Likewise meaningful freedom and equality can only be achieved 
in an ordered society. Individuals cannot unilaterally construct a just world 
around themselves and they cannot unilaterally guarantee that others will 
treat them with respect.  
Many of the goods we tend to associate with a life worth living are those 
made possible by relatively large and complex societies such as modern 
states. With the exception of some anarchists, it is widely held among politi-
cal theorists, economists, and political scientists that when societies become 
large and complex social cooperation and regulation must to some extent be 
arranged through political institutions instead of on a face to face basis or 
through small scale communal norms.4 There are a wide range of views on 
how much political regulation is required and in which realms of interaction 
the influence of political institutions is necessary. Even so, the claim that 
goods such as welfare, freedom and equality are goals that inevitably tie us 
to other people can most often be interpreted to mean that it is through well 
ordered political societies that these goods can be put into practice. Substan-
tive arguments about social justice couched in terms of freedom and equality 
are thus part of a larger set of arguments for how we should organize a po-
litical order so that its members can have meaningful lives.   
In this book I will argue that the problem of global warming is an instance 
of us being bound together worldwide in the morally distinct way described 
above. The potential threats to human welfare from our impacts on the envi-
ronment are the kinds of threats that give rise to the need for us to work to-
gether to secure human goods. When I say that global warming has bound us 
together globally in the same way we are bound together in existing political 
orders I am appealing to three distinct ways of being interconnected.  
First, we are interconnected by the fact that we are together and at a 
global scale threatening the environmental conditions we all depend on for 
our welfare. Global warming is simply one example, although a dramatic 
one, of the fact that we can have negative impacts on others’ abilities to se-
cure human goods. Second, we are further bound together by the fact that 
addressing this threat requires that we act together. The challenges involved 
                               
3 Ibid., 170-74.  
4 A summary of the arguments for why political institutions are necessary in modern societies 
is presented in Chapter III under the heading ‘The collective goods justification of the state.’ 
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in mitigating global warming is an example of how securing human welfare 
requires dependence on and contribution to collective efforts. Third, because 
we can only, I will argue, achieve meaningful results through global institu-
tional arrangements that can assure compliance to collective mitigation 
strategies, we must actively intensify global interconnectedness by entering 
into a new and global political project.  
This third claim amounts to the view that global warming has connected 
us together politically in some way and is based on both empirical and nor-
mative assessments. The empirical assessment follows from research in in-
ternational relations and international political economy on global warming. 
Here we see compelling arguments predicting that states will not overcome 
the global cooperative challenges involved in addressing the threat of cli-
mate change through voluntary or weakly enforced international agree-
ments.5 This means that achieving significant reductions of green house gas 
(GHG) emissions, which are thought to be causing global warming, cannot 
be achieved through international agreements like the Kyoto Protocol that do 
not have strong systems for compliance.6 If this evaluation is correct it is of 
course not enough to show that we are bound together politically in the way 
I have suggested above. What is needed is an argument showing that we 
have decisive reasons to secure the institutional conditions at the global 
scope through which we could collectively respond to the threat of global 
warming. It is this later normative problem that will be the central topic of 
this book.  
Theoretical analysis and empirical research in support of the claim that 
voluntary or weakly enforced international agreements are not likely to re-
sult in large scale reductions of total global GHG emissions will be de-
scribed in some detail in Chapter III. However, it is worthwhile to introduce 
the basic reasoning behind this perspective before presenting the normative 
questions this work will address. The reasoning is as follows: 
 
1) The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its most recent 
report from 2007 predicts that to avoid dangerous levels of climate 
change we have less than a decade to aggressively redirect powerful 
trends of increasing global GHG emissions and turn them into powerful 
trends of decreasing global GHG emissions.  
 
                               
5 This research is reviewed in Chapter III. 
6 The Kyoto Protocol is the name for an international agreement that commits industrialized 
countries to cut their emissions of green house gases to, on average, 5.2 % below their 1990 
levels by 2012 (there are no emission targets for developing countries). This agreement has 
been ratified by over 170 countries as of April 2008 (Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html ). 
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2) Given this very short time frame, having a realistic chance to achieve the 
extensive changes thought necessary requires the implementation of 
public policy that will create market incentives for mitigation or that will 
directly limit emissions levels.7 Here we see increasingly broad support 
in the academic literature for the view that major reductions in GHG 
emissions will require policies that can in one way or another put costs 
on these emissions (i.e. prices for the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
and other GHGs).  
 
3) The efficiency of these kinds of economic policy instruments both in 
terms of costs and ability to affect large scale reductions of GHG emis-
sions depends on the coordination of policy structures at the global 
scope. Without global coordination the costs of achieving large scale re-
ductions in GHG emissions rise significantly. Furthermore, without 
global coordination the efforts of countries that are reducing their GHG 
emissions can be undermined by a host of other countries. All countries 
that currently have significant emissions, are developing a capacity for 
large scale emissions, or could develop such capacities have the poten-
tial to undermine other nations’ mitigation efforts.     
 
4) Holding down the costs of reductions in GHG emissions is a major fac-
tor in motivating action on climate change. Likewise, ensuring that re-
ductions efforts undertaken by some actors are not undermined or made 
inconsequent by other actors is another central aspect in motivating and 
sustaining efforts to address the threat of global warming. 
 
5) The credibility of a system of coordinated and effective policies at the 
global scope aimed at generating incentives for GHG emissions reduc-
tions requires some system for ensuring compliance to such policies. 
 
6) The upshot is that efforts to significantly reduce GHG emissions cannot 
be achieved through international agreements like the Kyoto Protocol 
that have very weak compliance mechanisms. At the same time, globally 
coordinated policy arrangements that generate prices on GHG emissions 
and entail stronger compliance mechanisms require limiting the sover-
eignty of states in ways states are not currently limited.  
 
Many would argue that we face an impasse without any clear resolution. 
Immediate and effective action is necessary and requires a type of global 
coordination that will limit the sovereignty of states. At the same time when 
trying to develop proposals for how to respond to this global environmental 
                               
7 This is not to deny that a wide range of measures at many different scales will have to be 
adopted if we are to successfully change current patterns of atmospheric pollution. 
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threat we should take the state system as it currently exists to be an enduring 
fact about the world. As we will see, this impasse leads some to propose 
coordination strategies at various scales that do not limit state sovereignty 
and that have doubtful credibility. Others argue for strategies that can be 
adopted more unilaterally by states but that have questionable effectiveness. 
Some argue that we should give up on mitigation and focus instead on adap-
tation to climate change or even on entirely different problems. But what if 
we do not take the state system as it currently functions to be an enduring 
fact about the world?  
The central aim of this work is to investigate the implications in justice 
that follow from the above empirical assessment, and in this kind of norma-
tive analysis one must begin by being open to the prospect of large scale 
social or political change. An implication that stands out following the above 
empirical assessment for the political theorist is that to realistically over-
come the global collective action problems generated by any serious effort to 
mitigate climate change a supranational form of political authority is re-
quired. In other words, what is needed is some global system that could 
credibly implement and enforce compliance to public policy. These empiri-
cal conditions in turn raise a central problem for normative political theoriz-
ing on the issue of climate change. Are the reasons we have for acting in 
response to the threat of global warming, if we have any at all, strong 
enough to support a duty to accept some new form of global political author-
ity? Ought we to bind ourselves together with others in a global political 
effort that will limit the self-determination of states to some degree? These 
questions are the central research problems of this dissertation, and in an-
swering them I make a comparison between the case of global warming and 
liberal justifications of the state. 
I will argue that one can employ familiar liberal arguments for the mor-
ally legitimacy of political order to show that we do now have a duty to sup-
port a global political project that will allow us to collectively address our 
impact on the Earth’s atmosphere. If one accepts the ideas that human goods 
are dependent on establishing political orders and that individuals have 
moral reasons to accept the limits and demands of political society, then one 
should also accept my claim that the problem of global warming gives rise to 
similar kinds demands at the global scope. In other words, the grounds on 
which we could justify the moral legitimacy of states following foundational 
liberal premises also give us reasons to expand the scope at which we are 
politically constrained. The nature of the climate change problem has made 
general justifications of political order applicable to global relations.  
There is a great deal of division within liberal political thought over the 
notion of global justice. Some argue that the demands of social justice tradi-
tionally thought to be owed among members of a state are, in part or in 
whole, actually owed among all individuals everywhere. Others are sceptical 
of this dramatic broadening of the scope of distributive and political justice 
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and argue that the demands of social justice remain largely within the con-
fines of existing political communities. I will argue that even if one adopts 
the premises employed by the most influential forms of liberal scepticism to 
the idea of global justice it is clear that the threat of global warming has ex-
panded the scope of justice. More specifically, we now have a demanding 
duty of justice to create the political conditions at the global scope that 
would allow us to take decisive action to limit human induced climate 
change.   
Global political justice and the problem of political authority 
As we will see (especially in Chapter II), contemporary work in political 
theory on the issue of justice over state borders has tended to focus on dis-
tributive justice and to a lesser extent on political justice.8 The drastic con-
trasts between the chronic poverty afflicting the world’s poorer regions and 
the unprecedented wealth enjoyed in the world’s rich regions raises moral 
questions about the distribution of wealth globally. For similar reasons 
global economic relations and the fairness of their distributive effects have 
recently received a great deal of attention as problems of justice. The focus 
on distributive justice has also been at the centre of normative theorising on 
the threat of global warming.9 
Here work has tended to concentrate on questions about how to distribute 
responsibilities for burdening the costs of mitigating and/or adapting to hu-
man induced climate change between more and less developed countries. It 
is the world’s rich states that account for the majority of the GHG emissions 
currently in the atmosphere and that have enjoyed the lion’s share of the 
economic benefits from the energy use and intensive agricultural production 
that are the sources of this pollution. At the same time the growth in coun-
tries like China and India means that developing regions will soon overtake 
developed regions in total GHG emission levels. As such, on a go forward 
basis it is no longer the case that the world’s more developed regions can 
determine future outcomes for this environmental problem. 
Another central issue raised by global warming is the question of fairness 
in the distribution benefits and costs from human productivity between gen-
erations. Given our radically increasing capacity for large scale natural re-
source depletion and environmental pollution the question of what our obli-
gations to future generations are is being asked with growing urgency. Do 
we have any duties to protect the environment for the sake of people that do 
not yet exist, and if so what costs or limits to the current generation’s con-
sumption/welfare are required by justice?    
                               
8 See Charles R. Beitz, "Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice," Journal of Ethics 9, no. 1-2 
(2005). 
9 See Stephen M. Gardiner, "Ethics and Global Climate Change," Ethics 114, no. 3 (2004). 
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In this work the focus is shifted from the more studied issue of global dis-
tributive justice to the less studied issue of global political justice. More 
specifically, in arguing that global warming has created a duty to support a 
new supranational form of political authority I must address a pair of classic 
problems for political and legal philosophy. These are the justifications for 
political authority and for individuals’ political duties within political com-
munities. Traditionally the questions have been ‘is the authority exercised by 
the state morally justified’ and ‘do residents have duties to obey the law and 
support the state as a political project?’ I reflect on these same problems but 
instead ask them in the context of human relations at the global scope. The 
questions become, ‘when, if ever, are global forms of political authority jus-
tified’ and ‘can individuals have duties to support the creation of new global 
political arrangements for the sake of justice?’ 
I approach the threat of global warming in this way first because this en-
vironmental problem raises the prospect that we would need some global 
form of political order that could coordinate the actions of states in order to 
address it. As we will see this ends up being a question about whether or not 
the institution of a global political authority to secure the basic human need 
for a safe and relatively stable climate can be justifiable. Is climate change 
the kind of collective problem that could warrant the interference of coercive 
political institutions? Do we have good reasons to think that states will fail to 
achieve adequate levels of cooperation and that a supranational arrangement 
that can enforce a coordinated global strategy is necessary? When the an-
swers to these questions are yes they bring forth a set of normative problems 
regarding political legitimacy that are in important respects prior to the dis-
tributive problems noted above.   
If the threat of climate change generates collective action problems that 
appear intractable independent of some supranational form of political au-
thority then many of the principles of distributive justice we can identify for 
relations between wealthy and poor states or between generations will re-
quire some new political form of association through which they can be real-
ised. This in turn raises the subject political legitimacy at the global scope. 
What one might call ‘the problem of political legitimacy’ is the question of 
whether or not the coercion exercised by a political authority can be morally 
justified to the individuals subject to this authority. It is one thing to say that 
we would need a global form of political authority to have a reasonable 
chance at avoiding dangerous levels of global warming, it is quite another to 
claim that individuals could have duties to support the creation of such a 
global political project. One of the central problems of political legitimacy I 
will tackled is whether or not individuals around the world could have politi-
cal duties that would require them to support a supranational political re-
sponse to the threat of global warming. Another is the question of at what 
scope political decisions on how to respond to global warming must be made 
if they are to count are morally legitimate. Do sovereign states have the le-
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gitimacy to independently make public policy on the threat of global warm-
ing or must we make decision as a global collective if our policies are to be 
justifiable to those affected by these decisions?   
The traditional problems of political legitimacy remain controversial. Po-
litical theorists continue to debate if states could ever secure moral legiti-
macy for the coercion they exercise over members? Equally as debated is the 
question of what states must be like to count as morally legitimate and what 
the source of individuals’ political obligations or duties are. It will be neces-
sary to spend some time addressing these problems at the level of general 
theory in order to advance the argument of this book. Yet the reasoning I 
will put forth on these topics will aim to add to thinking about political au-
thority and legitimacy by reflecting on these issues for the global scope. 
Through the case of climate change I will show how one type of argument 
for global political duties can proceed. The level of ambition is to address 
these questions by assessing what a commitment to the basic premises and 
normative positions widely adopted in liberal political thought entail for the 
case of global warming.  
Misgivings about proposals for global political authority 
Although there is a greater focus on the notion of global distributive justice 
in the existing literature the contention that global problems or processes of 
globalisation call for new global forms of cooperation that may weaken the 
sovereignty of states is certainly not new.10 Arguments for such changes are 
advanced in the name of addressing global poverty and human rights viola-
tions, for making global trade and monetary arrangements fairer, to prevent 
species and habitat destruction, and to prevent wars. The idea of a global 
form of political authority is sometimes put forward for the specific case of 
climate change as well.11 However, the fact that we are all affected by global 
                               
10 For some contemporary examples see: Richard A. Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward 
a New Global Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), Daniele Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan 
Democracy and Its Critics: A Review," European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 3 
(2004), Brian Barry, "Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique," in Global Justice, 
ed. I. Shapiro and L. Brilmayer (New York: New York University Press, 1999), William D.  
Coleman and Tony Porter, "International Institutions, Globalization and Democracy: Assess-
ing the Challenges," Global Society 14, no. 3 (2000), David Held, "Changing Contours of 
Political Community," in Global Democracy, ed. B. Holden (London: Routledge, 2001), 
David Held, "Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty," Legal Theory 8, 
no. 1 (2002), David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalisation/Anti-Globalisation (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 2002), Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (London: 
Polity Press, 2002). 
11 For example see Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," Ethics 103, no. 1 
(1992): 65-67., Peter Singer, One World, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 
49-50. 
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conditions and processes of globalisation simply does not amount to an ob-
vious argument for introducing global forms of political authority. 
The most noticeable problem with following such reasoning too quickly 
is that states may be able to secure collective action and implement norma-
tive principles within the state system as it currently functions. Moreover, 
even when there is a strong empirical case for the view that states face a 
difficult collective action problem that makes it unlikely to achieve sufficient 
levels of some essential good, e.g. security, there remain a host of concerns 
that proposals for global forms of political authority give rise to. On balance 
the idea may not be worth the costs or risks.  
For example, a global government even if democratically controlled (as-
suming global democracy is possible) is nevertheless a form of political au-
thority that is by design highly centralised and distant from individual sub-
jects in terms of the weight of their influence on policy. Immanuel Kant fa-
mously argued that this distance would likely lead a world government to 
become either tyrannical or weak and ineffective.12 Another concern is that a 
world state might put pressure on previously self-determining communities 
to accept locally whatever form of political association that is employed 
globally, undermining a pluralism of political cultures.13 Furthermore, all 
states are characterised by and engage in what is sometimes called nation 
building in order to create a common identity among subjects. Such common 
identities, it is argued, serve to secure support for the collective political 
projects and standards of social justice among members of states.14 As such a 
global state would certainly aim towards creating some kind of common 
identity among members, which could ultimately undermine cultural diver-
sity more broadly. Strengthening a shared sense of identity at the global 
scope is not necessarily a threat to cultural difference, but the overall risk 
being appealed to is that a world government would simply be a tool for 
powerful states, cultures or elites to control the rest of the world.  
Though what I will propose is very far from a global state, the implica-
tions of an argument for supranational forms of political authority are far-
reaching. Even if the policy area under question is (and could be) limited, the 
risks involved in any genuinely effective form of global governance are 
similar to those involved in a global state. In a recent Financial Times article 
the president of the Czech Republic, Václav Klaus, echoed this concern with 
regards to efforts to coordinate reductions of global GHG emissions. Klaus 
argues that we can see “the biggest threat to freedom, democracy, the market 
economy and prosperity now in ambitious environmentalism, not in commu-
                               
12  See Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nisbet., 2nd, enl. ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 41-53, 93-130. 
13 See for example Michael Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2004), 171-89. 
14 Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 25-30. 
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nism. This ideology wants to replace the free and spontaneous evolution of 
mankind by a sort of central (now global) planning.”15  
Klaus’ comments echo familiar allegations. The push to create a global 
political response to climate change is part of a conspiracy orchestrated by 
people that value the environment over human welfare, by socialists that 
want to limit freedom and capitalism, or by western elites that want to con-
trol an increasingly powerful developing world. It is not difficult to see the 
strategic quality of such charges. One makes an assessment of what it would 
take to successfully address the problem and then one turns the solution into 
an accusation. This puts those that think we need to address the threat of 
global warming on the defensive. In the worst case a defensive debater uni-
laterally takes solutions that would require supranational arrangements off 
the table. This is a problem because, for example, it is not likely that we can 
have an effective global carbon tax scheme or a global emissions cap and 
carbon trading system without some global arrangement that weakens states’ 
sovereignty. One would expect the need for some system of enforcement to 
ensure that individual states comply with tax/cap levels. This is because in 
the absence of credible compliance mechanisms it will be difficult for states 
to underwrite confidence in such a system (see Chapter III). Yet the possible 
implications for state sovereignty do not mean that these two alternatives 
should be ruled out of hand from the outset.  
The debate strategies used by those that want to undermine efforts to re-
duce GHG emissions should not limit serious thought about how to react to 
the massive environmental challenge we appear to be facing. Nevertheless 
there is good reason to be concerned with the desirability of global forms of 
governance that are effective in implementing policies even when individual 
states attempt to avoid enforcing the policy in their territories. In addition to 
the imperative concern about whose interests would actually be guiding pro-
posed supranational political arrangements, there should be a concern that 
global forms of political authority will be embodied by institutions with their 
own inherent interests and logic. 
For example the interests of a political institution and/or its officials may 
steer it towards trying to expand the reach of its influence beyond what was 
originally envisioned. A supranational institution limited to climate policy 
could attempt to reinvent itself once major GHG reductions are achieved so 
as to continue to exercise influence and authority over states.16 We must also 
be concerned about the possibility that even when theory speaks for a supra-
national arrangement the reality of political compromise in such an institu-
tion could give results that are on the whole worse than the sum of varying 
                               
15 Vaclav Klaus, "Freedom, Not Climate, Is at Risk," Financial Times, June 13 2007. 
16 For example, one could imagine a shift of focus from the specific task of reducing GHG 
emissions to promoting sustainable development generally. This would be a much vaguer goal 
that would give more leeway for the pursuit of public policy in a broad range of areas. 
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local efforts. Likewise we must consider what a lack of political will among 
existing agents to support such arrangements means for a normative theory 
that prescribes such a global political response to human induced climate 
change. In other words, what will normative theory prescribe to individual 
agents in the climate change case given a context where others lack the will 
to cooperate? 
Many of the misgiving about the desirability of global forms of political 
authority have to do with the design of the proposed institutions. Could they 
be designed to represent the interests of all subjects in both a fair an effective 
way? Can supranational arrangements be limited to specific policy areas, 
leaving most meaningful political authority at the state level? Are global 
forms of political authority feasible at all given the scale at which politics 
would need to operate at, the diversity of interests and cultures around the 
world, and the current structure of states and international relations? In the 
next section I will speak very briefly to these questions of institutional de-
sign and feasibility. However, the body of this work will focus on a much 
more preliminary question. Are there clear moral reasons for supporting a 
global form of political authority to address the problem of climate change?  
Before we can even begin to talk about questions of institutional design 
we must know if it makes sense to say that we have a moral duty to work 
together to address our impact on the environment. If we do have such a 
duty, we must also know if we have a reason to think that accepting the costs 
and limits of a global political solution is morally required. Given conditions 
where instituting a global form of political authority is feasible, would such a 
response to the problems raised by global warming be on balance the only or 
best way to satisfy our duties to others? Simply pointing out that human 
induced global warming has connected us all together does not amount to an 
obvious reason to take on some set of demanding duties of justice so that we 
can reduce GHG emissions.  
Note that by demanding duties of justice I mean the idea that members of 
at least minimally just political orders have duties to accept a system of law 
and order, taxation to provide essential collective goods, a system for wealth 
re-distribution, and the dictates of democratically guided political institu-
tions. This is a term I will use throughout this book. Also note that the term 
demanding duties of justice indicates the political and distributive duties of 
justice we associate with, especially, a liberal democratic state generally and 
not necessarily all of the duties of justice thought to pertain in specific states.   
Liberalism and uncertainty about the demands of global justice 
That interconnectedness or interdependence are not obviously compelling 
reasons to think we have demanding duties of justice in the case of global 
warming is made apparent in the general debate over what Thomas Nagel 
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calls “the problem of global justice.”17 This problem is the philosophical 
question of whether it makes sense to think that there are if fact standards of 
global justice comparable to the standards of social and political justice we 
accept at the state level. Does it make sense to talk about global distributive 
or political justice at all? Many acknowledge the claim that a just state has a 
responsibility to ensure that its citizens do not fall below a certain living 
standard. For example, in a wealthy welfare state citizens would not accept a 
situation were those people whose earnings are in the bottom ten percent of 
income are constantly threatened by starvation. At the same time hundreds 
of millions of people living in the bottom twenty percent of world income 
suffer from food insecurity and millions die of starvation each year.18 
Wealthy countries do have the capacity to at least dramatically diminish this 
starvation. Does this mean that the world’s rich have a collective responsibil-
ity to ensure that the world’s poor have enough food in the same way a po-
litical community has such a responsibility towards its citizens? Such a prin-
ciple is one example of what one could mean by global justice, but it is not 
enough to simply point out that we can act collectively to do something to 
show that we share in a moral responsibility to actually do it. 
In the most general terms the global justice literature is characterised by 
those that claim that we are bound by demanding duties of justice at the 
global scope and those that argue that it is only given the kind of intercon-
nectedness that is found chiefly within states that it makes sense to talk about 
social justice. The argument from this dissertation makes a contribution to 
the global justice literature by advancing a thorough argument for how 
global interconnectedness can generate demanding duties of global political 
justice. The argument is developed in a manner that should be compelling 
for many of those that are sceptical to the idea. In particular the aim is to 
show that the central tenants of liberal political thought strongly support my 
cosmopolitan thesis; namely that we have duties to enter into a global politi-
cal project that would allow us to overcome the existing collective action 
problems that make mitigation of global warming so difficult to achieve.  
Cosmopolitanism denotes a host of views on relations between people at 
the global scope that have in common the notion that it is possible for each 
of us to belong to a global community in some way or another. Contempo-
rary cosmopolitan thought is often focused on the following normative ideas: 
each individual has moral worth, this moral worth is equal regardless of the 
state or community one belongs to, and these facts generate some more or 
less limited set of moral standards that are binding on everyone everywhere. 
                               
17 Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, no. 2 
(2005). 
18 See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "The State of Food Insecu-
rity in the World," (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
2006). 
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We are, according to cosmopolitans, part of a global moral community. The 
central argument of contemporary cosmopolitan political thought is that the 
demands of justice must be decoupled, at least to some degree, from the 
territorial bounds of the state. Cosmopolitanism is thus a challenge to current 
practice where we are thought, for example, to have demanding duties of 
distributive justice (e.g. social welfare programmes) within the state but not 
over state borders.  
Within the global justice literature it is liberal cosmopolitans that have 
advance the strongest arguments for this expansion of the scope of justice 
based on new kinds of global interconnectedness.19 Changes in the intensity 
and impacts of global trade and other forms of globalisation are thought to 
create a set of conventions, institutions, and patterns of interaction that con-
stitute, following John Rawls’ terminology, a global basic structure.20  This 
global basic structure must be justified to those affected by it in the same 
way traditional theories of justice require that the basic structure and institu-
tions of the state must be justified to those who are subject to the state’s au-
thority. This in turn means that relations at the global scope can be subject to 
principles of justice in the same way relations within a state are or should be.  
Appealing to changes in how we affect each other over state borders is 
only one of several ways in which cosmopolitan theories of global justice are 
advanced, and some alternative views will be described in the following 
chapter. However, for the purpose of introduction what I want to highlight is 
that arguing for expanding the scope of justice because of increased inter-
connectedness fits well with the view that when problems of environmental 
damage become trans-boundary or truly global in scope this interconnected-
ness also expands the scope of justice. On this view the territorial limits of 
states are no longer good touchstones for identifying those to whom we owe 
demanding duties justice. Furthermore, the system of sovereign states may 
not have the capacity or the legitimacy to address the environmental impacts 
we have on each other.  
At the same time one often finds dissatisfaction with liberalism among 
those that argue for standards of global environmental justice. This dissatis-
faction is apparent despite the fact liberal cosmopolitans regularly point to 
environmental degradation and its impacts as one reason for expanding the 
scope of justice beyond the territorial limits of the state.  One of the causes 
for scepticism towards liberal approaches is that despite what liberal cosmo-
politans argue many of the most notable anti-cosmopolitan theories are also 
                               
19 Prominent examples are, Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 
revised edition ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), Pogge, World Poverty 
and Human Rights. 
20 See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 125-69, 98, Thomas Pogge, Realiz-
ing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 240-73, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: 
Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 6-7. 
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advanced by liberals. In what is sometime called ‘green political theory’ one 
central problem with liberalism is that it does not clearly support the view 
that trans-border and global environmental problems generate the kinds de-
manding political and distributive duties of justice that we normally associ-
ate with a state.21 This work will be particularly focused on addressing this 
uncertainty about the implications of liberal political thought for the pros-
pects of global justice in the face of the threat from global warming.  
The prospect of global environmental justice  
Many liberal thinkers view political and distributive justice as largely or 
even exclusively about relations between people within existing coercive 
political orders, i.e. states.22 On this view individuals and even states may 
still have certain environmental or even ecological moral duties over state 
borders. However, such general moral duties might not be demanding 
enough to support the broad economic, social, and political changes envi-
sioned in much of what is prescribed by those that call for standards of 
global environmental justice. Such changes entail the kinds of demanding 
distributive and political duties that liberals tend to associate with standards 
of justice among individuals within a political order, and not with the general 
moral duties we owe to any individual. 
There are many characterisations of liberalism in green political thought 
that liberals would consider unfair. For example one finds the claim that 
liberalism entails giving preference to the interests of consumers and mar-
kets over other kinds of interests, making sharp distinctions between the 
public and the private realms, and being concerned largely with individuals’ 
rights and only secondarily with duties.23 Each of these supposed features of 
liberalism is thought to weaken the basis for requiring of individuals that 
they take full responsibility for their impacts on the environment. However, 
it is clear that liberal theories of distributive justice are not foundationally 
committed to maximizing consumption or even economic growth,24 feminist 
                               
21 Another important reason for dissatisfaction with liberalism is that its premises tend to-
wards anthropocentric principles of justice where the significant of the natural environment 
consists of its instrumental value to human animals. Here there appears to be a foundational 
divide between liberal theories of justice and, for example, political ecology. 
22 Michael Blake, "Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 30, no. 3 (2001), David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised 
Edition, Mathias Risse, "What to Say About the State," Social Theory and Practice 32, no. 4 
(2006). 
23 See Andrew Dobson, Citizenship and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), Marcel Wissenburg, "Liberalism," in Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge, 
ed. Andrew Dobson and Robyn Eckersley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
24 Frederic Gaspart and Axel Gosseries, "Are Generational Savings Unjust?", Politics Phi-
losophy Economics 6, no. 2 (2007), Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, 228-50. 
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thinkers have shown in compelling ways that a coherent liberalism cannot 
use appeals to individual liberty/autonomy to blindly support a stark and 
supposedly ‘natural’ distinctions between public an private concerns,25 and 
there does appear to be room within a liberal framework for demanding 
other regarding duties of justice as first-order concerns, especially following 
Kantian liberal thought. Still, I think we can in part understand the above 
concerns as rooted in the correct perception that following a liberal frame-
work it is not yet clear that environmental problems over borders and gen-
erations give rise to duties of justice on par with the demanding duties of 
egalitarian justice liberals argue pertain between citizens of nation-states.  
In this work I will take as my starting point an explanation for why one of 
the most widely held and strongest expressions of liberal anti-
cosmopolitanism, what Nagel calls the “political conception of justice,”26 
cannot simply be dismissed by cosmopolitans and green political theorists 
because it may fail to support desired environmental ends. The political con-
ception of justice represents one of the most important challenges to cos-
mopolitanism generally and is thus a serious challenge to viewing global 
environmental problems in terms of cosmopolitan justice. The remainder of 
the work is then dedicated to showing that in the case of human induced 
global warming the political conception of justice does have clear cosmo-
politan implications under current conditions despite what its proponents 
claim.  
The argument I will reach by the end of this book is that if one rejects 
strong partiality for the interests of the current generation, then the political 
conception of justice does entail a duty of justice to create a new global po-
litical project to address the human impact on our climate. If achieving  
meaningful levels of GHG reductions requires global institutional arrange-
ments designed to overcome exceedingly difficult global collective action 
problems, then it is only by engaging in this kind of global political project 
that we could choose to act in a way that is not unjustifiably partial to the 
current generation’s interests. In other words, it is only by engaging in a 
global political project to address global warming that we will be able to 
avoid allowing our own short-term interests to impose on people all over the 
world and far into the future damage that will seriously harm the environ-
mental conditions on which human welfare is dependent.  
Note that the aim of this book is not to advance a theory on the extent of 
our duties of justice to future generations in the case of climate change. 
                               
25 For an excellent example of this argument see Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the 
Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989). For an overview of relevant liberal feminist work on 
the compatibility of liberalism, feminism and the implications for liberal theory more gener-
ally see Ruth Abbey, "Back toward a Comprehensive Liberalism?: Justice as Fairness, Gen-
der, and Families," Political Theory 35, no. 1 (2007). 
26 Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," 120. 
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Rather, the point I want to make is that one need only accept that we have at 
least some duties to future generations in order to get demanding cosmopoli-
tan standards of political justice off the ground. More generally the work will 
show that just as a focus on gender has been used by liberal feminists to 
demonstrate that a coherent liberalism cannot lazily recognize socially ac-
cepted distinctions between the public and the private, a focus on environ-
mental interconnectedness helps us see that liberals cannot simplistically 
limit the scope of demanding duties of justice to those that share in an exist-
ing coercive political order (i.e. a state).  
The reader should note a methodological benefit of focusing on one of the 
most robust forms of liberal anti-cosmopolitan. If one can show that even 
those that hold the political conception of justice should accept a normative 
argument for a new global form of political authority in the case of climate 
change this reasoning will challenge a wide variety of perspectives on justice 
that are statist in character. By statism I simply intend to describe those 
views that can be contrasted with cosmopolitanism because they hold that 
nation-states demarcated the scope at which most or all of the demands of 
justice ought to be realised. As we will see, the cosmopolitan argument I 
advance for the case of global warming represents a serious challenge to 
statism because it entails a parallel with the argument in liberal thought gen-
erally for why we should have states in the first place.  
Because of the effects we can have on each other our ability to achieve 
human goods at all is dependent on solving a host of collective action prob-
lems by creating and/or supporting a political order that can secure essential 
collective goods such as collective security. On the statist view this is ulti-
mately why states are thought to be necessary and this necessity plays a cen-
tral role in any argument that tries to show that the authority exercised by 
states is morally justifiable. Following the political conception of justice 
there is something distinct about such political orders that give rise to far-
reaching demands of egalitarian justice between the individual members of 
states. I will argue that following the logic of the political conception of jus-
tice distinctive kinds of interconnectedness at any scope can give rise to far-
reaching demands of political justice. It is through demonstrating a convinc-
ing parallel between reasoning that is already incorporated into liberal statist 
thinking and my argument for a supranational form of political authority that 
the thesis of this book is able to advance a broadly challenging argument. 
The idea is that even if we follow what liberals sceptical to the idea of global 
justice say, the threat of global warming does expand the scope of justice to 
the global sphere. 
A note on divisible sovereignty  
Before giving a chapter by chapter outline for the rest of the book we should 
pause to observe a problem with any proposal for a supranational form of 
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political authority limited to one or a few policy areas. Such proposals regu-
larly confront immediate scepticism because they amount to the claim that 
sovereignty could be divided between states and some global authority. Di-
visible sovereignty is the idea that it is possible to have states with genuine 
sovereignty within their territory over most policy areas while for other pol-
icy areas sovereignty is located within a global or regional supranational 
institution.  
There are a host of theorists that claim it is possible to create such supra-
national institutional arrangements,27 but this notion also contradicts the 
Westphalian model of sovereignty that is often said to describe our current 
state system. On the Westphalian model, as Stephen D. Kranser notes, “Rul-
ers may be constrained, sometimes severely, by the external environment, 
but they are still free to choose the institutions and policies they regard as 
optimal. Westphalian sovereignty is violated when external actors influence 
or determine domestic authority structures.”28 The problem is then that nor-
mative proposals for supranational political authority may fail on the simple 
and familiar criterion of ‘ought implies can’ if it is the case that we must 
choose between a state system where individuals states have Westphalian 
sovereignty or a global state that exercises absolute sovereignty.  If it is not 
possible to divide sovereignty then the moral question of whether or not we 
should accept some limits on state sovereignty to collectively address cli-
mate change appears to lose its relevance. 
Following the traditional understanding of the Westphalian model sover-
eign authority over some territory can only be located in one place. When a 
state’s highest political authority does not have supreme and absolute author-
ity over its territory then genuine sovereign authority must either be located 
in some other actor (e.g. another state) or  else or there must be a lack of 
sovereignty authority in the given territory. In practice the theoretical claim 
that sovereignty must be absolute and indivisible is not born out by empirical 
evidence.29 Kranser in his widely cited study on the practice of sovereignty 
finds that, 
                               
27 See Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review," Barry, "Statism and 
Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique," Coleman and Porter, "International Institutions, 
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ing that its authority supersedes all other actors within its territory. Stephen D. Krasner, Sov-
ereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 20. 
29 See Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia (Nuclear Issues in Asia)," Interna-
tional Security 20 (1995), Krasner, Sovereignty : Organized Hypocrisy, Andreas Osiander, 
"Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth," International Organization 
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The bundle or properties associated with sovereignty - territory, recognition, 
autonomy, and control - have been understood, often implicitly, to character-
ize states in the international system. In fact, however, only a very few states 
have possessed all of these attributes. Control over both transborder move-
ments and internal developments has often been problematic....the basic prin-
ciple of Westphalian sovereignty, the autonomy of domestic structures, has 
frequently been compromised through intervention in the form of coercion or 
imposition by more powerful states, or through contracts or conventions that 
have involved invitations for external actors to influence domestic authority 
structures….Recognition has been accorded to entities that lack either formal 
juridical autonomy or territory, and it has been denied  to states that possess 
these attributes…. In the international system norms, including those associ-
ated with Westphalian sovereignty…, have always been characterized by or-
ganized hypocrisy.30  
 
For David Lake, critics that argue that sovereignty must be understood as 
indivisible “mistake a principle or myth for practice…we have nearly four 
centuries of experience with ‘slicing and dicing’ sovereignty into many 
forms.”31  
There is also a clear body of literature arguing that the authority structures 
of the states have been significantly altered by processes of globalisation and 
that state sovereignty is being deeply challenged by transnational forces and 
actors.32 Yet one need not accept claims about de facto destabilization of 
state sovereignty to advance an argument for global forms of political au-
thority. One can see states as by far the most important political actors and 
acknowledge a fundamental difference in the authority of states compared to 
transnational actors and still accept that it is possible to create institutions at 
the global scope that do fundamentally alter the authority structures of states. 
Daniel Philpott argues that new institutional developments show that inde-
pendent states need not have absolute authority in their territories.  He says, 
It is possible for an authority to be sovereign over some matters within a ter-
ritory, but not all. Today, many European Union (EU) member states exhibit 
non-absoluteness. They are sovereign in governing defense, but not in gov-
erning their currencies, trade policies, and many social welfare policies, 
which they administer in cooperation with EU authorities as set forth in EU 
law. Absolute sovereignty is quintessential modern sovereignty. But in recent 
decades, it has begun to be circumscribed by institutions like the EU, the 
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UN’s practices of sanctioning intervention, and the international criminal 
court.33 
 
Krasner rejects the “hyperglobalist’s” claim that state sovereignty has been 
significantly circumscribed by processes of globalization but accepts that, 
The EU which has both supranational authority structures such as the Euro-
pean Court of Justice and the European Parliament, and pooled sovereignty 
notably qualified majority voting in the Council for some issues is a new new 
thing. The member states of the European Union are no longer conventional 
sovereign states even though their voluntary decisions have created the insti-
tutional arrangements that have undermined their own sovereign autonomy.34  
 
The message is that creating non-absolute supranational authority structures 
and pooling sovereignty between states is a choice states could make in de-
signing global institutions.  
The kind of supranational political authority I will argue for should be 
conceived of broadly on a supranational model with a policy space limited to 
a narrow set of instruments should we choose to act on mitigating climate 
change. Thus the kind of supranational political authority I have in mind in 
this work is, for example, a credible global system that could generate global 
prices on GHG emissions through a tax scheme or through some system of 
emissions caps, emissions permits and permit trading.35 However, it is be-
yond the scope of this book to investigate issues of design further that this. 
Instead I will simply accept as a premise that it is at least possible to have 
supranational institutional authorities that circumscribe a clearly demarcated 
component of the sovereign authority states currently have. However, even if 
this premise is false and sovereignty cannot be divided it is clearly worth-
while for political theorists to investigate the idea that political authority 
over some policy areas ought to be located at the global scope.  
If sovereignty is not so divisible so as to make possible the kinds of su-
pranational institutions proposed, then I am faced with the choice of recom-
mending the maintenance of the state system or the creation a global state. 
Most theorists that argue for global forms of political authority do not rec-
ommend a global state given the concerns listed in the previous section. Yet 
as conditions change so must our assessment of the desirability of a global 
state. Thus the more good arguments there are for locating sovereignty over 
some set of issues at the global scope and the less reasons there are for dis-
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Association Annual Meeting (San Francisco: 2001), 7. 
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paraging such a development the better the argument for a global state be-
comes. If in two hundred years cultural and political differences between 
countries have become negligible the argument for a global state might be 
improved dramatically.  
The claim is certainly not that the problem of climate change takes us a 
long way towards an argument for a global state, nor am I claiming that we 
are unavoidably moving towards conditions that will demand or even facili-
tate the creation of a world government. Rather, I am claiming that political 
theorists should be continually weighing the arguments for and against this 
idea because changes in conditions change the kinds of political arrange-
ments normative theory should recommend.  Likewise, new conditions 
change the kinds of political arrangements that are possible.   
Even if one could show both that it is not possible to combine suprana-
tional institutions with a state system and that no change in circumstances 
could ever tip the normative balance in favour of a world state, there is still a 
third reason for political theorists to investigate if there is a normative argu-
ment for locating political authority at the global scope. Take for example 
the question of collective global security. The United Nations (UN) aims to 
collectively ensure that aggressive war is deterred ultimately by the use of 
military force via its member states. According to the UN Charter the Secu-
rity Council should determine when a state does and does not have a right in 
international law to use military force against another state.36 In practice the 
UN system does not have the ability to ensure that it decisions are followed. 
Furthermore, many would argue that it lacks legitimacy to exercise the au-
thority claimed in its charter or that one simply cannot achieve a system of 
collective security between states in the way envisioned by the founders of 
the UN. What is clear is that the UN system does not have sovereignty over 
global collective security policy. However, the normative claim that acts of 
military aggression must meet the standard of international legitimacy does 
seem to change the character of international relations.  
States may never find themselves subject to a genuine global authority for 
ensuring collective security, but the fact that an international norm of justifi-
cation is recognised in international law may compel powerful states to give 
reasons for their military activity in ways that states do not feel is necessary 
for other policy areas. The idea is that the kind of normative claims proposed 
in this work, even if not institutionalised, can change how we relate to each 
other at the global scope, thus making the investigation worthwhile. The 
conclusion we should draw is that the normative investigation proposed here 
does not fail to have relevance on the classic criterion of ‘ought implies can,’ 
even given a very conservative view on what is politically possible at the 
global scope.  
                               
36 Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter 
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An outline of the book 
The following chapter, Chapter II, begins by introducing some of the central 
tenants of liberal political thought and why political theory has become in-
creasingly interested in the problem of global justice.  I then describe how 
the case of global warming fits into this literature. This is followed by a 
more detailed outline of the various theoretical perspectives on the prospect 
of global standards of justice, both cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan, that 
are most relevant to this work. Having introduced the problem of global 
justice and given a review of the current state of thought, I develop a ration-
ale for why the anti-cosmopolitan ‘political conception of justice’ is taken to 
be the main opponent to my thesis. Finally I look to the established literature 
on what it would take to offer a convincing justification for the political au-
thority exercised by states so as to lay out a plan for how to go about arguing 
for a duty to support a supranational form of political authority. This chapter 
gives the necessary theoretical background for the argument to follow in the 
rest of the book.   
In liberal political thought justifying the demands of political and dis-
tributive justice to members of existing states is dependent in broad terms on 
arguments for 1) the need for political order and 2) individuals’ duties to 
support such orders. The first issue can be called the collective goods justifi-
cation of the state, and is based in the claim that we need the state to provide 
a set of goods that are necessary to virtually all individuals’ wellbeing such 
as a secure and orderly society and protection of our rights and property. 
Without a state, it is argued, such goods cannot be provided, will be under-
provided, or will not be provided in a just way. Given a successful argument 
for the need for some system of coercive political order the second issue that 
arises is how to justify to individuals that they have duties to support such 
political orders in various ways. In drawing a parallel between the way liber-
als justify the state to the case of global warming I will address the two kinds 
of arguments noted above in turn.  
In Chapter III I review the standard collective goods justification of the 
state and then along a similar line of reasoning defend the claim that we 
would need a global form of political authority in order to be successful in 
achieving significant reductions in total world-wide GHG emissions. The 
aim is this chapter is to show that there is an empirically and morally rele-
vant parallel between liberal arguments for why we need states at the domes-
tic scope and the claim that achieving serious mitigation of global warming 
would require a supranational form of political authority.  
After having reviewed the standard collective goods justification of po-
litical order in the liberal tradition, I present a theoretical account for why 
collective action is so difficult to achieve between states in the case of global 
warming. I also explain the degree to which it makes sense to compare the 
mitigation of global warming to collective goods we normally associate with 
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the state like law and order. Finally I review research on the international 
political economy of global warming, which indicates that in the absence of 
a credible system for compliance the effectiveness of coordinate global miti-
gation strategies will be inhibited. Having defended the notion of a need for 
a global form of political authority following liberal premises, the next stage 
in the argument is to show that individuals have duties to support such a 
global political project. This task is divided up into two chapters.  
As we will see, justifying political duties at any scope is itself a highly 
controversial issue. In Chapter IV I defend the theory on the source of our 
political duties that is embodied in the political conception of justice. Rawls 
calls this theory “the natural duty of justice.”37 Arguing that members of 
states have certain political duties requires defending the view that they have 
non-voluntary political duties. This is because the overwhelming majority of 
people never actively give their consent to the state’s authority in a way that 
could justify to them having political duties based on their voluntary 
choices.38 Even if one only considers liberal democratic states, we will see 
that it is widely accepted in the existing literature that consent cannot be the 
source of citizens’ political duties in states as they exist today. As such those 
that want to say that citizens have demanding duties of justice within some 
existing state but not beyond it are committed to providing a non-voluntarist 
justification of political duties. Following the natural duty theory we can, at 
a foundational level, justify demanding political duties to each member of a 
state by appealing to the fact that others need a political order of this kind. 
Thus even when we do not consent to the state or benefit from it in morally 
relevant ways, we can still have a duty to support it based on what we owe to 
other individuals. 
I will argue that we also have non-voluntary natural duties of justice to 
support a global political response to the threat of climate change. In other 
words, regardless of whether or not we consent to a global political response 
to the threat of climate change we have a duty to support this kind of supra-
national collective political effort. However, before I can advance this claim 
I must defend the natural duty approach against a set of general objections 
and alternative theories on the sources of political duties. This is the first 
purpose of Chapter IV. The second purpose is to show how the political con-
ception of justice entails a view on political duties that is applicable at the 
global scope as well. 
Finally, in Chapter V I bring together the analysis from the previous three 
chapters to advance the central positive argument of this work. I argue that 
following the logic behind the claim that individuals have non-voluntary 
duties to support existing minimally just states, we should also recognise a 
                               
37 Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, 99. 
38 See A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 1979), 57-100. 
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non-voluntary duty to create and support a new global political project for 
ensuring compliance to collective decisions on the problem of global warm-
ing. Even if those alive today do not have self-regarding reasons to address 
the threat of global warming as individuals or as a global collective, we do 
have other regarding reasons that justify taking on demanding and global 
political duties. 
I appeal to two types of other regarding reasons for supporting a global 
form of political authority in the case of climate change. First, if we do not 
create the institutional conditions at the global scope that would at least 
make it possible to prevent dangerous levels of global warming we will end 
up acting in a strongly partialistic fashion without any meaningful regard for 
the interests of future generations. By failing to create a global institutional 
arrangement that would give us a realistic chance of mitigating climate 
change we are indirectly ensuring large scale inaction for the existing gen-
erations. This kind of inaction is a form of strong generational partialism and 
is, I will argue, incompatible with the normative foundations on which the 
political conception of justice is grounded.  
The second other regarding reason for supporting a global form of politi-
cal authority in the case of climate change is as follows. It is no more legiti-
mate for a political community to unilaterally dictate to their contemporaries 
in the rest of the world its non-support of collective political responses to the 
threat of climate change than it is for individuals to unilaterally dictate to a 
domestic political community their non-support of politically ordered soci-
ety. Thus, in some circumstances existing political communities do not have 
the moral legitimacy to declare their own independence from obligations to 
support global political efforts. The claim here is that following the political 
conception of justice individuals living among members of a specific politi-
cal community do not have the moral legitimacy to unilaterally declare that 
they will live as anarchists within the shared territory. This same reasoning 
can, I will argue, be applied to relations between political communities for 
the territory they share at the global scope. The conclusion, Chapter VI, 
gives a summary of the argument in this book, highlights this work’s contri-
bution to liberal political thought on the problems of global justice and po-
litical authority, notes some limitations of the study, and finally notes how 
this work may have relevance for other debates in the global justice litera-
ture.  
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Chapter II 
 
Theorising about global political justice 
 
To get a clear picture of how I will argue for a duty to support the creation of 
a global form of political authority it will be useful to begin by explaining 
why theorising about social justice is increasingly concerned with justice 
over state borders. I will then explain how the problem of global warming 
fits into this thinking about the scope of justice. This background will enable 
me to set the stage within the global justice literature in more detail by iden-
tifying the main opposing views to my normative thesis. Finally I look to 
normative theory on the problem of justifying political authority so as to 
develop a strategy for defending the central claims of this book.   
Egalitarianism, social justice, and the problem of scope 
The central premise driving theory forward in much of contemporary politi-
cal philosophy is the moral equality of individuals.39 What political theorists 
mean when they say that individuals are morally equal can be best expressed 
by noting what its opposite would entail. A belief in inherent inequality 
could amount to seeing the lives of those from a ‘lower’ race, class, gender, 
or culture as worth less than those of some ‘higher’ ordered group. Only a 
belief in inherent inequality could justify feudalism, patriarchy and other 
forms of strict hierarchal social order based in prejudice. It is the belief in the 
inherent moral inequality between human and nonhuman animals that justi-
fies the pervasive practice of treating nonhuman animals as property and 
food.  
There is widespread disagreement in normative theory over the moral 
status of nonhuman animals, but there is very little disagreement over the 
claim that the race, gender, class, or culture a human is born into is not rele-
vant in determining the moral worth of the individual. Morally equality 
                               
39 See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 
Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, second ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
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means that there are no common inherent or circumstantial differences be-
tween people that could justify viewing some as valuable individuals that are 
owed our respect and concern but that could also justify treating others as 
things or as if they had no value at all. The moral equality premise is found 
in a range of theories of justice that can be described as egalitarian,40 and 
these now dominate mainstream academic thought on the just society.  
An intuitive reaction to egalitarianism is to focus on the gap between the-
ory and what has actually been achieved. Equal opportunity is a widely held 
ideal that enjoys support across the political spectrum in many states. Yet 
few deny that opportunity remains powerfully linked to the wealth, health 
and education parents can provide their children. Political equality or equal-
ity before the law both enjoy widespread support, but few deny that eco-
nomic power allows the rich to secure advantages in these spheres. Follow-
ing even a conservative view on how wealth within society should be shared 
it is not difficult to identify unfair distribution at some level in nearly every 
state, if not all. This claim is compelling simply by noticing that many of the 
world’s richest societies continue to fail to make sure that all resident chil-
dren have adequate food and health care. This gap between principle and 
reality is even greater if we look at what theorists take to be the practical 
implications of a genuine commitment to moral equality.  
In contemporary political philosophy a popular liberal view on social jus-
tice is that treating individuals as moral equals means that their rights, oppor-
tunities and access to resources within the political system should not be 
determined by arbitrary features of the individual beyond one’s control. This 
means that gender and race, for example, are not acceptable grounds for 
unequal treatment. Some also argue that individuals should be compensated 
for arbitrary bad luck such as being born into a poor family, disabled, or with 
few marketable talents.41 Generally speaking the idea is that a just society 
limits the degree to which chances of birth dictate how individuals’ lives go. 
An influential form of liberal egalitarianism in the academic literature is 
advanced by Rawls. He argues that inequalities in the set of resources all 
individuals need to pursue their version of the good life should only be al-
lowed when they are to the overall advantage of those in the worst off posi-
tions in society. Rawls defends this view in part by employing a hypothetical 
choice situation he calls the original position. Individuals in a society are to 
decide how to distribute liberties, opportunities, resources, and burdens 
among them, but in this choice situation they do not know their own identity. 
                               
40 Observe that the moral equality premise is strongly associated most of contemporary politi-
cal theory including, for example, the liberal, Marxist, utilitarian, and libertarian approaches. 
One cannot therefore assume much about the content of a theory of distributive justice simply 
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41 For a review of what is sometimes called luck egalitarianism see Elizabeth S. Anderson, 
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They do not know if they are men or women, of African or Asian decent, 
homosexual or heterosexual, rich or poor, lazy or industrious, and so on. 
Rawls argues that once we abstract away from individuals’ personal charac-
teristics and thus abstract away from individuals partial interests we can see 
that they would choose very egalitarian principles of distributive justice. 
Because they do not know what position in society they will have until after 
the choice is made, the only way for individuals to make sure that they have 
access the freedoms, opportunities and goods they need to lead worthwhile 
lives is to make sure that distribution in society is such that all individuals 
have access to these goods. 42  
Rawls thinks that in the impartial choice situation individuals would 
choose to distribute resource so that the person that ends up in the worst off 
position is as well off as possible.43 This is because each person in the choice 
situation may themselves end up in this position. The result is a highly egali-
tarian society, although not strict equality. What people would impartially 
choose in the original position is a controversial question as is Rawls’ own 
interpretation of egalitarianism. This debate aside, when considering this 
thought experiment we are meant to ask ourselves if we are being influenced 
by our own partial interests as opposed to advancing an objective view about 
what is in fact just when we defend existing political arrangements that place 
us in a privileged position. Inegalitarian proposals become suspect because 
we have good reason to think that in a strictly impartial choice situation peo-
ple would choose more egalitarian principles.  
There are of course numerous proposals for what it would mean to treat 
individuals with equal concern. Some call for an even more equal distribu-
tion of resources than Rawls’ theory while others call for far less. Yet what 
we can clearly see is that both familiar and far reaching visions of equality 
have clearly not been adequately realised. When we pay attention to these 
facts it is easy to be pessimistic and view academic talk about justice as uto-
pian and disconnected from reality. At the same time it is no stretch to claim 
that seeing social justice as about treating people as equals now enjoys un-
precedented social and political support.  
What were once considered legitimate reasons for denying some people 
political rights or equal treatment before the law are now considered to be 
based on offensive worldviews. For example, in many states women’s for-
mal access to education and employment and their legal status is now equal 
to men’s. Even though formal equality does not translate into actual gender 
equality, women’s circumstances have been greatly improved in many parts 
of the world. No state recognizes the treatment of individuals as legal prop-
erty even though the popular recognition of slavery is not far back in our 
history (illegal slavery and slave like conditions remain modern problems). 
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The rise of the democratic welfare state has in many countries altered that 
character of class structures to the benefit of a great many that do not find 
themselves in positions of sizeable economic or political power. In many 
countries where homosexuality used to be a criminal offence the state now 
officially endorses gay marriage, indicating a clear improvement in legal and 
social attitudes even though homosexuals continue to be marginalised in 
many respects. 
Despite the gaps between contemporary theories of justice and existing 
practice the increasing awareness of how class, gender, race, and sexuality 
shape individuals’ prospects and the rejection of such characteristics as mor-
ally relevant have made it less acceptable to treat individuals unequally on 
these grounds. Thus, even though we rightly find the pursuit of a just society 
to be unfinished business, we do see increasing support for the equal treat-
ment of individuals. Within this context the field of political philosophy has 
pressed forward in drawing implications from the moral equality premise, 
and in particular there is today a great deal of critical reflection over ine-
qualities that are not obvious to us if we only focus on our own societies.  
By accepting as a general principle that all individuals deserve some kind 
of decent or fair treatment regardless of the way they were born we are 
forced to question a world where how our lives go is hugely influenced by 
the arbitrary fact of where we are born. If we are convinced that each child 
should have an equal opportunity to achieve valuable goals in their lives, the 
acute disparity in basic security, education, and welfare between wealthy and 
poor countries forces us to ask ‘equal opportunity for whom?’ The acute 
disparity in the basic conditions of life between the world’s rich and poor is 
undoubtedly the kind of inequality a theory of justice must reflect over. As a 
result there has been an extensive amount of work in recent decades asking 
what the scope of justice is. If the treatment individuals are owed ought not 
to be dependent on arbitrary bad luck then should not one’s citizenship status 
also be disqualified as a legitimate determinate of the treatment and consid-
eration individuals are owed from others?  
Most can agree that it is unfair at the individual level that the country we 
happen to be born into has such a significant impact on our quality of life. At 
the same time the prospect of global egalitarianism can seem far too de-
manding. Could justice really require that we share our resources with all 
people in the same way we do or ought to share such resources within the 
state? One reason frequently appealed to for limiting systems of distributive 
justice to fellow citizens is that the state as a political project would collapse 
if everybody in need had access to its benefits. This concern points to the 
fact that distributive justice within the state is often defended, at least in part, 
by appealing to the ideas of mutual cooperation, mutual benefit, and recip-
rocity. Additionally, it is frequently argued that at least to a significant de-
gree the motivation to redistribute wealth within states is possible because 
members share in a culture and national identity that generates a sense of 
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solidarity. It is, some argue, too much to expect this kind of solidarity glob-
ally.  
Cosmopolitans see justice as about giving individuals equal concern re-
gardless of the state they live in. On this view if it is a shared ethnic, cultural, 
or national identity or contributing to a mutually advantageous cooperative 
political scheme that explains why demanding duties of justice pertain 
among citizens but not across borders, then the theory of justice at work is 
not genuinely egalitarian. Individuals as such are not the basic unit of con-
cern in the theory. The cosmopolitan contends that by limiting the scope of 
justice to the state one is in effect taking a non-egalitarian position and some 
unwanted conclusions about justice at the domestic scope follow.  
If we do not owe poor people around the world equal concern because 
this will not benefit us why, for example, should citizens unable to contrib-
ute to political society benefit from publicly financed services and protec-
tions? Likewise, how can one consistently claim that it is individuals that 
matter within a certain nation-state while claiming it is the group one be-
longs to that matters when we think about the demands of justice globally?44 
The risk involved in appealing to group difference in one context is that con-
sistency could force one to accept what appear to be patently unjust differ-
ences in standards of treatment between individuals based on group differ-
ences even within the state.  
Note however that in the global justice literature few disagree with the 
claim that there is something deeply morally problematic about the fact that 
the world’s rich do so little to address global poverty when we could prevent 
a great deal of suffering at only a small cost to ourselves. Anti-cosmopolitans 
that reject proposals for more demanding principles of global distributive 
justice comparable to those present in the welfare state do not usually do so 
because they think that outsiders have inherently less moral worth than in-
siders. Instead, what is at stake is how tightly connected we must be in order 
for it to make sense to say that there should be demanding duties of social 
justice between us. We may have clear moral duties to help the world’s poor 
to some degree, but outsiders do not have the kinds of claims to a society’s 
productive resources that its citizens have. It is only citizens that should 
share in a society’s resources as, in some sense, equal partners in a collective 
project. 
Some cosmopolitans accept this way of looking at the problem but argue 
that the demands of global justice are now much stronger than they have 
been in the past. This is because global interaction and interdependence, 
especially economic, increasingly give the world’s poor and less powerful 
legitimate claims to the kind of equal consideration normally associated with 
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standards of social justice in the state. On this view we are so tightly con-
nected with each other due to economic globalisation that it now does make 
sense to claim that all individuals should share in the world’s resources fol-
lowing the principles of distributive justice normally reserved for the state. 
Those that think that the nation, the state, international institutions or even 
global patterns of trade are morally relevant in determining the scope of jus-
tice argue for what are regularly called ‘associative duties.’ What I will call 
associative cosmopolitans simply think that there are forms of global inter-
connectedness that generate demanding duties of justice while associative 
anti-cosmopolitans think that the morally relevant connection is that among 
members of a state or nation. Those that think that how we are connected 
with others is not morally relevant in determining the scope of our demand-
ing duties of justice argue for non-associative duties and tend to be cosmo-
politans.45  
Climate change and the scope of justice 
In a similar fashion to the problem of global poverty, global warming also 
challenges us to reflect on the scope of justice. Concern about climate 
change is based in the broad and broadening scientific consensus that we are 
currently witnessing a dramatic increase in average global temperatures. 
These increases are thought to be caused by the release of large amounts of 
carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels and from agricultural activity 
that produces methane and nitrous oxide (together these three are the most 
important GHGs).46 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 
(IPCC) best estimate from its most recent 2007 report is that by 2100 the 
global average temperature will have risen from between 1.8ºC to 4.0ºC47 
(the full range of estimates is from 1.1 ºC to 6.4 ºC).48  The IPCC states that 
“warming of the climate system is unequivocal,” and that it is at least 90% 
certain that emissions of GHGs from human activity are causing the changes 
we are currently observing.49    
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Some expected consequences for human wellbeing are increases in river 
run off and water availability in high latitudes and some wet tropical zones 
of 10 to 40%, and decreases in already dry regions of 10 to 30% by 2050. 
Already by 2020, 75 to 250 million people in African are expected to suffer 
from increased water scarcity. Changes in temperature and water availability 
are expected to reduce the land area suitable for agriculture and shorten the 
growing season in some African areas. At the same time, “yields from rain-
fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50%.”50  Crop yields are also ex-
pected to decrease by a third in Central and South Asia, while they can in-
crease by 20% in East and Southeast Asia. The IPCC predicts decreased 
water availability for those regions dependent on melt water, which amounts 
to 1/6 of the world’s population.51 This effect combined with increasing 
population and economic pressure is expected to have a negative impact on 
freshwater availability in much of Asia, particularly in the large river basins, 
which could affect a billion people by 2050.52  
One of the most dramatic effects of global warming is its impact on sea 
levels, which the IPCC expects to rise between 18 and 59cm by the end of 
the century.53 By 2080 sea level changes are predicted to increase by millions 
the number of people affected by flooding each year.54 More extreme 
weather events such as heat waves, floods, droughts, and cyclones are fore-
casted as well, and these events are expected to lead to increased death and 
disease.55 Other health impacts include “increased burden of diarrhoeal dis-
ease; the increased frequency of cardio-respiratory diseases due to higher 
concentrations of ground level ozone related to climate change; and, the 
altered spatial distribution of some infectious disease vectors.”56 Developing 
regions will tend to be more vulnerable to negative impacts due to a combi-
nation of a greater share of the most negative climate impacts, greater de-
pendence on climate sensitive natural systems, and less capacity for adapta-
tion.57 Another major impact is the forecast that 20-30% of all plant and ani-
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mal species assessed by the IPCC will be at a higher risk for extinction given 
an average global temperature increase of 1.5-2.5 ºC.58 
There is increasing debate over whether the IPCC is too conservative in 
its warnings and it is easy to build much more detailed and thoroughly catas-
trophic scenarios from the available literature.59 Yet, what is important to 
recognize is that climate change has a real potential to threaten human secu-
rity and welfare all over the world. This kind of environmental problem is a 
clear case of a collective problem that is not limited in its territorial scope. 
What matters for the intensity of global warming is the total amount of 
GHGs emitted into the atmosphere not where these pollutants are emitted 
from. One country’s emissions affect all countries meaning that both the 
causes and effects of human induced global warming force us to think about 
the ways we are interconnected over states borders. The threat to human 
wellbeing is so large it also seems clear that it is the kind of problem that a 
theory of justice must address.  
The distribution of natural resources and protection of the environment 
are among the central concerns that constitute our thinking about the condi-
tions necessary for securing human goods. Our use of and impact on the 
environment within the state clearly impacts on the ability of a society to 
achieve collective security, productiveness, and even freedom and equality. 
The distribution and consumption of environmental goods within a given 
territory can be either fair or unfair, and the need for guiding principles of 
justice in this realm is strengthened by the fact that we have the capacity 
deplete or pollute environmental goods in ways that undermine their value to 
us. Few would deny that it is legitimate for a state to address in terms of 
justice activities within its borders that could, for example, alter the entire 
coastline. Likewise, the potential that we could dramatically alter conditions 
along many coastlines all over the world is the kind of threat to human wel-
fare that a theory of justice must pay attention to.  
Global warming plainly raises questions about the territorial scope of jus-
tice, but in order to fully understand this problem we must also notice that 
asking what we ought to do about global warming also broadens the tempo-
ral scope of our thinking about justice. Emission of CO2 from the burning of 
fossil fuels is a problem because it has a very long atmospheric life and be-
cause much more CO2 is being introduced into the atmosphere than is being 
removed by natural processes. This means that CO2 is accumulating in our 
atmosphere and it is this accumulation from past emissions that is the major 
cause of warming at any given point in time. These physical facts mean that 
even if we start to dramatically reduce our output of CO2 (currently output 
levels are accelerating rapidly), the concentration in the atmosphere will 
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continue to rise as will the impact of the green house effect on the global 
mean temperature.60  
Limiting increases in the global mean temperature to between 2.0 ºC and 
2.4 ºC above pre-industrial levels requires a long term stabilization of at-
mospheric CO2-eq at 445 to 490 ppm.61 Warming above this level is often 
claimed to pass a threshold were the most significant impacts from climate 
change will start to occur. However, achieving this goal would require that 
emission levels go down 50 to 85% below 2000 levels by 2050, with total 
global emissions peaking in 2015.62 This is a huge challenge given that under 
current conditions it is expected that demand for energy in 2030 will be 60% 
higher than in 2000 with the increase in CO2 emissions levels actually being 
more than 60% over the same period.63   
Achieving the kind of mitigation the IPCC thinks is possible is dependent 
on us acting now to dramatically reduce emissions because waiting to make 
emissions cuts would require that we take on even more aggressive cuts later 
to achieve comparable results. Furthermore, inaction in the near to medium 
future ultimately increases the levels of warming we are committed to re-
gardless of subsequent GHG reductions.64  The important point to notice is 
that because of the cumulative nature of atmospheric pollution and long time 
lags before we see the full impacts of mitigation efforts, any costs we take on 
now will benefit future generations much more than they benefit us. As we 
will see in the following chapter, in terms of economic cost benefit analysis 
many researchers would argue that the current generation will not gain eco-
nomically by investing in global warming mitigation. Looking to Figure 1 
we can clearly see the generational aspect of the problem.  
                               
60 David Archer, "Fate of Fossil Fuel CO2 in Geologic Time," Journal of Geophysical Re-
search 110 (2005), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 
2001: Synthesis Report. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 16-17. 
61 IPCC, "Mitigation of Climate Change - Summary for Policymakers," in Climate Change 
2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assess-
ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ed. B. Metz, et al. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 23. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See, International Energy Agency, "World Energy Outlook 2006: Summary and Conclu-
sions," (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2006). 
64 IPCC, "Mitigation of Climate Change - Summary for Policymakers," 23. 
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Figure 1: The intergenerational character of global warming mitigation 
 
Source: IPCC, Special Reports on Emissions Scenarios, Regional Impacts of Climate Change, Land Use, 
Land-Use Change, and Forestry, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer, 
Aviation and the Global Atmosphere (2nd) (IPCC Secretariat, 2001), figure 5-2.  
What is required is a dramatic response over the short term that is not just 
about cutting current emissions but that turns around a powerful trend of 
increasing emissions. At the same time the desired effects in terms of tem-
perature stabilisation occur relatively far into the future, and stabilisation of 
some of the most important negative impacts arrive in the distant future. 
Furthermore, although more and more studies conclude that the costs of 
mitigation are clearly outweighed by the gains when measured over periods 
spanning several centuries, the point in time at which the benefits of aggres-
sive mitigation efforts outweigh costs could be quite far into the future.65 If 
such is the case mitigation efforts will be a net economic cost for existing 
agents. This temporal aspect of the global warming problem leads to some 
clear questions about how we should think about justice across generations.  
The idea of intergenerational justice like that of global justice follows 
quite naturally from individualistic and egalitarian theories of social justice. 
If we owe each individual some level of concern simply because of their 
status as our moral equals then there seems to be at least a good case for the 
idea that we owe future generations some moral concern as well. On its face 
                               
65 See for example, Y. Okan Kavuncu and Shawn D. Knabb, "Stabilizing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions: Assessing the Intergenerational Costs and Benefits of the Kyoto Protocol," Energy 
Economics 27, no. 3 (2005). 
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it would be odd to claim that all people living today matter a great deal while 
the people that we have every reason to think will exist in the future do not 
matter at all. With our relatively new found technological capacity to dra-
matically worsen future environmental conditions for life on earth (e.g. 
through nuclear war or unsustainably depleting environmental goods) we 
now face the prospect of a few wealthy regions and a few wealthy genera-
tions consciously imposing huge costs on the rest of the world and on future 
people. This has lead philosophers to ask how we ought to distribute the 
costs and benefits of resource depletion and economic productivity over 
generations. If we ought to give equal concern to individuals what must we 
do, if anything, for future generations?  
As we have seen I will argue that there is now a duty to create a new form 
of political authority at the global scope so that we can both make collective 
decisions on how to address the problem of human induced global warming 
and credibly enforce these decisions. In developing this argument I will ap-
peal to both the global and intergenerational aspects of the global warming 
problem. However, before explaining how I will argue for this position it 
will be helpful to give a more detailed sketch of approaches to the problem 
of global justice relevant to my thesis.  
Review of the global justice debate  
The purpose of this section is to place my argument in relation to a set of 
dominant approaches to the problem of global justice that are committed to 
the moral equality premise. Those theories that adopt this normative premise 
must address the seeming discrepancy between the norm that it is individuals 
that matter in a theory of justice and the norm expressed in existing practice 
where we owe compatriots demanding duties of justice but not outsiders. 
The perspectives outlined below are classed along two dimensions. The first 
dimension is whether the theory sees demanding duties of justice as gener-
ated when we are associated with others in some morally relevant way or if 
moral equality is on its own thought to be sufficient to generate such de-
mands of justice (non-associative). The other dimension is whether the scope 
of justice is viewed to be global/transboundary (cosmopolitan), or if it is 
viewed to be largely limited to the state (anti-cosmopolitan).  
The result is a focus on three general perspectives: non-associative cos-
mopolitanism, associative cosmopolitanism, and associative anti-
cosmopolitanism. One could imagine several views that could be placed into 
the category of non-associative anti-cosmopolitanism, which I do not in-
clude. One example is the view that individuals do not have duties of justice 
to any other individual regardless of whether or not they reside in the same 
state or not. In general this fourth category will be characterised by scepti-
cism to the idea of justice at a foundational level or alternatively to the idea 
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that individuals are moral equals. Both of these views are strongly rejected 
by liberals, but it is beyond the scope of this book to defend theorising about 
justice against these kinds of scepticism. 
Although I am chiefly concerned with the idea of global political justice, 
the easiest way to sketch the central approaches in the global justice litera-
ture is to report on how various theories relate to the prospect of global dis-
tributive justice. There has been extensive analytic focus on the problem of 
global poverty and on how to think normatively about economic relations 
between states. It is on these questions that we find more developed propos-
als for what justice at the global scope is. Even though it is necessary to fo-
cus on distributive justice in presenting the existing literature we will still be 
able to identify general reasons for defending some view on the problem of 
global justice over another.  
Non-associative cosmopolitanism 
Following non-associative cosmopolitanism the simple fact that we share an 
equal moral status with others is sufficient to generate demanding duties of 
distributive justice.66 The implication is that we are bound by principles of 
distributive justice that apply globally and it is not shared political institu-
tions, economic interaction, interdependence, a shared culture or any other 
limited form of group identification that gives rise to such duties. On the 
strict version of non-associative cosmopolitanism it is only our shared moral 
status that should be considered in working out principles of distributive 
justice and all individuals should be subject to the same standards of dis-
tributive justice regardless of where they live. On the moderate view our 
shared moral status generates demanding duties of distributive justice that 
apply to all individuals, but at the same time there can be separate systems of 
distributive justice that apply to members of, for example, a state because 
they shared in a cooperative political system.67  
Global utility maximisation 
The clearest example of non-associative cosmopolitanism comes from utili-
tarian thinkers because the utilitarian does not see the problem of global 
justice as a special case distinct from other questions of morality or justice. 
                               
66 Note that I am only interested in those approaches to the problem of global justice commit-
ted to the premise that the inherent moral worth of each individual is equal. This entails reject-
ing some forms of realist scepticism about global justice that are based in a general scepticism 
about the existence of moral standards. For developed criticisms of sceptical realist ap-
proaches to the problem of global justice see Beitz, Political Theory and International Rela-
tions, Allen Buchanan, "Beyond the National Interest," Philosophical Topics 30, no. 2 (2002), 
Pogge, Realizing Rawls, Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights.  
67 Simon Caney, "International Distributive Justice," Political Studies 49: 975-76. 
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The existence of separate states, individuals’ identifications with different 
nations or cultures, and any other associations individuals have do not, on 
their own, tell us how we ought to distribute valuable goods. These group-
ings are only significant to the degree that they contribute to or detract from 
the goal of maximizing utility, usually measured following some metric of 
wellbeing. For the utilitarian the simple fact that all individuals share an 
equal and inherent moral worth necessitates counting each individual’s well-
being equally in working out what justice demands of us.  
Peter Singer argues that a commitment to moral equality requires of indi-
viduals that they give assistance to others whose life is threatened. One may 
have to ruin their Armani suit to save someone from drowning or let a newly 
purchased and uninsured Porsche be destroyed by an oncoming train to save 
a baby left on the tracks.68 Yet once we accepted the intuitively appealing 
arguments for taking on these costs Singer points out that we are daily faced 
with the choice to save many people from death due to starvation and disease 
by donating amounts that are much less than we spend on our own luxurious 
lifestyles. Utilitarianism does not aim at strict equality of resources or even 
wellbeing. Still, given that nearly three billion people live in conditions of 
extreme poverty while one billion live in conditions of unprecedented afflu-
ence, any serious attempt to maximise human wellbeing in current condi-
tions will require the world’s wealthy to redistribute significant resources to 
the world’s poor.69 
Cosmopolitan libertarianism 
Libertarianism and especially Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory70 has clear 
cosmopolitan implications. If justice means that we must above all respect 
each individual’s liberty and negative rights, then the libertarian might object 
to the existing state system because it tenaciously restricts the free move-
ment of people, especially from poor to wealthy regions.71 A focus on just 
entitlements at the global scope could support arguments for radical global 
redistribution depending one’s historical analysis of existing global disparity 
and on whether or not one begins from the premise that the physical world 
                               
68 See Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 
3 (1972), Singer, One World. 
69 For examples of utilitarian approaches to the problem of global justice see: Richard J. Ar-
neson, "Consequentialism vs. Special-Ties Partiality," Monist: An International Quarterly 
Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry 86, no. 3 (2003), Richard J. Arneson, "Do Patriotic 
Ties Limit Global Justice Duties?", Journal of Ethics: An International Philosophical Review 
9, no. 1-2 (2005), Robert E. Goodin, "What Is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?", 
Ethics 98 (1988), Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Singer, One World, Peter K. 
Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996). 
70 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
71 Onora O'Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 129. 
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was originally unowned, collectively owned, or owned in equal shares.72 In 
general what we owe to others is not determined by the fact that we share in 
some institutional arrangement; instead institutional arrangements must be 
designed to ensure that all individual’s rights to self-ownership are not vio-
lated. 
Non-associative global egalitarianism 
Liberal egalitarian theories of justice have traditionally tended to view dis-
tributive justice as applicable between individuals that share in a collective 
political project like the state. However, some liberal egalitarians maintain 
that our shared moral status on its own generates demanding duties of dis-
tributive justice independent of institutional arrangements. Joseph Carens 
argues that “Citizenship in the modern world is a lot like feudal status in the 
medieval world. It is assigned at birth; for the most part it is not subject to 
change by the individual’s will and efforts; and it has a major impact upon 
that person’s life chances.”73 The implication of this analogy is that justice 
requires the elimination of the effect of citizenship status on life chances.  
One specific recommendation is that the country we are born into ought 
not to dictate the opportunities we have to pursue a variety of goods such as 
careers, lifestyles, education, wealth, etc…. 74 To the degree that a system of 
separate states frustrates the individual’s entitlement to equality of opportu-
nity non-associative egalitarian cosmopolitanism will call for new global 
institutional arrangements.75 Another argument is that there is no good rea-
son to limit impartial reasoning about distributive justice to those that belong 
to the same state.76 Any such limitation would privilege the status-quo of 
institutional boundaries while these same boundaries should be viewed as 
arbitrary when it comes to each individual’s moral worth.  
A common argument based on these premises is that we should aim to 
maximise the position of those in the worst-off position globally following 
                               
72 For a succinct assessment of libertarian cosmopolitanism see Charles R. Beitz, "Interna-
tional Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought," World Politics 51, 
no. 2 (1999). 
73Joseph H. Carens, "Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective," in Free 
Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money, ed. Brian 
Barry and Robert E. Goodin (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 26. 
74 See Simon Caney, "Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities," Metaphilosophy 
32, no. 1/2 (2001), Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 2002), Chapters 3 & 4. 
75 See Caney, "Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities," 114, Joseph H. Carens, 
"Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders," Review of Politics, no. 49 (1987). 
76 David A. J. Richards, "International Distributive Justice," Nomos 24 (1982). 
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Rawls’ egalitarian theory of distributive justice within the state.77 This would 
entail radical changes such as sweeping transfers of wealth from developed 
to developing regions, continuous redistribution at the global scope, and 
implementation of an institutional scheme with enough authority to imple-
ment redistribution at the global scope. Like with utilitarianism, the global 
implications following from egalitarianism under current conditions tend to 
be very demanding. Yet liberal egalitarianism is principally committed to 
maintaining relative equality between individuals and could thus be more 
demanding than most other proposals over both the short and long term.  
Human rights as global positive duties 
Another perspective on the problem of global poverty has been to argue that 
we all have a duty to ensure that human rights to basic needs or to capabili-
ties are satisfied.78 Broadly speaking a human rights approach will have a 
notion of 1) what human rights are and 2) who has a duty to ensure their 
satisfaction. When it comes to 2) the question is if states should be chiefly 
responsible for guaranteeing their citizens’ human rights or if wealthy states 
and individuals have positive duties to help ensure that every individual’s 
rights are satisfied regardless of where they live? The later view is clearly 
distinct from current practice even though one could argue that wealthy 
states and their citizens appear at least to be more open to the idea of positive 
duties to provide for the basic needs of the global poor and address situations 
where states fail to protect their citizens’ human rights.79 A theory of justice 
commitment to promoting human rights around the world may only argue 
that we ought to do what we can when it is not a significant cost to our own 
interests.80 Alternatively some are for establishing institutional arrangements 
that will ensure human rights satisfaction for all.81  
Associative cosmopolitanism 
For this second group of theories demanding duties of distributive justice 
comparable to those that exist in a just state are only generated when we are 
                               
77 This is a rejection of Rawls’ own view where demanding duties of distributive justice apply 
only between individuals that share a political order. See, John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
78 On the capabilities approach and global justice see Martha Craven Nussbaum, Frontiers of 
Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2006), 273-315.  
79 One might for example view the reasoning behind the UN Millennium Development Goals 
in this way (see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/) 
80 Allen Buchanan, "Recognitional Legitimacy and the State System," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 28, no. 1 (1999). 
81 See Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 66-69, Henry Shue, "Mediating Duties," Ethics 98, no. 4 (1988). 
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interconnected in some morally significant way.82 Associative cosmopolitans 
argue that global conditions do demonstrate the kind of interconnectedness 
that is required. This theoretical perspective tends to follow in a liberal egali-
tarian tradition, especially the work of Rawls, were equal treatment means 
equal treatment within an institutional scheme. Following this tradition it is 
not any inequality or any instance of unfairness that gives rise to standards of 
distributive justice but rather inequalities that can be traced to the effects of 
legal, social and political structures. Several liberal cosmopolitans employ 
Rawls’ basic structure concept meaning ‘‘the way in which the major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the divi-
sion of advantages from social cooperation,’’83 while others employ a weaker 
standard of morally relevant association.84  
Basic-structure cosmopolitanism 
On this view there are a global set of conventions, agreements and institu-
tions85 that determine the distribution of valuable goods, burdens, and claims. 
The global basic structure is in need of justification to affected individuals 
because it is comparable in moral significance to the state’s basic structure 
and because it produces unjust inequalities.86 For example, Beitz and Thomas 
Pogge have both argued that due to the level of modern economic globalisa-
tion we can no longer claim that state boundaries demarcate independent 
systems of social cooperation. Given these new conditions, they argue that 
the Rawlsian original position ought to apply to all of the world’s people as 
individuals deliberating on how this global basic structure should be de-
signed.87  
The distributive implication, as Pogge puts it, is that “we can justify our 
global institutional order only if we can show that the institutional inequali-
ties it produces tend to optimize (against the backdrop of feasible alternative 
                               
82 This perspective is not opposed to the idea that our shared moral status is sufficient to 
generate some moral duties to address the needs of the global poor. However a distinction is 
made between the moral duties we owe to any individual and the more demanding duties of 
justice owed to those with whom we are associated in some morally relevant way.  
83 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 7. 
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85 For example the UN General Assembly and Security Council, the World Trade Organiza-
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and praxis for collective security, trade, disease control, and environmental protection. 
86 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 255-59. 
87 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 129-54, Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 256-
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global regimes) the worst social position.”88 Critics argue that it seems coun-
terintuitive to say that in the absence of economic interaction the global rich 
have no distributive obligations to the global poor while once these two 
groups voluntarily enter into a trade agreement that is mutually beneficial 
(even if the terms are much better for the stronger partner) the relative ine-
quality suddenly has profound distributive implications. Qualifying the ar-
gument by requiring significant and extended cooperation also seems coun-
terintuitive. Imagine we have one poor region with limited global trade and 
another poor region that has more significant and extended trade with a 
wealthy region. Why should this second and potentially better off poor re-
gion be the beneficiary of a system of wealth redistribution and not the first 
region?89  
The liberal anti-cosmopolitan argues that if in the absence of economic 
interaction there is no positive duty to redistribute resources and nothing 
about economic interaction on its own leads to requirements of distributive 
justice, then economic relations cannot suddenly generate demanding duties 
of global justice.90 Alternatively, non-associative cosmopolitans argue that 
we have an intuitive reservation about the relevance of economic interaction 
because it is not levels of trade but rather inequality itself that gives rise to 
global distributive demands.91 Note however, that what Beitz and Pogge have 
in mind is not simply some level of economic cooperation that triggers 
global distributive justice.  
Beitz argues that globalisation not only “involves a pattern of transactions 
that produce substantial benefits and costs; their increased volume and sig-
nificance have led to the development of a global regulative structure.”92 The 
argument is that because the global economic order entails rules that benefit 
some and disadvantage others it does make sense to require that these bene-
fits and costs are distributed fairly among all those that operated within the 
regulatory system (i.e. distributive justice). Pogge in his more recent work 
emphasises how the existing global basic structure harms people living in 
                               
88 Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 247. 
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poor countries, and how the global rich are morally implicated in this harm 
by supporting an unfair basic structure that is to their own benefit. The em-
phasis on harm allows Pogge to argue that addressing the conditions of the 
global poor should be at the top of our moral ‘to do list.’ This is because the 
negative duty not to harm is widely viewed in liberal theory as more easily 
justified and likely stronger than the positive duty to assist strangers.93  
Pogge also argues that a national economic order is justifiable to its mem-
bers only if two criteria are met, 1) the “rules can be changed without vio-
lence by the will of a majority that is affected by these rules” and 2) “avoid-
able life-threatening poverty” is prevented.94 According to Pogge, a global 
economic order must satisfy at least one of these two criteria if it is to have 
any chance of being justifiable to individuals, while the current global basic 
structure fails on both counts. Note however that it is doubtful that Pogge 
thinks that an economic order is justifiable if it does no more than prevent 
death due to poverty. Instead his more recent arguments should be under-
stood as an attempt to show that even if we take only the most minimal re-
quirements for justifying a basic economic structure we must accept the 
normative argument for major reform of global economic relations to better 
serve the interests of those in the worst off positions.95  
Associative anti-cosmopolitanism  
Associative anti-cosmopolitanism is the central line of thought from within 
the liberal tradition among those that think that demanding duties of justice 
are only morally necessary between citizens of a state. Much of this work 
falls under what Beitz calls “social liberalism.” This is the view that each 
state is responsible satisfying its citizens’ claims to social justice, and over 
borders it is relations between states not individuals that are of interest. Prin-
ciples at this scope are about ensuring the conditions that allow states to 
provide for their citizens free from unjustified external interference.96 Note 
that this perspective is still compatible with the idea that we have humanitar-
ian duties to all others because we are moral equals, and many argue for very 
demanding duties of this sort. What is rejected are standards or egalitarian 
social justice applied to the global scope. 
                               
93 See Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 91-116. 
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95 See Thomas Pogge, "Real World Justice," Journal of Ethics: An International Philosophi-
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The Law of Peoples  
Rawls’ in his The Law of Peoples argues that global justice consists of those 
principles that would be agreed to between peoples on impartial terms. Thus, 
he proposes two separate original positions, one between individuals to iden-
tify principles of justice for the domestic basic structure and one between all 
liberal and decent illiberal peoples97 for the international basic structure. 
Peoples would, according to Rawls, agree to the following list of principles: 
 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independ-
ence are to be respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no rights to instigate war 
for reasons other than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of 
war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable 
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and so-
cial regime.98 
 
Rawls rejects outright the proposition made by Beitz and Pogge that his 
brand of liberal contractualism should lead one to recommend implementa-
tion of a global systems of distributive justice.99  
For Rawls the inappropriateness of global distributive justice is based, 
broadly, on two arguments. First he claims that it is the domestic basic struc-
ture and not the global basic structure that is chiefly responsible for a coun-
try’s level of wealth and for the institutional distribution of benefits and bur-
dens that have a meaningful effect on individuals’ lives.  Because the global 
basic structure does not play an important role in either of these two realms 
there is no need, Rawls argues, to justify it to individuals. Yet, because the 
global basic structure does potentially affect a peoples’ interest in self-
determination it must be justifiable on impartial grounds to peoples.100 
Rawls’ theory on just relations between peoples will be described in much 
more detail in Chapter V. However, one can summarise a second argument 
for not treating the global basic structure like domestic one’s that follows 
from Rawls’ concern with the interests of peoples.  
On Rawls’ account a global system of distributive justice is problematic 
because it could limit the self-determination of peoples and could also result 
                               
97 For the definition of decent illiberal peoples see Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 64-70.  
98 Ibid., 37. 
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100 Ibid., 61-62. 
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in the imposition of liberal standards of justice on all peoples. Rawls consid-
ers such outcomes as unjust because he argues that in international relations 
we must be prepared to respect some reasonable pluralism about how to 
organise political society. Just as a liberal state must make room for indi-
viduals’ illiberal but reasonable conceptions of the good, international soci-
ety must make room for a plurality of reasonable views about the good po-
litical system (i.e. liberal and decent non-liberal peoples).  
Rawls’ second argument against global distributive justice does not mean, 
as some critics have proposed, that he thinks that poor non-liberal peoples 
would prefer not to get wealth transfers from rich liberal states.101 Rawls’ 
point is a general one about what it means to respect peoples’ political auton-
omy, and it does appear to be a strong argument if we start with the premise 
than an international theory of justice should take the interests of peoples to 
self-determination to be of primary concern. To see this we need only think 
about what the institution of a global system of distributive justice would 
entail from the perspective of different peoples. 
Liberal peoples would not readily accept large scale distribution to poor 
states for the sake of the global worst off if receiving states institutionalised 
an illiberal hierarchy of human value that systematically placed women or 
minorities in the worst off position. It seems more plausible that support for 
global distribution of resources in wealthy liberal states would actually de-
pend on their being at least institutionalised pressure on illiberal states to 
give their citizens a liberal standard of equal concern. Furthermore, even 
though illiberal peoples might accept a liberal system of global distributive 
justice when they are one of the beneficiaries, they might reject the system if 
they were to be one of the benefactors. This kind of double standard would 
not be acceptable to other peoples. As such, implementing a global system of 
distributive justice would put pressure on illiberal political systems to adopt 
liberal standards of justice both globally and domestically. Thus, it does 
seem appropriate to suggest that a system of global distributive justice could 
threaten a pluralism of political cultures and the political autonomy of peo-
ples.102 For this reason I find that Rawls’ critics do better when they simply 
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challenge his principled defence of illiberal political cultures and abandon-
ment of individualism at the global scope.   
The political conception of justice 
This is a form of non-cosmopolitan social liberalism that does not incorpo-
rated Rawls’ analogy between toleration of individuals’ illiberal conceptions 
of the good and illiberal political cultures. As Nagel puts it, one can follow 
Rawls’ “political conception” of justice were egalitarian distributive justice 
is something that exists between individuals only when they share in the 
kind of strong political association embodied by the state in a way that still 
sees individuals, not peoples, as the basic unit of concern.103 On the political 
conception what is centrally relevant to a theory of justice is that the state 
represents a coercive legal system that encompasses society’s political, so-
cial and economic institutions. This system, Michael Blake notes, “differs 
from mere ground rules of voluntary cooperation, since the legal system is 
able to do something distinctive—to use coercive force in determining what 
entitlements and holdings will be defended and held.”104  Even if there is a 
global basic structure with institutions and conventions that regulate global 
trade, there is no global coercive political authority that must be justified to 
all individuals. Distributive justice is activated within states only as part of 
what is needed to justify the non-voluntary and coercive nature of the state to 
individuals as moral equals.  
It is important to notice how this approach emphasises the coercive nature 
of the state as the source of claims and burdens within a system of distribu-
tive justice instead of fair reciprocity in any kind of cooperative venture. 
Founding principles of distributive justice on reciprocity is often taken to 
lead to a problem for non-cosmopolitan egalitarians. Reciprocity is one clear 
non-communitarian way to argue for limiting claims and burdens of justice 
to a specific group when we only have the morally relevant exchanges with 
group members and not outsiders. Limits on the scope of our reciprocal du-
ties are not due to giving outsiders less moral consideration but rather due to 
having different kinds of relations with different groups of people. However, 
using reciprocity to limit the scope of justice by appealing to simple resource 
exchange and cooperation in society does not clearly support the idea that 
distributive justice applies in the state but not beyond it. 
First, those who contribute few resources or none at all within a state do 
not appear to have a basis on which to make claims to equal concern in de-
termining the distribution of their society’s wealth. Reciprocity based in 
simple economic/social cooperation tends to undermine the defence of egali-
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tarianism in the domestic scope. At the same time resource exchanges exist 
over state borders. Thus appeals to this kind of reciprocity do not appear to 
succeed in limiting the scope of justice to the domestic sphere. The political 
conception of justice avoids these problems because it does not tightly tie 
individuals’ claims in distributive justice to simple resource exchange and 
cooperation.105  
On the political conception of justice it is each individual citizen’s status 
as subject to and, in some sense, author of the non-voluntary and coercive 
authority of the state that explains why they are owed equal consideration in 
assessing the terms of distributive justice within political society.106 Citizens 
of states are expected to accept the authority of the state so as to secure this 
large scale cooperative scheme, the provision of collective goods, and the 
political order that is need to make the former two possible. It is the sum of 
individual members’ support for the state and its dictates that is ultimately 
the source of political order. All those that benefit from the state depend on 
their fellow citizens to underwrite this system of coercive political authority. 
It is this kind of interdependence that gives rise to the demand that each in-
dividual should be given equal concern in determining the fair distribution of 
the goods and burdens produced by this system of cooperation.  
What we end up with is an argument based in fair reciprocity among 
those that underwrite the state’s authority combined with an argument about 
what individuals are owed as moral equals in order to justify to them the 
limits on their liberty involved in political society. The political conception 
thus emphasises the Rawlsian argument that justice is about relations in spe-
cific types of political institutions. What is deemphasised is Rawls’ view that 
the interests of peoples and protecting their self-determination gives us deci-
sive reasons to limit the scope of justice to existing political communities. 
Why the political conception of justice is a particularly strong challenge to 
liberal forms of associative cosmopolitanism will be explained in more detail 
in the following section. However, I will first round off this sketch of the 
global justice debate with another form of anti-cosmopolitanism that does 
focus on the interests peoples in rejecting demanding duties of global justice.  
Anti-cosmopolitan liberal nationalism 
This group of non-cosmopolitan theories of justice stress Rawls’ second 
anti-cosmopolitan argument, namely that justice at the global scope should 
be about the protection of national self-determination for decent political 
cultures. This view is not in conflict with liberal principles according to what 
is sometimes called liberal nationalism because a liberal system of social 
justice is dependent on individuals enjoying a distinct culture and sharing a 
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national identity within their political community.107 Individuals, it is argued, 
can only make meaningful choices from within a specific cultural context 
and a sense of shared identity is necessary for the enjoyment of individual 
autonomy.  
David Miller argues that national belonging is not morally arbitrary but 
rather morally central to the question of distributive duties. There are other 
regarding moral duties at the global scope such as the duty of assistance, but 
our duties of justice to co-nationals take priority and are much more exten-
sive than any duties we owe to outsiders. Miller’s appeal to national identity 
rather than simply coercive institutions gives him a straightforward argument 
for why we ought not to create global political arrangements that bind all 
together in a common system of distributive justice. Any such global system 
would undermine legitimate partiality for co-nationals, which in turn would 
undermine the preconditions for the realisation of liberal social justice. Na-
tional community and a shared identity are necessary conditions for solving 
“collective action problems, to support redistributive principles of justice, 
and to practice deliberative forms of democracy.’’108 Furthermore, because 
individual autonomy is dependent on a cultural context there is a universally 
justifiable argument for partiality to the interests of co-nationals.109 
I will conclude this review of the global justice debate here. There are of 
course many other perspectives that are not introduced in this short review 
(e.g. Marxist perspectives).  I have focused on approaches to the problem of 
global justice that I take to be most relevant to the normative questions 
raised by the threat of climate change and to the liberal thinking on social 
justice that my thesis departs from.  
A cosmopolitan political conception of justice 
I will argue for a duty to create a new form of global political authority with 
a mandate to adopt and ensure compliance to policy responses to the threat 
of global warming. The normative argument on which this prescription is 
based is that human induced climate change has connected us to others at the 
global scope in a way that gives rise to demanding duties of global justice. 
Thus, the argument is a form of associative cosmopolitanism. Note however 
that I do not make the negative argument that it is only when we are associ-
ated in a certain way that duties of justice can arise. Instead I focus on sim-
                               
107 For arguments in defence of liberal nationalism see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizen-
ship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, David 
Miller, "National Self-Determination and Global Justice," Citizenship and National Identity 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), Miller, On Nationality, Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).  
108 Miller, On Nationality, 98. 
109 See Miller, "National Self-Determination and Global Justice." 
 60 
ply making one type of positive argument for a global associative duty of 
justice. In defending this position I set out from the debate described above 
between associative cosmopolitans (e.g. Pogge and Beitz) and associative 
anti-cosmopolitans (e.g. Rawls, Nagel, Blake, Risse) over the conditions 
under which there can arise demanding duties of global justice.  
My strategy, like that of many associative cosmopolitans, is to demon-
strate that the kind of interconnectedness that we have at the state level and 
that gives rise to a set of demanding duties of justice is also present at the 
global level. However, I do not try to defend the idea of global associative 
duties by pointing to the expansion of global cooperation or international 
institutional bonds. Instead I advance the familiar Kantian position that when 
our fates are bound up with each other’s agency in ways that motivate the 
need for political institutions, respecting others as moral equals can give rise 
to a duty to join with others in coercive political projects.110 Thus it is not the 
fact that there is a fairly weak global attempt at cooperation to address global 
warming (i.e. the Kyoto Protocol) that is generating demanding duties of 
justice. Instead it is a set of reasons for collective action that exist independ-
ent of existing institutional arrangements and independent of whether or not 
we are currently cooperating. What this way of reasoning amounts to is the 
claim that on a proper understanding of the political conception of justice the 
theory is not nearly as anti-cosmopolitan as its proponents claim.  
How the political conception of justice can be cosmopolitan even when 
we do not share in coercive political institutions at the global scope is, I will 
show, made clear in the global warming case. Addressing the threat from 
global warming requires that we tackle a set of exceedingly difficult global 
collective action problems both between states and between generations. It is 
these facts and the nature of the potential impacts from global warming that 
give rise to a duty of justice to create a new global political project to ad-
dress the human impact on our climate. This argument parallels the argu-
ment in liberal thought generally for why we should have states in the first 
place. Namely, that because of the effects we can have on each other our 
ability to achieve human goods at all is dependent on solving a host of col-
lective action problems by creating and/or supporting a political order that 
can secure essential collective goods such as collective security. Following 
the political conception of justice there is something distinct about such a 
political order that gives rise to far-reaching demands of justice.111 I will 
show that following the normative ideals embodied in the political concep-
tion of justice we can also have demanding duties of justice among those 
with whom we ought to share thick political institutions. 
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Why the political conception of justice?  
Those that reject the moral significance of existing borders or institutions in 
determining the scope of demanding duties of justice will of course be recep-
tive from the outset to the claim that the norm of state sovereignty may need 
to be weakened if this is necessary to address serious global environmental 
problems. However, if I can successfully make a case for demanding duties 
of justice at the global scope following the normative premises accepted by 
associative anti-cosmopolitans I will have proposed an argument that should 
be compelling or at least challenging for a number of perspectives that are 
sceptical to the idea of global justice. More importantly, the political concep-
tion of justice is one of the most important challenges to liberal cosmopol-
itanism and thus to the cosmopolitan thesis of this book. This is because it 
appears to succeed in justify limits on the scope of justice along what are 
admitted to be arbitrary political boundaries, and because it defends this anti-
cosmopolitanism based on premises and arguments widely shared by liber-
als. The familiar liberal principles employed in the political conception of 
justice are: 1) individualism, 2) reciprocity, and 3) voluntarism.  
Individuals as the foundational concern in theories of morality or justice 
The political conception departs from contemporary contractualist theories 
of justice of the sort advanced by Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, Brian Barry, Na-
gel and Beitz.112 In general terms contractualism tries to weigh individuals’ 
partial interests against the recognition that from an impartial perspective 
each individual matters equally. The goal then is to identify some reasonable 
balance between partial interests and moral concern for others.113 As such, 
the political conception of justice does not deny demanding duties of global 
justice by claiming that standards of justice are simply an expression of na-
tional, culture, or racial bonds. Individuals are the basic unit of normative 
analysis. The argument from the political conception is that any time indi-
viduals share in a set of political institutions that have the authority to dictate 
the terms of social cooperation (as is the case with states) demands of social 
justice apply.114 
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Reciprocity  
The force of the political conception is in that it offers a liberal defence for 
having different normative standards between individuals within a state 
compared to those for relations over state borders. On this view we owe 
moral consideration to all others, which entails humanitarian duties. How-
ever, demanding duties of justice apply only among those that share in a 
coercive political order like the state. Actually satisfying humanitarian duties 
would certainly require the world’s rich to do much more than they are today 
for the world’s poor.115 Still, this humanitarianism does not require that out-
siders be treated as if they had claims that are equal to those of insiders when 
determining how to distribute liberties, rights, opportunities and resources 
available in any given political society. On the political conception this dis-
tinction does not violate liberal principles because it is fairness and reciproc-
ity among those that must accept the coercive nature of regulation within the 
state that gives rise to demanding duties of justice. This kind of fair reciproc-
ity simply does not apply between members of different states because they 
do not share in a coercive political structure.  
In general the appeal to reciprocity is powerful because it is a central part 
of the standard argument within liberal political thought for why we should 
accept demanding duties of justice within the state.116 On this view the duties 
of citizenship are rightly viewed as demanding, but these demands can be 
motivate in terms of fair reciprocity for the goods political society provides 
and the contributions fellow citizens make to help secure these goods. Be-
cause the argument for reciprocity gets off the ground as soon as individuals 
contribute their part to underwriting the political authority of the state (i.e. 
by accepting this authority), it is able to coherently defend egalitarian stan-
dards of distributive and political justice among nearly all the state’s mem-
bers while at the same time excluding non-members from equal claims with 
this system of justice. This is justifiable simply because individuals outside 
of the state are not asked to underwrite a state’s political authority or to ac-
cept its dictates in the same way insiders are.  
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Following liberal premises there is no good reason for why some indi-
viduals should be given more consideration than others in determining how 
the benefits of such an order should be distributed. Furthermore, of necessity 
the dictates of the state are not voluntary for any individual member. Some 
standard of egalitarian justice among members is necessary to justify the 
coercive and non-voluntary nature of the state to individual subjects. On this 
view we all have a negative moral duty not to undermine the states people 
depend on but we do not have positive political duties to support each politi-
cal community in the same way members have such a duty within their own 
society.117 Thus the kind of reciprocity appealed to in the political conception 
of justice does not arise between individuals over borders.  
Cosmopolitans often note that some contemporary forms of global gov-
ernance, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), impose limits on 
what states can do, and that these arrangements are more extensive than sim-
ple treaties between states. The WTO is characterised by compliance mecha-
nisms that are underwritten by most of the world’s states, although we must 
note that the implementation of penalties (i.e. trade sanctions) for WTO rules 
violations are not imposed collectively but by the state(s) that win a com-
plaint hearing against another state via the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body.118 Associative cosmopolitans take the development of the modern 
global trade regime to be one clear example for how global institutional con-
ditions are similar enough to those within states to give rise to similar stan-
dards of justice. However in defending different stands between these two 
realms the political conception of justice is pointing to actual differences 
between states and global institutional arrangements as the morally relevant 
ones for when demanding duties of justice are appropriate.  
Nagel notes that arrangements such as the WTO are “set up by bargaining 
among mutually self-interested sovereign parties,” and that it is states that 
are responsible to their citizens for the content of such agreements not the 
global institution.119 The implication is that demanding duties of egalitarian 
justice arise only in “a form of organization that claims political legitimacy 
and the right to impose decisions by force, and not to a voluntary association 
or contract among independent parties concerned to advance their common 
interests.”120 But what is the difference between claiming political legitimacy 
over individuals and a collective of states that claim to have the legitimacy to 
demand of member states that they comply with a set of international rules? 
The claims of WTO member states are certainly based in principles of fair 
reciprocity.   
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The difference is that the claim to political legitimacy means that the state 
is thought to have the moral authority to use coercive force to ensure that 
individual residents do what is required of them so as to secure the political 
order members depend on (e.g. obey the law and pay taxes). On this view, 
within states or at least in just states individual subjects have a political duty 
to support the collective political project and states have political legitimacy 
in exercising sovereign authority to secure this support. Attempts at non-
support (e.g. disobeying the law) are failures to satisfy the political duties 
one owes to fellow members. I will spend much more time working out 
these ideas and objections to them in Chapter III, but what is important to 
note here is that the WTO does not claim for itself this kind of political le-
gitimacy.   
Compliance in the WTO is about making sure members follow the agree-
ments they chose to make with other states and to act in the spirit of the 
agreement. There is no pretence of moral authority to use coercive force so 
as to ensure that all states 1) support the collective project in the first place 
or 2) continue to support it. Even though it is enormously costly for a state, 
non-support of the WTO does not give other participating states a legitimate 
reason to use coercion and states can unilaterally choose to exit the WTO.121 
There is no political duty on the part of states to support the WTO beyond 
what is embodied in the agreements they have already made. A state’s citi-
zenry does not fail in some political duty owed to the international commu-
nity by not supporting the WTO as a political project, although we can say 
that participating states have committed themselves to follow the terms of 
exit within the agreement.  
The heart of the difference between states and the WTO is thus not the 
presence of compliance mechanisms as such, since both do engage in disci-
plinary instruments in securing rule following. Rather it is the combination 
of a system of compliance with that claim that individual subjects have po-
litical duties to support the collective political project. This stronger form of 
membership is descriptive of what is expected from citizens of a state but is 
not, it is argued, descriptive of the principles on which the WTO is based. Of 
course it may be the case that this distinction it is not factually correct. It 
may be the case that as a collective the states that make up the WTO take 
themselves to have the moral authority to do more than ensure compliance to 
agreements but to also coerce in the name of universal support for the politi-
cal project. If this is empirically true of what the WTO member states actu-
ally do then those that advance the political conception of justice would have 
to agree that demanding duties of justice pertain in this arrangement. Yet 
there does seem to be a clear element of voluntarism in the WTO that is not 
present in the state, and a clear difference in the content and means of the 
WTO’s compliance system. By pointing to actual and morally relevant dif-
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ferences between domestic basic structures and the global basic structure the 
political conception of justice challenges all forms of cosmopolitanism based 
on the likeness of global conditions to domestic ones.    
Voluntarism 
We can now see that the third way in which the political conception chal-
lenges liberal cosmopolitanism; namely because the theory is not in princi-
ple anti-cosmopolitan. If we had supranational forms of political authority it 
would also make sense to talk about global standards of justice.122 However, 
Nagel makes it clear that global forms of political authority must exist prior 
to any suggestion of demanding duties of global justice. He says,    
Justice is something we owe through our shared institutions only to those 
with whom we stand in a strong political relation…. Furthermore, though the 
obligations of justice arise as a result of a special relation, there is no obliga-
tion to enter into that relation with those to whom we do not yet have it, 
thereby acquiring those obligations toward them. If we find ourselves in such 
a relation, then we must accept the obligations, but we do not have to seek 
them out, and may even try to avoid incurring them….the requirements of 
justice themselves do not, on this view, apply to the world as a whole, unless 
and until, as a result of historical developments not required by justice, the 
world comes to be governed by a unified sovereign power.123 
 
If we were to choose to create a global form of political authority there 
would also be demanding duties of justice at the global scope, but this choice 
could not itself be required by justice. States may have very good reasons for 
creating global forms of political authority, but a political society rightly 
exercises self-determination when it comes to decisions on expanding the 
scope of political obligations (e.g. as has been the case with the EU member 
states).124  
Those that advance the political conception of justice must provide a non-
voluntarist justification for the associative political duties individuals are 
thought to have within states. This is because the overwhelming majority of 
people never actively give their consent to the state’s authority in a morally 
relevant way.125 The position is one of non-voluntarism for existing states (or 
at least those states that are minimally just) but voluntarism for any new 
institutional arrangements of this kind.126 Treating the two cases differently 
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does appeal to the liberal view that our obligations to others should be 
founded, as far as is possible, on voluntary consent.  
A central characteristic of liberal political thought is the high value placed 
on individual liberty and as a result liberals adopt a presumption in favour of 
individual freedom from coercion. This presumption causes a problem for 
justifying the state because states are necessarily coercive. Liberals have 
appealed to a range of consent based justifications for the state in order to 
reconcile the combined commitments to liberty and the need for political 
order. If individuals consent to the authority of the state then the coercion 
involved in the political order is not a violation of individuals’ liberty or 
autonomy. Justifications of states along these lines have been offered by 
appealing to direct, tacit and even hypothetical consent. As we will see in 
chapter III, such attempts fail to amount to a successful consent based justi-
fication of states as we know them, and there is no pretence to a consent 
based justification of the state following the political conception of justice. 
But this does not mean that voluntarism is abandoned.  
Nagel argues that the “search for legitimacy can be thought of as an at-
tempt to realize some of the values of voluntary participation, in a system of 
institutions that is unavoidably compulsory.”127 To do this one appeals to 
justifications for political order that aim to show that it would be unreason-
able to choose not to have coercive political orders, “even though the choice 
cannot be offered.”128 The difference at the global scope is, according to the 
political conception, that the choice to limit political legitimacy to the state 
or expand it to supranational institutions actually can be offered. Political 
obligations within existing states cannot be based in voluntarism but in mak-
ing political association as voluntary as possible we should accept that fur-
ther expansions of the scope of our political duties should be based on the 
voluntary choices of individuals through their political communities.  
A global natural duty of justice 
By advancing the argument that there is a moral duty to create and support a 
new global political project to address the problem of human induced global 
warming I have committed myself to a non-voluntarist argument for global 
political duties that derives its moral force from something other than recip-
rocity. If we have under current conditions a duty to create a new form of 
political authority at the global scope we must have this duty independent of 
what we do or do not consent to. Furthermore, if there is now a duty of jus-
tice to create such a supranational political authority it cannot be a reciprocal 
duty for two reasons.  
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The first reason is that reciprocal political duties are duties that are only 
owed within political orders we have benefited from in some way. This is 
why fair reciprocity is thought to generate demanding duties only within the 
state in which we have membership and why we do not have nearly as ex-
tensive positive duties to support the functioning of other just states as we 
have in our own state.129 Because there currently is no supranational political 
institution to address the problem of global warming we cannot logically 
have a reciprocal political duty to support such a project.  
Second, even if there were such a supranational arrangement those in the 
current generation could not have a reciprocal duty to support it because we 
could not benefit from it in the morally relevant way. Normally the idea that 
an individual subject has a duty based in fair reciprocity to obey the law and 
pays taxes is dependent on the individual receiving things that they benefit 
from in a self-regarding sense. I now have a duty to help support my state’s 
public education system because I once benefited from it and continue to 
indirectly benefit from its existence. But in the case of global warming any 
costs we take on now to address the problem, including the costs involved in 
creating a supranational political authority, will not lead to comparable bene-
fits for us in terms avoided climate change. The benefits from acting to ad-
dress global warming cannot generate a fair play reciprocal duty because 
almost all of what we can do today is for the benefit of future generations. 
Thus the only way to get the argument for the proposed supranational politi-
cal authority off the ground is to appeal to some kind of non-reciprocal duty 
that is largely other regarding.  
As I have explained in this chapter, if either the argument for limiting the 
scope of justice based on reciprocity within existing political orders or for 
voluntarism in expanding the scope of our political duties to others are true, 
my contention that we can have a duty to enter into supranational political 
project to address the problem of global warming is undermined. However, I 
will show that once we have a better understanding of the reasoning em-
ployed to support non-voluntary duties within the state it becomes obvious 
that we cannot simply rule out the possibility of non-voluntary and other 
regarding duties to create political institutions at the global scope. Non-
voluntarism for existing institutional arrangements but voluntarism for any 
institutional arrangement that does not yet exist is as position that will not 
hold given the normative commitments embodied in the political conception 
of justice. Rawls himself makes it clear that following the contractualist jus-
tification of the state on which the political conception of justice is based 
non-voluntary political duties cannot rest solely on an argument from fair 
reciprocity. This line of reasoning has implication beyond the state. 
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The claim I will advance is that global warming has activated what Rawls 
calls the “natural duty of justice.” 130 This duty “requires us to support and to 
comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us 
to further just arrangements not yet established….”131 Rawls advances this 
argument because he comes to realise, rightly I think, that received benefits 
cannot justify to individual members the kinds of political duties they are 
thought to have in non-voluntary states. Instead one must appeal to a natural 
duty at a foundational level to account for all members having non-voluntary 
political duties within these kinds of political orders.132 Natural duties are 
moral duties we owe to others that are not based in some commitment we 
have voluntary taken upon ourselves or in obligations generated due to bene-
fits we have received from the efforts of others.  For example, we have a 
natural duty not to be cruel to others. A natural duty of justice is a specific 
occurrence of such duty and is a non-voluntary and other-regarding duty to 
enter into or support a political order because others depend on these politi-
cal institutions to secure essential goods.  
This reasoning will be explained in detail in Chapter IV. However what is 
important to notice here is that if justifying non-voluntary political duties in 
existing states does not rely solely on consent or reciprocity but also rests on 
non-voluntary and non-reciprocal other regarding duties then one cannot 
simply point to the lack of a global form of political authority to rule out the 
possibility that we could have global duties of justice under current condi-
tions. If the natural duty of justice is foundational in justifying to individuals 
that they ought to accept the demands of political society within the state 
then we must at least be open to the prospect that this same natural duty 
could generate duties to support the creation of new, even global, political 
projects. I will use the natural duty theory of political duties to argue that the 
problem of global warming has generated a global natural duty of justice to 
support a global political project that could address the human impact on the 
atmosphere.  
Before moving on to the next section it is worth pausing to notice why I 
argue for global political duties and not just a system of what is now com-
monly called global governance, i.e. an international system of agreements 
charged with coordinating states efforts to achieve common goals. For ex-
ample, the WTO system coordinates global trade policy and is, many would 
argue, one of the strongest forms of global governance given its compara-
tively strong system for ensuring compliance among member states. What I 
propose is something more than what we find in the WTO because I do not 
only argue that we need an international agreement with a compliance sys-
tem that will limit state sovereignty. I also argue that even though we do not 
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currently have this kind of supranational arrangement political legitimacy 
already resides at the global scope. 
On my thesis non-support for the institutional conditions from which we 
could mitigate global warming amounts to a failure to satisfy our duties to 
others.  In other words, political legitimacy for the issue of global warming 
can only be fully realised at the global scope and this makes the issue one of 
global justice instead of international coordination. When I argue for a 
global form of political authority as opposed to global governance I am indi-
cating this normative distinction. The problem of climate change has shifted 
some part of what states could previously have legitimate political authority 
over to the global scope.  
The compliance scheme in a global political effort to address the threat of 
climate change could be quite similar to that of the WTO, although likely 
more collective in character than the practice of letting individual states im-
pose trade sanctions on partners found to be in violation of WTO rules. 
States could underwrite such a global political effort with various forms of 
coordinated trade sanctions. The most important difference from the WTO 
following the political conception of justice would be at a normative level. 
Non-support on the part of individuals and their political communities for 
the project of intensified coordination of global trade rules is not on the po-
litical conception an example of moral failure to satisfy what is owed to oth-
ers in global relations. However, non-support of global efforts to address 
climate change is considered to be this kind of moral failure following the 
interpretation I will offer.  
Does this in turn mean that states could legitimately use coercive trade 
sanctions or even military force to compel non-cooperating states to join the 
global political project I am proposing against their consent? I will not be 
able to address this question in this work and can only indicate that I cannot 
imagine a plausible justification for the use of military force. The case for 
economic sanctions is probably less clear cut, but it must be stressed that the 
argument from this book cannot be taken to indicate answers to such ques-
tion one way or another. What should be emphasised is that my argument is 
focused on a specific kind of normative issue that despite raising the above 
kind of questions is clearly delimited from it. The aim of this book is to 
demonstrate that the problem of climate change has generated conditions at 
the global scope that give rise to demanding duties of global justice. More 
specifically the aim is to show that those liberals that are sceptical to the 
prospect of global justice in the absence of global forms of political authority 
ought not to be sceptical in the case of global warming. Thus the point I 
want to make is that in this case we do have duties to create a global form of 
political authority and that these political duties of justice are not founded in 
consent or reciprocity.  
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How to justify political authority and political duties 
In this section I outline a general approach to for showing when political 
authority is morally justified and for when we have political duties to sup-
port a coercive political system. To do this we must look to the well estab-
lished body of thought on the justification of the state. It is here that we can 
identify what kinds of arguments would amount to a justification for some 
form of political authority and for political duties to support or create such 
an authority. I will then outline how I will apply these standards of justifica-
tion to the global warming case.  
Political philosophers should ask themselves two distinct questions in 
thinking about whether the political authority of a state can be morally justi-
fiable. Can we justify the need for a state and do individuals have duty to 
obey the state? These two questions are often conflated in discussions on the 
moral foundations or lack there of for the authority exercised by political 
institutions and it is quite natural to do so. As soon as we ask if the state is 
justified we must ask ourselves, ‘justified to whom.’ However, we cannot 
simply assume that a successful normative argument for why we need the 
state also shows that individual subjects have a duty to obey the state. Nor is 
a successful rejection of the claim that individuals have political duties 
enough to show that the authority exercised by the state is not morally justi-
fied.  
Interestingly the dominant academic view increasingly appears to be that 
following liberal premises the vast majority of individuals do not have po-
litical obligations within existing states. This position is based on the norma-
tive assessment that individuals could only have obligations to obey the state 
by voluntarily consenting to its authority and that states as we know them are 
non-voluntary for most subjects.133 Following such an assessment individuals 
do not have a clear moral reason to obey the dictates of the state because it is 
the state that gives them, although we can have other moral reasons to do 
what the state dictates.  
Even among those that do not think that individuals have political obliga-
tions within states many maintain that the state can still be morally justified 
in using coercion. One version of this argument is that although one does not 
have a duty to obey the state it would be wrong to obstruct a just state exer-
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cising legitimate authority.134 Given this possibility and the current nature of 
the academic debate we have good reason to keep the justification of the 
state and the justification of political duties separated. Advancing just one 
kind of justification will not be viewed as a compelling argument for the 
other kind of justification given the current state on thought on this subject. 
Defining political duty  
Before continuing with the issue of how to go about justifying political order 
and political duties it is important to first explain what I mean when I say 
that someone has a political duty to obey the state. On the definition I will 
use one has a political duty to obey the state when there is at least a prima 
facie duty to obey. This means that we have a duty when there is a strong 
presumption in favour of obeying even though we allow for the possibility 
that other moral considerations can, in specific cases, override the require-
ment to support the state.  
The idea of a prima facie political duty is based on the intuition that when 
a state dictates something that is deeply immoral, such as killing off a group 
of innocent residents, one cannot be morally excused for supporting the pol-
icy simply by pointing to one’s general political duty to support the state. 
Others insist that individuals can only be said to have genuine political du-
ties when they have a duty to obey the state in a content independent fashion, 
i.e. regardless of what it dictates. The concern here is that if subjects are 
justified in disobeying the state based on personal assessments on whether or 
not they should obey then we have undermined to some extent the idea that 
individuals have reason to obey the state simply because it is the state that 
dictates something. The problem is that contingent obedience appears to 
ultimately undermine the moral authority of the state to use coercion or the 
threat of coercion to ensure that an individual subject obeys even when he 
does not think he ought to.  
Joseph Raz in his important work on authority argues that, 
the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person 
involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with rea-
sons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he 
accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and 
tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply 
to him directly.135  
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Raz’s project asks when if ever I am better able to act on reasons I have by 
accepting a political authority’s directives as authoritative for me in a con-
tent independent fashion. The questions of interest for this work are a bit 
different. What I ask instead is whether or not we can have non-voluntary 
duties to accept the demands of justice within exiting states (i.e. political 
duties). Likewise, can we have non-voluntary duties to create coercive po-
litical institutions that ought to apply to us? If there are other regarding natu-
ral duties of justice to accept the demands of political society my conclu-
sions are centrally relevant to Raz’s question about authoritativeness. Natu-
ral duties of justice are one class of reasons for action that individuals have. 
However, one can theorise about the existence of these kinds of reasons for 
accepting political duties without having to give definitive answers on Raz’s 
question about content independence and a political institution’s status as 
authoritative for individual subjects in this sense.136  
It is because I do not aspire to contribute to the debate over content inde-
pendence and authoritativeness that I simply define having a political duty as 
at least entailing that one has strong moral reasons to obey the dictates of the 
state because it is the state that makes them.137 This clearly leaves an opening 
for the prima facie conception of political duties. If leaving such an opening 
means that I have not provided an accurate definition of political duty we 
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can still say with confidence that having a duty to obey the state except 
given extra ordinary and weighty overriding moral considerations is some-
thing much more than not having a duty to see the state’s commands as gen-
erating any special reasons to obey at all. Thus, if it can be shown that we 
have such a duty to support the creation of a supranational political authority 
we will have demonstrated that we have a demanding duty of global justice 
even if the terminology I use is rejected.    
The two tasks of justification  
John A. Simmons offers an informative distinction that can be used to clarify 
what it would take to 1) justify the need for political order and 2) to justify 
that individuals have political duties within such an order.138 He argues that 
when we try to justify political authority we are trying to show that “some 
realizable type of state is on balance morally permissible (or ideal) and that it 
is rationally preferable to all feasible non-state alternatives.”139 Once this 
issue is settled we still must ask when, if ever, individual subjects have a 
moral obligation or duty to support and obey a particular political authority. 
Simmons calls this second issue the problem of moral legitimacy and says a 
state’s legitimacy is, 
the complex moral right it possesses to be the exclusive imposer of binding 
duties on its subjects, to have its subjects comply with these duties, and to use 
coercion to enforce the duties. Accordingly, state legitimacy is the logical 
correlate of various obligations, including subjects’ political obligations.140 
 
The first line of argumentation examines what it is about what the state does 
and how it does it that makes it a candidate for having moral legitimacy. 
What is required here is an argument that shows that we need the state in 
some morally relevant way. The second line of inquiry asks what it is about 
the relationship between individual subjects and the state that generates for 
an individual subject a moral duty or obligation to accept the dictates of the 
state. Here the question is what, if anything, could justify the claim that indi-
viduals ought to obey the dictates of some actual state.  
In general Simmons’ distinction is a useful one for organising the various 
kinds of arguments a liberal justification of political authority and individual 
political obligations/duties must employ. However, notice that Simmons 
claims that “political obligation” is the “logical correlate” of a morally le-
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gitimate political authority. As we will see in Chapter IV, Simmons thinks 
that we only have political obligations if we perform some act that indicates 
our informed consent to a specific political authority.141 Thus, what Sim-
mons is really saying is that informed consent is the logical correlate of the 
state’s moral legitimacy. However, the claim that we only have political 
obligations when we consent to an authority is a normative argument. Logic 
cannot show us that these are correlated and what is required instead is an 
argument for why individuals can only have political obligations if they con-
sent to them. 142  I will argue for non-voluntary duties to obey the state and 
will use the term political duties, leaving the term political obligations for 
voluntarist justifications of state authority. What we want to investigate is 
whether morally legitimate political authority is the normative correlate of 
political obligation (consent), political duty (natural duty), or not correlated 
at all.  
Another modification is also in order. When Simmons says that justifying 
a state involves showing that it is rationally preferable to all non-state op-
tions he is appealing to a public goods justification of the state. This will be 
described in some detail in the following chapter. However, it is enough here 
simply note that the public goods justification is based on the claim that cer-
tain cooperative goods central to human wellbeing can only be achieved if 
there is a political authority that can ensure that cooperation is a dominant 
strategy for most individuals, ultimately through the use of coercion. The 
theory of public goods uses the familiar assumption in economic theorising 
that one of the central motivations agents have is rational self-interest, and 
boils down to the idea that individual self-interest gives most a reason to 
want some set of goods that can be produced through cooperative social 
order. However, in the absence of political institutions self-interest also un-
dermines effective cooperation in large scale societies.  
What is important to note here is that there is no moral argument flowing 
from this economic analysis of the state that demonstrates that the only kinds 
of goods we need the state for are those that are rationally preferred by each 
individual in this self-interested way. On could imagine such a normative 
argument but when defining the tasks involved in justification we must at 
least allow for the possibility that needing the state means needing it to pro-
vide collective goods that are vital for most individuals’ wellbeing. This 
opens the possibility to argue that we can justify political duties by also ap-
pealing to what is reasonable in moral terms instead of relying exclusively 
on self-interested reasons.  
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With these two small modification of Simmons’ original distinction we 
have now clearly identified two distinct tasks involved in developing a nor-
mative argument for the moral legitimacy of some system of political author-
ity. First it is necessary but not sufficient to show that there is some collec-
tive good we need the system of political authority for, such as collective 
security, because the good cannot be provided adequately without such po-
litical institutions. Second we must show that individuals have a ‘moral 
ought’ to support and obey the system of political authority. In arguing for a 
new form of political authority at the global scope I will for each of these 
tasks first review liberal justifications at the state level, particularly those 
favoured by proponents of the political conception of justice. I will then 
draw a parallel to the case of global warming.143  
The first task in the process is fairly straight forward. I begin in Chapter 
III by outlining the collective goods argument for why we need a state and 
then argue that a similar collective goods argument applies at the global 
level for the case of mitigating human induced global warming. Research on 
how to provide what are often called global public goods covers a broad 
range of global collective action challenges that exist across state borders. 
For many of these challenges it is not regularly argued that global forms of 
political authority are required to provide the good. However, I do defend 
the view that achieving meaningful reductions in GHG emissions is 1) a 
global public good and 2) is hampered by the kind of collective action prob-
lem that requires a global system for assuring compliance to collective pol-
icy initiatives. Undertaking the second task of justifying political duties to 
support such a global political project is more complicated.  
Defending the natural duty theory of political duties 
Here my strategy will essentially be the same as with justifying the need for 
political authority in that I will draw a parallel between political duties 
within a just state and my argument for a global natural duty of justice. 
However, in arguing for these political duties it will be necessary to spend 
more time addressing the preliminary question about why we should think 
that individuals have political duties at any scope. The idea of non-voluntary 
political duties is itself highly controversial and requires that the problem be 
tackled in two separate chapters.  
As we have seen, my argument for non-voluntary and other regarding 
moral reasons to accept the costs involved in creating a global political sys-
tem will be based in the notion of a natural duty of justice. This is the idea 
that treating others as moral equals requires that we accept political duties 
within the state. I argue that following this theory we can also be morally 
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required under certain conditions to support the creation of a political author-
ity that ought to apply to us. In debates over the source of political duties in 
the state the natural duty of justice faces a host of powerful criticisms, par-
ticularly from voluntarists and those that think that political duties are foun-
dationally based in principles of fair reciprocity. In Chapter IV I argue that 
neither the voluntarist nor the reciprocal fairness arguments are sufficient at 
the level of general principle to justify political obligations or duties (i.e. 
within state or otherwise). Instead, I argue that we can only justify such du-
ties by including an appeal to a natural duty of justice.  
The aim of defending the natural duty approach against objections from 
voluntarism and reciprocity has two main purposes. One is that I will be able 
to use this discussion to argue against general liberal scepticism towards 
global justice from those that advance different theories on the source of 
political duties. As we have seen, some of the most convincing forms of 
liberal scepticism to the idea of demanding duties of global justice are based 
in the ideas that such duties could only be generated by voluntary consent or 
that such duties could only arise once the same kinds of reciprocal relations 
that exist between citizens of a state come into existence at the global scope. 
The argument from Chapter IV cuts off these kinds of objections to the pros-
pect of global justice at the level of general theory. If I can show that natural 
duty is a foundational justification for political duties at the state level then 
simply noting a lack of consent or fair reciprocity at the global scope will not 
be enough to show that we do not have demanding political duties at the 
global scope. The second central aim is to highlight how the political con-
ception of justice is committed to the natural duty theory given the way it 
justifies political duties within states. By establishing this point Chapter IV 
provides the foundation for the argument to come in the following chapter.  
In Chapter V I argue that based on the principles embodied in the political 
conception of justice we can still have global political duties even in the 
absence of existing institutions, consent, and relations of reciprocity compa-
rable to those that exist in the state. In other words, those that hold the politi-
cal conception of justice cannot simply rule out the possibility that we could 
have duties to support the creation of new forms of political order at the 
global scope that ought to apply to us. The reasoning I will advance here is 
quite straight forward. Because the political conception of justice is commit-
ted to the idea of a natural duty of justice and because this duty is about what 
individuals owe to each other give certain kinds of interconnectedness, the 
political conception of justice must at a conceptual level be open to the pros-
pect of a global natural duty of justice. This logical and conceptual necessity 
of course does not in any way show that we do have global natural duties of 
justice in the climate change case or in relation to any other aspect of human 
relations at the global scope. However, it is only once this point about the 
theoretical underpinnings of the political conception of justice is established 
that I will be able to move on to the culmination of my argument where I 
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show that this theoretical possibility for a global natural duty of justice has 
become a reality in the case of global warming. Thus, in the second half of 
Chapter V I advance two distinct moral reasons for why existing agents (in-
dividuals and their political communities) ought to accept the demanding 
cosmopolitan duty of justice to support a supranational form of political 
authority in the case of global warming. These two reasons are based in re-
spect for future people and respect for our contemporaries as moral equals. 
Note that there is an enormous body of literature on the problem of justi-
fying political duties. Covering the entire field is beyond the scope of this 
book, and I am forced to make some strategic choices on the views that are 
important for me to address. In Chapter IV we will see that the standard lib-
eral arguments to establish political obligations or duties within states are 
based in consent, fair reciprocity, or natural duty, and that they have all 
faced serious challenges.  Many working on this problem argue that the lib-
eral tradition has failed to offer a compelling theory to resolve the problem 
of political duties, while several positions have emerged that try to reform 
and rebuild on traditional arguments. I have selected what I take to be an 
important contemporary voluntarist theory, Simmons’ philosophical anar-
chism, and an important contemporary theory based in reciprocity, George 
Klosko’s theory of presumptive benefits and fairness.144 By defending the 
natural duty theory against the challenges advanced by these two approaches 
I will be able to address the main criticisms of my approach to the problem 
of political authority. In what follows I will briefly explain why I will not 
address one additional approach to the question of political duties that has 
also gained considerable attention; namely what is called the non-
correlativity thesis.145  
Problems with the non-correlativity thesis for the question of new 
institutions 
The non-correlativity thesis is the view that a political authority can have the 
moral legitimacy to exercise authority even though individual subjects do 
not have corresponding political duties. This could mean that the state has a 
liberty right to issue commands and coerce subjects into obeying while it 
does not have a claim right to expect acceptance of its dictates as legitimate. 
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The non-correlativity thesis could also mean that subjects do not have a duty 
to support a morally legitimate state, but neither can they interfere with the 
state’s efforts to exercise its authority (i.e. when the state acts in a way that is 
just or, at least, not unjust).146   
The non-correlativity thesis is a fairly convenient approach to take if one 
does not want to accept the more radical position of philosophical anar-
chism, i.e. that political obligations can only exist in genuinely voluntary 
political orders, while at the same time one accepts the popular position that 
there is no fully compelling argument for the view that all members have 
political duties in non-voluntary states. Following the non-correlativity thesis 
it is not necessary to establish political obligations in order to show that non-
voluntary states can be morally legitimate. I will not spend any time going 
through the arguments for the non-correlativity thesis but will instead sug-
gest that it cannot help us answer questions about whether or not we have a 
non-voluntary duty to create a political order. 
On first sight one would expect the non-correlativity thesis to hold that it 
could be possible for a morally legitimate form of global political authority 
to come into existence but that we could not have a non-voluntary duty to 
create this kind of political order. One would not expect the non-correlativity 
thesis to support the idea of a non-voluntary duty to actively create a certain 
kind of political order because if we had reasons for such a positive duty to 
create a political authority the same reasons would certainly also entail a 
non-voluntary duty to actively support this same political order once estab-
lished (i.e. as opposed to simply not interfering with it).147 However, there is 
a problem with this way of reasoning.  
If some exiting political authority is morally legitimate in the sense that it 
legitimately exercises coercion even though individual subjects do not have 
political obligations, this must be because we need this political order on 
moral grounds. If we did not have some compelling normative argument 
based in human need for having a system of coercive political authority it 
would not make any sense to claim that the coercive nature of the state can 
be morally legitimate. Given this analysis one would expect that following 
the non-correlativity thesis we would need a just political order to be re-
created should unfortunate circumstances lead to its dismantlement. It is this 
proposition that creates a problem for the non-correlativity thesis.  
If Sweden was to fall into anarchy those that think that the current Swed-
ish state has morally legitimacy but that Swedes do not have political obliga-
tions within this system could not simply be indifferent to that fact the terri-
tory moved from political order to anarchy. If they were simply indifferent to 
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the prospect of anarchy then it would be unintelligible to say that the Swed-
ish state’s authority was legitimate on moral grounds. If there is some moral 
reason for thinking having a state is a good thing we are forced to ask our-
selves whether or not we have a duty to re-create this order should it disap-
pear. What could those that adopt the non-correlativity thesis say?  
If the answer is that we do not have a duty to re-create the political order 
we bring into doubt the reasoning used to argue that a just state can be mor-
ally legitimate in exercising authority. If the reasons for thinking the state is 
a good thing are not weighty enough to warrant re-creation it is difficult to 
comprehend how it could be weighty enough to make it morally legitimate 
in the first place. If we instead answer yes to the re-create question this 
brings into doubt the reasoning used to argue that individuals do not have 
duties to support a morally legitimate political order. How could it be that 
we have a duty to reconstitute the state but not a duty to support it once we 
do? Without saying anything more we can already see that there is some 
important doubt about whether or not the non-correlativity thesis can make 
sense once we move away from the assumption that all we need to think 
about is exiting and just political orders.     
I will not attempt to go furtherer in addressing the non-correlation ap-
proach in this book. All I want to make clear here is that while the non-
correlativity thesis might be a convenient middle ground approach, it is 
fairly unhelpful once we apply it to the problem of whether or not individu-
als can have a duty to support the creation of a political order that is deemed 
necessary for advancing the cause of justice. One should also note that if I 
can show that there is a natural duty of justice to create a new supranational 
form of political order with a mandate to enforce a coordinated policy on 
global warming I will have dealt a significant blow against the non-
correlation thesis. This is because I will have shown that there can be a non-
voluntary duty to create a political order.  If this is true I will have also im-
proved the argument for the idea that one can have a non-voluntary duty to 
actively support an existing political order.  
Summation 
This chapter has introduced how the case of climate change fits into contem-
porary debates over global justice and has reviewed some of the central lines 
of argument in this literature. We have seen how the problem of global 
warming raises question about the territorial and generational scope of jus-
tice. I have also classed dominant perspectives on the idea of global justice 
along two criteria: 1) do standards of justice arise through associative rela-
tions or non-associative relations (i.e. shared moral status alone), and 2) un-
der current conditions do we have demanding duties of justice at the global 
scope or are the demands of justice largely limited to the state level (i.e. 
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cosmopolitanism vs. anti-cosmopolitanism)? Given that my thesis departs 
from the way in which the problem of climate change has intensified global 
interconnectedness I focus specifically on the debates between associative 
cosmopolitans and associative anti-cosmopolitans. The question in general 
raised by these two perspectives is what kinds of interconnectedness gener-
ate demanding duties of justice. The specific question I address in this book 
is whether or not the problem of climate change has interconnected us in a 
way that generates demanding duties of global justice.  
In answering the question I have chosen to focus on the political concep-
tion of justice. Those that adopt the political conception are sceptical to the 
prospect of global justice but at the same time it is an individualist theory 
that does recognise the arbitrariness of existing political borders from the 
perspective of the individual. Limits to the scope of justice are thus not de-
fended by appealing to the inherent values of national identities or commu-
nal norms. The political conception does not limit the scope of justice to the 
state by conceiving of the interests of groups of people as ends whose moral 
value takes priority over the value of individuals outside of the group. In-
stead, when defending limits to the scope of justice the political conception 
identifies associative differences between individuals in their relations at the 
global scope and those among members of states as morally relevant in de-
termining the scope of our demanding duties of justice.  
The argument against cosmopolitanism advanced following the political 
conception is that any time individuals share in a set of political institutions 
that have the authority to dictate the terms of social cooperation, as is the 
case with states, demands of social justice apply. These kinds of political 
associations give rise to standards of fairness and reciprocity among individ-
ual members that can justify at least the basic and common political and 
distributive duties of justice we normally associate with a liberal democratic 
welfare state. More precisely the idea is that the state’s claim to morally 
legitimate political authority over members and its use of coercion are what 
justify both the idea that members of political communities owe each other 
egalitarian duties of political and distributive justice and the idea that it is 
non-egalitarian humanitarian standards that constitute the demands of moral-
ity at the global scope. In the later case it is the lack of the right kind of po-
litical associations that explains why more demanding political and distribu-
tive duties of justice do not apply.  
Because the political conception offers a highly individualistic challenge 
to cosmopolitans it is not nearly as susceptible to charges of failing to treat 
individuals as ends in themselves, which has traditionally been the central 
way in which cosmopolitans have rebuffed liberal forms of anti-
cosmopolitanism such as liberal nationalism. In fact, as we have seen those 
that adopt the political conception of justice regularly appeal to principles of 
reciprocity and fairness among individuals that are central to a wide range of 
egalitarian liberal theories of justice. As such, I have argued that the political 
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conception of justice represents one of the most important challenges to 
cosmopolitanism generally and thus to the cosmopolitan thesis I advance in 
this book. Second, I argued that there is a methodological benefit of develop-
ing my thesis from within the theoretical framework employed by those that 
advance the political conception of justice. If I can show that in the case 
global warming the political conception has clear cosmopolitan implications, 
then this argument should be compelling to a broad range of liberal forms of 
scepticism towards the idea of global justice. Note however that I do not 
advance what I have called a cosmopolitan political conception of justice 
simply because it has some strategic methodological advantages. Rather, I 
take contractualism to be an exceptionally compelling approach to questions 
of social justice generally and aim to address what I view to be problems 
with the way several prominent contractualist thinkers have interpreted this 
theory for questions of global justice.   
Finally, I have laid out a strategy for justifying a supranational form of 
political authority and duties to support the creation of such an authority. 
Here I have followed Simmons’ work which has been critical of some overly 
simplistic ways in which liberals have attempted to justify political authority. 
With some necessary modifications to Simmons’ original distinction, I have 
I proposed a two staged strategy for justifying the moral legitimacy of a 
global form of political order to address the threat of human induced climate 
change. Justifying to individuals the moral legitimacy of existing political 
orders or the moral necessity to create some proposed political order is de-
pendent on 1) showing the need for political order and 2) demonstrating that 
individuals’ have duties to support a particular political order or to create a 
particular political order. 
In the first stage one must show that a system of political order is neces-
sary to provide a set of goods that are essential for most individuals’ wellbe-
ing and that the goods in question cannot be provided, will be underpro-
vided, or will not be provided in a just way without a political order. I will 
argue in the following chapter that providing the good of a stable climate 
(i.e. mitigation of global warming) is like the collective goods regularly ap-
pealed to by liberals in justifying the state. Environmental protection at this 
scale is central to securing human wellbeing while the good of global warm-
ing mitigation cannot be provided without some system that can ensure 
compliance to coordinated policies at the global scope (i.e. some form of 
global political authority). 
Given a successful argument for the need for political order the second is-
sue that arises is justifying to individuals that they have duties to support 
such a political order. In advancing this second stage of my thesis I have 
argued that it is necessary to begin by focusing on general theories on politi-
cal duties. To do this I propose to demonstrate that individuals can have non-
voluntary duties, i.e. duties not based in consent, to support existing political 
orders (Chapter IV). More specifically this discussion will serve to support 
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the natural duty theory of political duties that is embodied in the political 
conception of justice. I have suggested above that the reasoning used to 
show that individuals can have non-voluntary political duties in existing 
states can also support my claim that individuals have duties to support a 
new global political project to address the threat of climate change. Thus, 
once I have defended the natural duty theory of political duties at the level of 
general theory I will in Chapter V argue that the threat of global warming 
generates comparable natural duties of justice at the global scope. On my 
interpretation the political conception of justice has clear cosmopolitan im-
plications in this case, namely that under current conditions we can have 
demanding duties of global justice. Defending this second move will com-
plete the second stage of the argument I have outlined in this chapter.  
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Chapter III 
 
Collective goods, political order, and global 
warming 
In this chapter I will argue that the collective goods reasoning traditionally 
employed by liberals to justify the need for the state can also be employed to 
justify the need for political order in the case of global warming. The main 
objective is to show that there is a normatively relevant similarity between 
the cooperative challenges involved in providing, for example, law and order 
at the domestic level and the good of climate change mitigation (i.e. the re-
duction of GHG emissions and the stabilisation of global warming trends). 
Like with law and order at the state level, achieving the good of a stabilised 
climate requires that we act collectively and in this case at the global scope. 
However, if it is not realistic to expect adequate collective action independ-
ent of some system of political authority that can assure compliance to coor-
dinated policy among the relevant agents then it may be possible to justify a 
supranational form of political association to address the threat of global 
warming.  
To begin it is worthwhile to repeat the basic logic behind the idea that 
similarities between domestic and global collective action problems can be 
relevant to theories of global justice. A justification for the state that is com-
mon in liberal political thought is that the state is needed to secure collective 
security and basic welfare. There are many other kinds of justifications of-
fered for why we need the state, but the appeal to security and welfare ap-
pears to be necessary at a foundational level to get a liberal argument for the 
state off the ground. In other words, the state’s role in securing welfare and 
security are at least necessary to justify the coercive nature of political order 
and to justify to individuals that they ought to support political society in 
various ways. What then should liberals that think that political order can be 
justified say when states fail to secure these goods either independently or 
multilaterally through international agreements? What can we say when 
there is a need for political organisation to ensure collective security or wel-
fare at the global scope but states appear to be unable to provide these 
goods? 
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The kind of cosmopolitan thesis I advance in this book is based broadly 
on the reasoning that if the state is at a foundational level justified based on 
its ability to provide security and welfare then this same reasoning can be 
used to justify the need for instituting supranational forms of political au-
thority when states fail to secure these goods. The claim is certainly not that 
it simply follows automatically from state failure to provide some global 
good that a supranational arrangement is justifiable. Rather the argument is 
that from a liberal perspective there is no inherent reason for why the justifi-
cation of political order applied at the state level could not also under certain 
conditions justify political order at both narrower and broader scopes than 
existing states. 
The idea is then that if one can show that a supranational form of political 
authority is needed to avoid the potentially huge negative impacts on human 
welfare expected from global warming, then one has at least shown that 
some necessary conditions for justifying such a global political project are 
present. Demonstrating the significantly stronger claims that such a global 
form of political authority is morally justified and that we have duties to 
support such a development requires of course much more argumentation. 
For example, these stronger claims are dependent on showing that we have 
some decisive normative reasons for creating the institutional conditions that 
would make mitigating global warming possible. 
I will not try to show in this chapter that we do in fact have decisive 
moral reasons to support a collective global effort to mitigate climate 
change, nor will I even try to show that political order can be morally justi-
fied at the state level. These normative issues will be addressed in Chapters 
IV & V, and I will limit myself in this chapter to the first task of justifying 
political authority. As was noted in Chapter II the first task for defending my 
cosmopolitan thesis for the case of global warming requires showing that we 
would need a supranational political arrangement to be able to mitigate this 
environmental threat. I will for the most part in what follows simply present 
the reasoning behind the view that this is in fact the case. In a sense I simply 
assume for the purposes of this chapter that mitigating global warming is an 
essential good in order to make it intelligible to ask if we could achieve it 
through weakly enforced international agreements or if we would need some 
stronger supranational political arrangement. 
Note however that I am forced to go a bit further than this in order to sat-
isfy the task of justifying the need for political order on liberal premises. In 
order to suggest that there is some kind of parallel between the collective 
goods arguments regularly offered to justify the need for the state and the 
case of climate change it is necessary to reflect over the different kinds of 
reasons individuals have for action that could both make global warming 
mitigation a collective good and that also make achieving the collective good 
difficult due to collective action problems. There are many goods that re-
quire extensive human cooperation but do not warrant the interference of 
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coercive political institutions. This can be because the good in question is 
either not so important that we can justify using coercive political institu-
tions to provide it or because the good can be adequately provided independ-
ent of political institutions. In order to justify the need for the provision of 
some collective good through political institutions it is important to show 
that individuals have reasons to see some outcome as an essential good and 
that it makes sense to expect that individuals acting independent of some 
system of political order with fail to adequately provide the good in question. 
In the case of global warming there is some difficulty in drawing a direct 
parallel to at least some of the standard liberal arguments for the state.  
For example, when justifying the need for state provision of law and order 
to individuals one often finds the claims that law and order will not be pro-
vided in an adequate fashion without a state even if individuals act rationally 
and that all or nearly all individuals benefit from their being a state run sys-
tem of law and order. This is the familiar Hobbesian appeal to individuals’ 
rational self-interest in justifying to them that they ought to accept the costs 
and limits of coercive political authority in a given territory. Rational self-
interest generates some collective action problems in securing social order 
and rational self-interest also gives individuals reasons to accept political 
arrangements designed to resolve these collective action problems. In the 
case of global warming it is not clear that one can motivate the need for po-
litical order in this way. 
The efforts we in the current generation make to mitigate global warming 
will not translate into the stabilisation of global warming trends over our 
lifetimes. Instead the largest share of benefits from our efforts will be in-
curred by other people far into the future. As we will see, this leads to some 
problems in trying to characterise what kind of collective action problem, if 
any, is in fact generated by the threat of global warming. Most importantly 
one may not be able to appeal to the full range of reasons for accepting po-
litical order that tend to be advanced in liberal arguments for why we need 
states. This is a problem because, as we will see, it is the nature of the collec-
tive action problems we face that are foundational to arguments in the liberal 
tradition for justifying the need for political institutions to mediate certain 
aspects of human interaction. Despite these problems one can still, I will 
argue, justify the need for political order at the global scope in the case of 
global warming following the commitments widely adopted by liberals. I 
will show that there is enough of a similarity between the justification of 
political order typically adopted in liberal thought and conditions in the case 
of climate change to get the cosmopolitan thesis of this book off the ground. 
I begin the chapter by giving a brief summary of how the need for the 
state is normally justified following liberal theoretical premises. I will then 
develop the argument that one can justify the need for political order at the 
global scope in a comparable way for the case of global warming. To do this 
I present and interpret theoretical and empirical research on the prospects for 
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collective action to mitigate climate change. Here I look specifically to re-
search on the international political economy of global warming mitigation. 
This research suggests that the main difficulty in securing a global arrange-
ment that could effectively achieve the levels of emissions reductions 
deemed necessary by the IPCC is the lack of a credible system to assure 
compliance to such international arrangements. From the perspective of po-
litical theorising a central implication of this empirical assessment is that we 
would need a supranational form of political authority should we have deci-
sive reasons to act collectively in response to this threat. This assessment in 
turn gives rise to the larger question about global justice that is addressed in 
the following chapters. Could we have duties of justice to support this kind 
of global political project?  
The reader should note that in the current chapter I explain and defend a 
central set of perspectives on the prospects for collective action to address 
global warming. Thus this chapter presents an empirical underpinning for the 
rest of the study that is derived from existing work in international relations 
and international political economy on global warming mitigation. My own 
analytic contribution is in part providing the reader with a better understand-
ing on what it means to have a collective action problem in the case of global 
warming and in part highlighting the normative implications of various re-
sults from economic and political analysis on this problem.  
The collective goods justification of the state 
The collective goods justification of the state is based in the claim that with-
out a state a set of collective goods that are necessary for most individuals’ 
wellbeing cannot be provided, will be underprovided, or will not be provided 
in a just way. The reasoning behind these kinds of claims has a long tradition 
in political theory, but we find an early modern and well developed expres-
sion of this view in Hobbes’ work with John Locke, David Hume and Adam 
Smith being other prominent thinkers that have seen the function of the state 
in this way.148 According to Hobbes, it is only by empowering an absolute 
Sovereign and thus creating a strong political authority that there is any hope 
for achieving those human goods that are made by possible by exchange, 
cooperation, and community.149  
                               
148 For a succinct explanation of the collective goods justification of the state as it has been 
employed in political theory see Russell Hardin, "Economic Theories of the State," in Per-
spectives on Public Choice, ed. Dennis C. Mueller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
149 Hobbes, Leviathan, 86-90, 170-74. 
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Locke is more optimistic than Hobbes about what is possible politically 
within the realm of reasonable risk aversion for anarchy, but the central 
theme of Locke’s justification of the state is that we need a   
settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the stan-
dard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies 
between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all ra-
tional creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant 
for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in 
the application of it to their particular cases.150  
 
We need the state so that we can create an “indifferent judge, with authority 
to determine all differences according to the established law,” and an institu-
tional structure that can “back and support the sentence when right, and to 
give it due execution….”151  Without a state Locke argues that individuals 
could not be assured of the protection of their rights and property, and the 
condition of constantly being in danger of attack would undermine their 
ability to enjoy human goods. It is law and order, i.e. the functions of legisla-
tion, adjudication, and enforcement, together with basic security and the 
enforcement of individuals’ rights that come first to mind in describing how 
the state is justified, especially in the social contract tradition. Over the past 
40 years this line or reasoning has become more formalised in what is often 
called the study of collective action.152  
Public goods and the economic theory of the state 
The collective goods provided by the state are now often described as 
public goods because they must be provided through collective action and 
are non-excludable, meaning that the amount I contribute to the good’s pro-
vision does not affect the degree to which I can enjoy the good.153 If a state 
provides national defence and I avoid, illicitly, contributing to the tax system 
that supports defence spending I still enjoy this good. Public goods are also 
defined as being non-rivalrous. This means that my enjoyment of national 
defence does not affect your ability to access the same good. This can be 
contrasted with rivalrous consumable products like foods where my use does 
prevent you from being able to consume this same product.154  
Table 1 provides a basic classification of the different kinds of goods 
along the excludability and rivalrousness parameters.  
                               
150 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration, Shapiro, 
Ian ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), 155. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
153 Ibid. 
154 Another way to define public goods is as non-excludable and indivisible. 
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Table 1: Public goods and common pool resources 
 Non-rivalrous Rivalrous 
Non-excludable 
Public goods 
Defence, law and order, 
weather forecasts 
 
Common pool resources 
Fish stocks, maintenance of 
the atmosphere’s protective 
functions  
Excludable 
Club goods 
Patented knowledge (legal 
exclusion), cable television 
(technical exclusion) 
Private goods 
Food, computers, cars 
 
Following the logic of collective action we should expect those goods where 
access cannot be efficiently excluded to be underprovided or not provided at 
all in the absence of coercive political institutions. The idea is that one needs 
the coercive instruments employed by a political authority to ensure coop-
eration among large groups of people when individuals’ rational choices in 
markets do not secure the provision of public goods.155 
In the standard example of national defence any single individual’s non-
contribution does not undermine the ability of the community to provide 
defence and as a result any self-interested and rational agent has an incentive 
to free-ride by avoiding their share of the cost while letting other’s pay. The 
individual agent reasons that because national defence will be provide even 
if he does not pay his best option is to try to avoid paying, i.e. he will still 
benefit from national defence despite his own cheating. Yet if each individ-
ual reasons in this way and there is no state to ensure that individuals con-
tribute to the collective good we can expect that national defence will be 
badly under funded. In the absence of a state even if there a many individu-
als that have a strong interest in providing the good they will worry that any 
contribution they make will be undermined by others’ free-riding, and even a 
relatively small number of non-cooperators could undermine the system.   
Provision of a public good is said to have the structure of a prisoners’ di-
lemma. Even though all players prefer that the good should be provided col-
lectively over the option of non-provision each player’s best option, regard-
less of what others do, is to attempt to free-ride on the efforts of others by 
avoiding contributing their share of the cost. The state’s role is to assure that 
                               
155 Richard Abel Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: Study in Public Economy (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1959). 
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the collective project will not be undermined and it does this by using sanc-
tions in such a way that contribution becomes a dominant strategy for most 
members of the society. Free-riding need not undermine human cooperation 
in many circumstances but the logic of collective action is concerned with 
free-riding and cooperation of the kind we find in complex modern societies 
among large groups of people. The basic idea is that individuals acting on 
their own rational interest will fail in some cases to secure what is collec-
tively rational unless there are coercive political institutions that make coop-
eration the dominant strategy for most actors.156 
Normative requirements in liberal collective goods thinking  
The theory of public goods as it is used in contemporary liberal political 
thought incorporates the rationalist logic of economic theories of the state 
but also entails a host of normative claims that are not always immediately 
apparent. The most obvious underlying normative position is that securing 
individuals’ welfare and rights protection is important.157 There are also 
some less obvious underlying normative assumptions at work in the way 
liberals use the public goods theory. Liberals sometimes argue that some 
good must be provided through the state because provision through a volun-
tary scheme does not ensure that all that want and/or need access to the good 
actually get it, or because the good would not be provided in a morally ac-
ceptable way. 
For example, markets may be able to successfully provide protection ser-
vices that cover a large majority of residents in a territory in an excludable 
fashion. On a strictly economic analysis the good would not be a public one. 
However, ensuring that all residents have access to some sufficient and 
comparable level of protection may require state provision of the good. Thus 
it is the normative requirement for universal provision that gives provision of 
security services a public goods character. Because liberals do not usually 
adopt a strictly economic theory in arguing for the need for the state I will 
refer to the collective goods justification of the state instead of a public 
goods justification, although I will incorporate both terms as appropriate in 
what follows. 
For many collective goods that appear to be pure public goods there are 
clear prospects for non-state provision,158 and there are those that take this 
                               
156 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 9-16. 
157 Russell Hardin, "The Normative Core of Rational Choice Theory," in The Economic World 
View, ed. Uskali Mäki (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
158 See for example: Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public 
Goods, and Club Goods, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Russell 
Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), Elinor Ostrom, 
"How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action," Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 15, no. 3 (2003). 
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evidence to undermine the need for non-voluntary and coercive political 
authority at a more fundamental level.159 Yet, these findings rarely represent 
a serious challenge to the claim of interest here; namely that we do in fact 
need political order to provide a set of essential collective goods. For exam-
ple, security and social order services can be provided in relatively exclud-
able ways, but the private provision of law and order in the absence of a state 
will either be unstable or very much like a coercive state. 
Nozick famously argues that private protection services in conditions of 
anarchy naturally move towards monopoly because as long as there are 
many protection agencies of relatively equal strength there is a risk for con-
flict between them and insecurity for the clients of these firms. This gives 
individuals incentives to coordinate around one dominant agency.160 Yet, 
when there is a monopoly over the provision of law and order we get neither 
the efficiency gains nor voluntarism normally associated with markets, mak-
ing it difficult to see the advantage of having a for-profit supply.  
Samuel Freeman puts forth the liberal perspective well when he says,  
Political power is held in trust, as a fiduciary power; those who occupy po-
litical offices act in a representative capacity, for others’ benefit. Since it is 
held in trust, political power is not to be exercised for the benefit of the per-
son who occupies political office. So far as political power is contractual, 
then, it is not based in a mutually beneficial bargain between ruler and 
ruled.161 
 
When protection services are provided through a market in conditions of 
anarchy the services are founded exclusively in a series of mutually benefi-
cial contractual agreements meaning that there will not be “any place for 
political society, a ‘body politic’ that political authority represents in a fidu-
ciary capacity…. People’s rights are selectively protected only to the extent 
they can afford protection and depending on which services they pay for.”162  
                               
159 See Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), Bruce Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the 
State (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1990), Anthony De Jasay, 
"Freedom from a Mainly Logical Perspective," Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute 
of Philosophy 80, no. 314 (2005), Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbours 
Settle Disputes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), Tibor Machan, "Fishkin 
on Nozick's Absolute Rights," Journal of Libertarian Studies 6 (1982), Jan Narveson, The 
Libertarian Idea, Ethics and Action (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), Murray 
Newton Rothbard, For a New Liberty (New York,: Macmillan, 1973), David Schmidtz, The 
Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Good Arguments (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1991), Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987). 
160 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. 
161 Samuel Freeman, "Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View," 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, no. 2 (2001): 121. 
162 Ibid.: 148. 
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A for profit protection agency with a monopoly on power does have an in-
terest in providing real protection so as to allow their clients to be productive 
and able to pay high rates, but they also have an interest in exploiting cus-
tomers by maximising what they have to pay for protection. 
Some deny that private provision would lead to monopoly,163 but with 
many agencies competing for customers and territory one would expect ei-
ther continual conflict or cartel building between agencies.164 This first op-
tion is literally not an example of large scale collective security, while the 
second option is not much better, if at all, than monopoly.  Here we see one 
clear example of how the public goods justification of the state as it is used 
in liberal political thought is bound up with normative criteria on the way a 
good should be provided.  
It is also doubtful that such a non-state scheme could provide protection 
to all those who want it within any given territory. Imagine a handicapped 
person that is unable to create a surplus of resources and is also unable to 
deter and enforce violations of his rights. This person will not be able to pay 
for protection services or threaten protection agency clients, and as a result 
for profit protection agencies will not have any incentive to include handi-
capped persons in the protection scheme. Even more problematic, the 
stronger the protection agencies become and the more successful they are at 
gating out non-clients the more able bodied people that are unable to pay the 
protection premiums effectively become handicapped in relation to clients. 
The very poor, like the physically handicapped, cannot expect protection 
form either each other or from private protection agencies and their clients.  
Of course, we can simply argue that it is wrong for any individual to vio-
late another’s rights regardless of whether or not they belong to a protection 
agency. However, it is difficult to see why a private protection agency that is 
motivated by profit would have an interest in taking responsibility for ad-
dressing violations against non-clients that do not represent a threat to cli-
ents. These conditions are not acceptable following liberal premises and the 
rejection of such a relationship between individuals and a system of social 
order contributes to the justification of a state system where all individuals 
benefit from collective security within any given territory. This normative 
position is an example of how demands of distributive justice can sometimes 
lie beneath the use of what appears to be public goods reasoning to justify 
the state. Providing collective security does give rise to collective action 
problems but not necessarily only because another form of provision is inef-
ficient in relation to the preference satisfaction of a set of individuals. Non-
state provision of a collective good can be rejected by pointing to collective 
                               
163 David D. Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism (New 
Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1978). 
164 Tyler Cowen, "Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy," Economics and Phi-
losophy 8, no. 2 (1992). 
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action problems because other forms of provision fail to satisfy some norma-
tive standard.  
Common pool resources 
Let us now look at the management of common pool environmental 
goods. The logic of collective action tells us that the only way to ensure sus-
tainable use of valuable but non-excludable resources is through a political 
authority that can coercively control access to the resource, tax usage, or 
parcel out ownership to private interests in such a way that there will be in-
centives to invest in long-term sustainable usage. Common pool resources, 
like fish in a sea all have access to, create a “tragedy of the commons” pris-
oners’ dilemma. Individuals have unrestricted access to a valuable common 
resource and have an interest in maximising their personal use of the re-
source. Maximising resource use would require exploiting it at a sustainable 
level, but the individual users are unable to cooperate with each other to 
achieve this social optimum. Instead each agent chooses to maximise his 
own short-term usage and together they destroy the commons by, in this 
example, over fishing the sea.165  
Regardless of whether or not others choose to exploit the resource at a 
sustainable level any individual agent maximizes her own interests by ex-
ploiting the resource at a much more aggressive rate. Even if most individu-
als would not choose to free-ride on a fishing industry operating at a sustain-
able level, in the absence of some system for ensuring that the vast majority 
do fish sustainably rational agents will, together, over exploit the resource. 
Likewise, in the case of pollution it is argue that there are often weak or no 
mechanisms in the market for getting companies and consumers to pay for 
many of the negative environmental externalities they produce, which neces-
sitates the intervention of political authorities.  
However, there are a wide range of different common pool resources and 
clear evidence that sustainable management is possible for some resources 
through market forces or voluntary non-state arrangements.166 Yet realizing 
these more voluntary approaches requires that the group of potential users is 
well-defined, that they have relatively similar interests in the resources so 
that they can coordinate on a common set of rules about how, when and how 
much to use the resource, and that there is direct contact between those with 
access to the resource to facilitate rule making, monitoring and enforce-
                               
165 Garrett Hardin, "Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162 (1968). 
166 Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Re-
sources (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994)., Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, 
"Are Public Goods Myths?," Journal of Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994). 
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ment.167 Obviously these conditions do not exist for large complex groups 
that have varying interests in resources when they lack the ability to directly 
monitor each other. When these latter conditions hold for problems of pollu-
tion, e.g. air pollution, it will also be difficult to address such environmental 
degradation without systems of political authority.  
Some problems with the idea of well ordered anarchy  
Some reject this way of reasoning generally and argue that there are clear 
ways to provide social order independent of a coercive state. There are, on 
this view, many opportunities to cooperate with others over the provision of 
goods that are normally thought to have a prisoners’ dilemma logic given 
repeated interaction between the relevant agents.168 Players faced with a long 
set of opportunities to cooperate can employ various strategies, the most 
famous being “tit for tat,”169 where continued cooperation is dependent on 
others choosing a cooperative strategy. If a player tries to free-ride on others’ 
cooperation they will be punished in future opportunities to cooperate, which 
is to their disadvantage. Michael Taylor argues that this kind of signalling 
and learning over many interactions can lead players into stable coopera-
tion.170 The implication is that we do not need a state to resolve collective 
action problems.    
However, as we have seen, the conditions under which these conclusions 
hold speak against seeing these results as providing a genuine alternative to 
the state. For example, each player must be able to know if each of the other 
players cooperated or not in their previous interaction.171 As societies be-
come larger and more complex it becomes too costly, too risky, or simply 
impossible to prevent free-riding in the fashion described by anarchists.172 
One could argue that the analysis thus far should not move us to accept non-
voluntary political orders but instead to abolish states and establish small 
scale anarchist communities in their place. Yet it is hard to see what is attrac-
tive about this option. 
                               
167 For empirical and theoretical research on the prospects for non-state provision of common 
pool resources see Elinor Ostrom, "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (2000), Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: 
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990). 
168 De Jasay, "Freedom from a Mainly Logical Perspective," 206-16, Taylor, The Possibility 
of Cooperation, Chapter 3. 
169 Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
170 Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation, 85-88. 
171 Ibid., 61. 
172 See Klosko, Political Obligations, 42-46., Morris, An Essay on the Modern State, 93-98. 
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These kinds of ordered anarchist communities must be small so that all 
members can have close social contact with each other.173 As such the collec-
tive benefits we can expect from social order are rather limited. One suspects 
that such small scale communities will fail the test of preferability for most, 
but even if this was not the case moving towards such communities is proba-
bly utopian given the sheer numbers of people living today and the threats of 
hostility from outsiders.174 Furthermore, it is far from obvious that small 
scale anarchy represents an improvement from the perspective of individual 
liberty.  
Proving that anarchy can be ordered entails proving that social relations in 
anarchy can be regulated in a way similar to how relations are regulated 
through political institutions within the state but without an organisation that 
uses coercion against individual members. From the perspective of the indi-
vidual born into an ordered anarchy its rules and the scope of the commu-
nity’s authority are not obviously more voluntary than those of a state. The 
choice to follow the communal order or, ultimately, to suffer the loss of the 
means for survival due to the organised non-cooperation of the rest of the 
community cannot be described as voluntary. Even if individuals are freer in 
an ordered anarchy to stop contributing to collective projects than they are in 
a state, this is not the kind of choice an individual that questions one or a few 
of the anarchical community’s rules can view as a real opportunity to exer-
cise his liberty. Instead the individual accurately experiences social rules 
backed up by the threat of organised non-cooperation as coercive. Further-
more, there is good reason to expect that the demands on the individual to 
conform to social standards of behaviour in an anarchical community will go 
beyond what is needed to secure social order and will be unattractive from 
the perspective of liberty.175  
The above gives us a general picture of the reasoning underlying liberal 
arguments for why a system of political order is needed to secure the collec-
tive goods of large scale social cooperation. In what follows I will argue that 
should we have decisive reasons to prevent global warming this collective 
project also requires the creation of a global institutional system that can 
assure compliance to policy aimed at protecting the atmosphere as a global 
collective good.   
                               
173 Morris, An Essay on the Modern State, 74-80. 
174 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 46-
47, Morris, An Essay on the Modern State, 78-80. 
175 Morris, An Essay on the Modern State, 77-78.  
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Mitigating global warming - the prospects for collective 
action  
The atmosphere is a commons, meaning that there is open access to its bene-
fits and all are free to deplete these benefits through pollution. Maintaining a 
stable climate has the structure of a public good because agents cannot be 
excluded from the benefits that follow from efforts to protect the resource 
from depletion. Reducing GHG emissions is sometimes called a summation 
public good in the economics literature. This means that the global warming 
mitigation gains from reducing GHG emissions by one metric ton from any 
specific emitter are exactly the same as the benefits from one metric ton of 
reduced pollution from any other emitter. What is important is the sum total 
of emissions reductions not who makes these reductions. Minimizing human 
induced climate change requires dramatic reductions in GHG emissions, 
while mitigation efforts create free-rider problems where non-contributors 
can benefit from others’ GHG reductions without taking on costs them-
selves. Thus, it is often argued that human induced climate change is repre-
sentative of a tragedy of the commons collective action problem.176  
Note that mitigating climate change can be thought to match the condi-
tions of a pure public good better than some other global public goods. For 
example controlling the global spread of infectious disease can be a weakest 
link good. In this situation all those parties that can have an affect on global 
conditions must participate in preventing spreading of the disease because 
otherwise the good of public health will not be adequately provided for all. 
This may change the incentive structure of actors such that voluntary agree-
ments between states are effective in providing the good (e.g. one might see 
voluntary wealth transfers from richer to poorer states that will ensure that 
all countries engage in sufficient disease prevention measures). Other global 
public goods have a best-shot structure, such as the discovery of a cure for a 
disease. Once the good is provided by one party it is provided for all, i.e. the 
knowledge for how to cure a disease but not necessarily access to treatment. 
For these kinds of goods it can be the case that there is no need for coopera-
tion because some agent has an interest in unilaterally providing the good 
even if others will free-ride on their efforts.177 
Reducing GHG emissions means forgoing the economic benefits associ-
ate with energy consumption, and energy consumption is powerfully linked 
to the wealth enjoyed by developed countries and development goals around 
                               
176 See Stephen M. Gardiner, "The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of 
the Kyoto Protocol," Ethics and International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2004), Stephen M. Gardiner, 
"The Real Tragedy of the Commons," Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, no. 4 (2001). 
177 Todd Sandler, Global Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
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the world.178 Thus, even if a country wants to achieve the benefits of limiting 
global warming all states and their citizens have clear self-interested reasons 
for avoiding the costs of emissions abatement and free-riding on the efforts 
of others. Fel! Hittar inte referenskälla., taken from Todd Sandler’s Global 
Collective Action, is a simple model of an international agreement to reduce 
GHG emissions by 10%. Compliance to the agreement is represented as an 
n-player prisoners’ dilemma.  
Note that Sandler simplifies the problem by making each country’s effect 
on the climate equal, but the point of the table is merely to highlight the sup-
posed basic challenge to achieving effective cooperation between states 
within such an international agreement. In this game the cost of emissions 
reductions for each nation is 8, and taking on this cost results in a benefit of 
6 going to each one of the nations (including the contributing nation).  
 
Table 2: A simple model of the international mitigation collective action problem 
 Number of GHGs-reducing nations other than Nation i 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nation i does not cut 
GHGs by 10% 
Nash 
0 
 
6 
 
12 
 
18 
 
24 
 
30 
 
36 
 
42 
Nation i does cut GHGs 
by 10% 
 
-2 
 
4 
 
10 
 
16 
 
22 
 
28 
 
34 
Social Optimum 
40 
Source: Todd Sandler, Global Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 23.  
The values in the bottom ‘cooperation’ row are always less for Nation i than 
those in the upper non-cooperative row. Nation i’s best strategy is always to 
defect from cooperation and free-ride on the efforts of others regardless of 
how many other countries reduce emissions. If no other nation cooperates, 
Nation i will not cut emissions because the cost is 8 while the payoff is only 
6 resulting in a net loss of -2. If only one other nation cuts emissions Nation i 
can free-ride on these efforts by avoiding contributing a cost of 8 but gaining 
a benefit of 6 from Nation 1 for a net gain of 2 compared to the cooperation 
strategy. 
No matter how many cooperating players there are there is always an in-
centive to free-ride, and each nation has the same incentive structure result-
ing in a Nash equilibrium where none of the players cuts emissions (the out-
                               
178 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Energy Assessment: 2004 Up-
date, Jose Goldemberg and Thomas B. Johansson, eds. (New York: UNDP, 2004). 
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ermost box on the upper left hand side of Fel! Hittar inte referenskälla.). 
But in this model it is also the case that the payoff for cooperation is huge. 
For a cost of 8 each nation can optimally secure a benefit for themselves of 
48 leaving them with a total net-benefit of 40 (the outermost box on the 
lower right hand side). Resolving the collective action problem results in a 
total net benefit and social optimum of 320 (8 x 40). If just two nations co-
operate each get a net benefit of 4. 
On the above view, the nature of the collective action problem is such that 
if states do enter into voluntary agreements to manage this global commons 
actually achieving cooperation will be difficult because there is no global 
political authority that can make free-riding an unattractive strategy. Even if 
it is collectively rational to cooperate it is not individually rational to do so 
for any of the parties to the agreement. This incentive structure will, follow-
ing the standard public goods reasoning, undermine the self-enforcement of 
the agreement.  
Is mitigation a collective good for existing agents?  
In order to say that ensuring the provision of some good gives rise to the 
kind of collective action problem that could justify the need for a system of 
political order one needs to at least satisfy two conditions. One must show 
that individuals have reasons to cooperate in pursuit of the good in question 
and that it is unlikely that the good will be adequately provided without 
some system of political authority. This chapter focuses on the argument that 
voluntary international accords between states are not likely to produce ade-
quate levels of global warming mitigation (i.e. the second condition). Yet, in 
order to suggest that the difficulties involved in securing cooperation on 
global warming mitigation strategies are comparable to the collective action 
problems liberals appeal to in justifying the state it is necessary to also show 
that individuals could have reasons to pursue global warming mitigation. Is 
the mitigation of climate change really a collective good and is it the kind of 
good that could generate a collective action problem among existing agents?  
Following the logic presented in Table 2 one might want to argue that the 
mitigation of climate change is clearly a collective good and that securing it 
clearly generates a collective action problem. As it is presented above the 
gains from mitigation compared to the ‘do nothing’ scenario are so large that 
there is an obvious parallel between the collective goods justification of the 
state and the case of global warming. Because the environmental damage 
expected from global warming is so extensive we can say that mitigating 
human induced climate change is an essential human good. Furthermore, 
because efforts to mitigate global warming have the structure of a pure pub-
lic good ensuring adequate provision of this good calls for some system of 
supranational political authority to alter the conditions that make voluntary 
cooperation between states ineffective. This is the Hobbesian argument for 
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why rational agents should see a system of political authority as necessary; 
namely to guarantee collective security because all other human goods are 
dependent on security.  
As we have seen, liberals usually go beyond Hobbes’ rationalistic eco-
nomic justification of the state to include moral reasons for why we should 
accept the demands of a political order. Still, this does not entail a rejection 
of the Hobbesian argument for the state but rather normative additions to it. 
In other words, virtually all liberals that think political order is justifiable 
appeal to both rational and moral reasons in advancing such a justification.179 
If the picture painted above on the nature of the collective action problem we 
face is accurate many if not most liberals would see this as a sufficient to 
justify, in general terms, the idea that one would need some system of supra-
national political authority to resolve the collective action problem. In other 
words it would make sense to think that global warming is the kind of prob-
lem that could warrant the interference of political institutions at the global 
scope, although additional arguments would still be required to show that all 
things considered we ought to pursue the good of global warming mitigation 
in this way.  
Objections to the suggested comparison between securing public goods 
(e.g. commons) among individuals livening in a specific territory and the 
case of global warming are not likely to be based on the view that the envi-
ronmental threat is just not serious enough to warrant such a comparison (i.e. 
if one accepts the predictions offered by the IPCC). Instead objections are 
much more likely to be based on the argument that states could find ways to 
cooperate to address the threat of climate change without having to institute 
some additional form of political authority at the supranational level. When 
the payoffs for cooperation are significant we should be much more optimis-
tic about the likelihood that sovereign states will be able to successfully pro-
vide global public goods. I address reasoning along these lines for the case 
of global warming later in the chapter. However before moving on to this 
problem it is important to address a more basic difficulty in making a theo-
                               
179 Among those thinkers that can be classed as liberals but do not have this tendency to ap-
peal to both rational and moral justifications of the state we find, for example, David Gauthier 
who tries like Hobbes to justify political obligations by exclusively appealing to rational 
reasons individuals have. David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (New York: Clarendon Press, 
1986). We also find a host of more or less anarchist approaches by theorists that do not think 
that states can be morally legitimate. As has been noted my ambition in this book is not to 
convince those that doubt that political order can be justified at any scope that it could be 
justified at the global scope in the case of global warming. Instead, I have limited myself to 
the task of showing that those liberals that think political order is justifiable at the domestic 
scope should also accept my argument for some form of global political order in the case of 
climate change. I will however address problems with both Gauthier’s approach and the ap-
proach of a relevant anarchist position in Chapter IV.  
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retical case for the idea that efforts to reduce the human impact on the at-
mosphere entails a collective action problem.   
The first thing to note is that the collective action problem depicted in 
Fel! Hittar inte referenskälla. does not incorporate one of the main reasons 
for why it would be so difficult to get states to live up to agreements that 
would entail major cuts or limits to their GHG emissions. This is that the 
payoffs in terms of the current generation’s economic interests from a policy 
of GHG emissions reductions are more than likely negative. As a result those 
that exist today have an economic interest in avoiding costly GHG emissions 
reductions both individually and collectively. This in turn makes it implausi-
ble to draw a parallel to the Hobbesian economic rationale for why individu-
als should see the need for political order as justifiable. If the current genera-
tion’s economic self-interest is clearly not served by cooperating to reduce 
GHG emissions then it seems difficult to justify to them that they need some 
system of political order for the sake of their own welfare. In fact one cannot 
say that the current generation faces a collective action problem at all if we 
adopt the Hobbesian approach to justification. The threat of global warming 
is a intergenerational problem and this fact has important implications for 
how one can and cannot justify the need for a global political project to ad-
dress our impact on the Earth’s climate. To see what affect this has on how 
we can characterise the collective action problems generated by the threat of 
global warming we need to have a clear understanding of the intergenera-
tional structure of this threat.  
The intergenerational structure of the global warming problem 
Climate change is caused by the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere 
and one of the most important GHGs is CO2. The huge expansion in the 
burning of fossil fuels over the past century is causing the global mean tem-
perature to increase because CO2 has an average atmospheric life time of 
between 200 and 500 years, which in turn leads to accumulation and an in-
crease in the atmospheric concentration of CO2.180  A significant portion of 
emitted CO2 will remain in the atmosphere for several thousands of years.181  
Much of the climate change we will experience in our lives times is due 
to accumulation of past GHG emissions, and the current generation will not 
suffer significant consequences from the pollution it will add to the total 
atmospheric GHG accumulation while it does enjoy the benefits of energy 
consumption. Furthermore, even if the impacts and costs on human wellbe-
                               
180 Archer, "Fate of Fossil Fuel CO2 in Geologic Time," IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Synthe-
sis Report, 16-17. 
181 Archer argues that because such a large percentage of CO2 emissions will have an atmos-
pheric life time measured in thousands of years, for policy purposes we can say that 25% of 
CO2 emissions remain in the atmosphere forever. See Archer, "Fate of Fossil Fuel CO2 in 
Geologic Time," for his specific estimates.     
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ing from climate change become significant the current generation at any 
point in time cannot improve their own circumstances to any significant 
degree by reducing emissions because it is the long term accumulation of 
GHGs that is determinative of the strength of the human impact on the green 
house effect. This means that limits and reductions on the current genera-
tion’s GHGs emissions will almost exclusively benefit future generations.182 
As a result Stephen Gardiner argues that climate change entails an “intergen-
erational” collective action problem in addition to the “intragenerational” 
one.183 However the question is what kind of collective action problem is it 
and does is provide some basis on which to say that political order is justi-
fied? 
In a tragedy of the commons collective action problem the parties have 
shared mutual self-interest to get off a path that will ultimately lead to the 
destruction of the environmental good in question. In a commons problem 
modelled on a standard prisoners’ dilemma each agent has a short-term in-
terest in over-fishing a common pool fishery when others are also over-
fishing. However they also have a long-term interest in the institution of 
some system that could insure that nearly all agents fish at sustainable levels. 
This is because each agent has more to gain from being able to continue to 
exploit the common resource over the long term at sustainable levels then 
they have to gain from more extensive exploitation over the short-term. This 
picture of an agent’s interest is not representative of the situation for any 
specific generation in the case of global warming. 
In general terms individuals do not have self-interested economic reasons 
to take on the costs that would result from effective policies to radically re-
duce GHG emissions (of course some existing agents may have such inter-
ests). This in turn certainly affects the degree to which states see themselves 
as having self-interested reasons to do something about climate change if we 
say that the interests of existing agents have a greater effect on the policy of 
states than the expected interests of agents far off into the future. Let us look 
more closely at the claim that the economic costs of mitigation for the cur-
rent generation will outweigh the economic benefits for the current genera-
tion. 
In a recent cost-benefit study of global mitigation policies measured in 
terms of consumption Kavuncu and Knabb find that keeping total yearly 
CO2 emission at year 2000 levels would, 
cost the generation born in the year 2000 approximately 8% more, in terms of 
lifetime consumption, then the no control case.…The costs are even larger for 
                               
182 This remains true as long at there are no workable ways to remove CO2   from the atmos-
phere or other ways to compensate for the effect of GHGs on the climate. See Stephen M. 
Gardiner, "A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem 
of Moral Corruption," Environmental Values 15 (2006). 
183 Ibid, Gardiner, "The Real Tragedy of the Commons," 403-04. 
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the generation born in 2070 under the control policy. In fact the generational 
costs continue to increase until the year 2105. The generations that actually 
benefit from the stabilization program are not born until sometime in the dis-
tant future. From our simulation results, for the intermediate damage case, we 
do not see a positive NCE(t) measure until the year 2315.184  
 
The above is just one estimate of when the payoffs from a conservative miti-
gation effort will arrive.185 However, it helps to highlight that the current 
generation does not have a self-interested economic interest in addressing 
climate change making the collective action problem fundamentally more 
difficult to resolve that a situation where one can appeal to agents’ self-
regarding welfare interests to at least some degree in trying to achieve coop-
eration.  
One might think that this claim about the lack of a benefit from mitigation 
efforts is empirically wrong given recent economic analyses that show huge 
returns from immediate investments in reducing GHG emissions. The most 
well known example is The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change.  This report, commissioned by the United Kingdom’s treasury de-
partment (HM Treasury), finds that stabilising the concentration of GHGs in 
the atmosphere within the range the IPCC recommends for avoiding the 
most serious impacts of global warming would cost an average of 1% of 
yearly total global gross domestic product (GDP) (this average is stated as 
1% of global GDP by 2050 in the report). At the same time it is expected 
that if we do nothing the cost in terms of global warming impacts not 
avoided will amount to between 5% and 20% of global GDP at the end of 
this century and thereafter.186 
Following the Stern Review a cost-benefit rational clearly calls for imme-
diate action to mitigate human induced climate change. There has been im-
portant academic criticism of the Stern Review. The main concerns are that 
the report chooses cost and benefit estimates selectively to strengthen the 
case for mitigation and that the discount rate and time frame in Stern’s eco-
nomic model have large affects that further overstate the case for mitiga-
tion.187 In general intergenerational cost-benefit analyses like that advanced 
                               
184 Kavuncu and Knabb, "Stabilizing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Assessing the Intergenera-
tional Costs and Benefits of the Kyoto Protocol," 379-80. 
185 As we have seen, the IPCC claims that keeping global temperatures below 2.4% would 
require emission levels to drop from 50 to 80% below 2000 levels by 2030.  
186 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007). 
187 Partha Dasgupta, "Comments on the Stern Review’s Economics of Climate Change"  
(Department of Economics, Cambridge University, 2006), William D. Nordhaus, "A Review 
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in the Stern Review are very sensitive to the choice of discount rate, and this 
rate is ultimately based on normative assumptions about how to weigh losses 
in GDP today in terms of welfare against future GDP gains. Such studies are 
also sensitive to the time horizon over which the cost-benefit analysis is 
modelled.188 As a result we do have reason to question the highly positive 
case the Stern Review makes for significant and immediate action (see note 
183). However, it is much more important to observe for the purposes of my 
argument that if we only try to evaluate what the most welfare efficient pol-
                               
188 The underlying normative assumptions that affect the choice of key parameters in eco-
nomic models are often poorly worked out and difficult to ascertain while they at the same 
time have an enormous impact on what is viewed to be the most efficient level and timing of 
investment in mitigation efforts. The difference between a low and high discount rate is the 
difference between prescribing immediate and significant mitigation versus gradual and mild 
mitigation or no mitigation at all. Stern uses a discount rate of 0.1%, much lower than the 3% 
rate used by Nordhaus, one of the most prominent economists working on this problem. The 
discount rate is determined in part by what economists call the ‘pure time preference’ of 
consumption, which simply means the preference for consumption now over consumption in 
the future. Stern adopts ‘utility based discounting’ where welfare is valued as equal between 
generations meaning zero discounting. This is based on the view that the positive discount 
rates usually used in the market place or by governments (e.g. at 2-10%) can only be justified 
when it is roughly the same people that will be affected by the choice to invest in future wel-
fare or to consume now raising current welfare. In cases like climate change where the choice 
is between our welfare and the welfare of other people in the future a positive discount rate 
amounts to viewing our own welfare as more important than that of other people. The slightly 
positive rate of 0.1% is arrived at by taking into consideration the risk of human extinction. 
The second determinate of the discount rate is the declining marginal benefit of extra con-
sumption. On this factor a choice of positive discounting is taking into consideration the 
expectation that future generations will be richer in real terms than we are. The idea is that 
richer people get less benefit in terms of welfare gains from comparable percent gains in 
wealth (i.e. consumption) than poorer people. Here Stern chooses not to discount for declining 
marginal benefit.  This choice improves the case for mitigation but is much harder to support 
on the supposed utilitarian reasoning he adopts.  Those economists that object to the Stern 
Review’s low discount rate usually argue that it leads to absurd results where the current 
generation is expected to taken on huge costs for the sake of future generations’ welfare even 
if the improvements for the future are slight. This happens especially when benefits in the 
future are enjoyed by several generations, as is the case with mitigating global warming. In 
the Stern Review the possibility that low discounting will result in recommendations for huge 
investments today to secure marginal benefits over several generations is hidden somewhat by 
setting the time frame of the model to 200 years, which again needs to be motivated on nor-
mative grounds. At the same time, market style high positive discounting cannot be justified 
simply by noting that this practice and avoids counter-intuitive results. High positive dis-
counting also leads to the counter intuitive notion that our welfare is more important than 
future people’s welfare. However one chooses to deal with the issue of discounting the impli-
cations are to a significant degree normative. One is often left with the impression that 
economists are manipulating the discount rate on parameters of time preference and declining 
marginal utility and making choices about the time scale of the model so as to produce results 
that match their moral intuitions. At the same time they are not directly taking on the estab-
lished normative debates over what can and cannot be justified intergenerationally, which 
undermines the prescriptive relevance of economic choice theory. 
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icy is over several generations we miss completely how the intergenerational 
structure of the problem can affect the prospects for global cooperation. 
Even if cost-benefit analyses like the Stern Review accurately prescribe large 
scale mitigation as the most welfare efficient policy option over several gen-
erations they do not tell us what the best cost-benefit option is from the per-
spective of a single self-interested generation.  
By looking at the problem for the perspective of each generation we can 
reason about the kinds of incentives the current generation and each coming 
generation will have with regards to reducing GHG emissions. Thus it is 
very useful to present a cost-benefit analysis such as the one offered by Ka-
vuncu and Knabb, which does not engage in weighing of the welfare value 
of consumption over time and between different generations. The figures 
given by Kavuncu and Knabb’s simply explain what effects a mitigation 
policy would have on consumption levels at various points in time compared 
to what consumption levels would be in a do nothing scenario.189  
Given that for the current generation the costs of mitigating climate 
change outweigh the benefits the collective and individual payoffs of choos-
ing the cooperative strategy within the international mitigation treaty repre-
sented in Table 2 are negative, i.e. a net cost. The corresponding strategic 
situation gives us a Nash equilibrium of not reducing emissions which also is 
the social optimum for a self-interested and rational generation. Thus what 
we should expect following public goods reasoning is that even if states 
agree to an international mitigation policy that would entail large cuts in 
emissions the effectiveness of the agreement would be undermined by ef-
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1992), Aubrey Meyer and Tony Cooper, A Recalculation of the Social Costs of Climate 
Change (London: The Global Commons Institute, 1995), William D. Nordhaus and Joseph 
Boyer, Warming the World (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), Stern, The Economics of Climate 
Change: The Stern Review.) Furthermore, any normative argument based solely on cost-
benefit analysis will simply highlight some central problems with the way many economists 
conceptualise these issues. We get things wrong when we take welfare as the only parameter 
and we get things terribly wrong when we take consumption to be the only parameter of 
welfare. For example, it is wrong to take it as a given that because the future will be richer it 
is OK to impose on them a host of climate problems as long as the costs on them are less than 
the costs would be for us to prevent that damage. This simply assumes that if given a choice 
the future would choose higher consumption levels instead of a better climate. We also cannot 
focus on consumption levels alone because we need to consider the lose of certain climate 
conditions that cannot be brought back by future generations and the risk that the effects of 
climate change can be much more sever than we predict. Future generations may have higher 
consumption levels but we will have limited their consumption choices. Economists will have 
a very difficult time putting a dollar figure on these kinds of problems, while they must cer-
tainly play a huge role in our assessments about what to do. 
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forts to free-ride and various forms of non-participation as long as there was 
no credible system of compliance built into the system. Even more trouble-
some, Gardiner notes that given a situation where past generations have not 
engaged in significant mitigation “The same reasoning will apply to each 
future generation as it comes into being. However much it may deplore the 
effects of the previous generations decisions on it, each generation will face 
the same decision situation with respect to generations later than it.”190 The 
nature of the problem is such that if each generation acts on its rational self-
interest we will be stuck on the path of inadequate action and the human race 
will behave in a way that will dramatically worsen the environmental condi-
tions for its own wellbeing.  
The above analysis is not as easily comparable to the kind of collective 
action problems that are thought to justify the need for coercive political 
arrangements as it may appear at first. This is because it does not seem to 
make much sense to say that humanity faces a collective action problem. 
Humanity is not an agent that can cooperate with some other agent. Mean-
while, existing agents such as individuals or states that can actually encoun-
ter cooperative challenges do not seem to be faced with the likes of a prison-
ers’ dilemma or some kind of assurance problem in the case of climate 
change. Existing agents in general do not have clear self-regarding interests 
for cooperating because the expected welfare benefits will be incurred by 
other people in the future. At the same time, it is precisely an interest in the 
welfare benefits associated with cooperation that are usually highlighted 
when one appeals to a prisoners’ dilemma or some assurance collective ac-
tion problem in justifying the need for political order on Hobbesian grounds.  
The implication one could draw is that existing agents simply do not face 
the kind of collective action problem that could give them reasons to accept 
the interference of political institutions. The argument for a global political 
authority to address the threat of global warming does not even get off the 
ground because we cannot identify any interests or reasons existing agents 
have that could justify to them that they need such an arrangement. In re-
sponse to this conclusion one might argue that states, unlike individuals, 
have self-regarding interests that span several generations. From a state level 
perspective we can still justify the need for political order following Hobbe-
sian reasoning. 
It seems at least plausible to characterise the interests of states in this way 
because they regularly plan investments and projects in ways aimed at secur-
ing some interest in the future. Current members do not clearly gain personal 
welfare benefits from such efforts. If we accept for the sake of argument that 
states are agents with interests that span several generations, the fact that 
benefits from GHG emissions reductions arrive far off into the future does 
not mean that existing agents necessarily lack rational self-interested reasons 
                               
190 Gardiner, "The Real Tragedy of the Commons," 404. 
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to want to secure cooperation. States may have such interests, which means 
that global warming mitigation can still be depicted as a pure global public 
good, i.e. a tragedy of the commons collective action problem. As such it 
would still make sense to justify the need for political authority on Hobbe-
sian grounds. One can imagine a host of empirical objections to this line of 
reasoning but we need not address these here. There is a normative objection 
that makes an argument based on the intergenerational interests of states 
somewhat unattractive for the task of justification as it has been set up in this 
chapter. 
Justifying a supranational political order based on the interests of states as 
described above entails expecting of existing individuals that they accept 
certain limits on their liberty for the interests of the state as opposed to ac-
cepting the demands of political order for their own interests and/or the in-
terests of other members of their communities. Treating the interests of 
states as ends that take priority over the interests of individuals is not com-
patible with individualist theories of justice. Egalitarians see individuals as 
ends in themselves and as a result must reject a justification of political order 
where individuals are thought to simply be of instrumental value to the states 
that rule over them. It is the state that is thought to be instrumentally value to 
members and not visa versa. This means that utilitarians and liberals, for 
example, do not have access to the argument that states have intergenera-
tional interests in avoiding damaging climate change when they try to justify 
the need for a supranational political authority. This in turn means that liber-
als will be hard pressed to find a way to justify the prospect of coercive po-
litical arrangements for the global warming case on Hobbesian grounds.  
There is a third way to justify the need for political authority that both 
takes into consideration the intergenerational structure of the global warming 
problem and that can be acceptable following the premises widely adopted in 
individualistic theories of justice. This is to argue that we have other regard-
ing moral reasons to address the threat global warming. Following this ar-
gument we could justify the constitution of some system of political author-
ity on Lockean grounds by arguing that the protection of individuals’ natural 
rights is dependent on the institution of an order that will leave intact the 
natural conditions all individuals depend on and have a right to. In a similar 
fashion one could appeal to Kantian/contractualist grounds by arguing that 
treating others as our moral equals requires that we make a serious effort to 
mitigate climate change and secure the environmental conditions all indi-
viduals’ welfare is dependant on. The clearest way to incorporate such 
Lockean or Kantian moral arguments for action would be to appeal to what 
we owe to individuals in the future. 
Appealing to moral reasons for action does appear to be a workable way 
to argue that the difficulties in getting existing agents to cooperate to address 
the threat of global warming represents a collective action problem for these 
agents. This is because the collective goods arguments for the state within 
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liberal tradition commonly go beyond Hobbes’ rationalist economic justifi-
cation and incorporate moral reasons for accepting political order. If existing 
agents have moral reasons to avoid seriously damaging the environmental 
conditions future people’s welfare is dependant on, then they are faced with 
one of the kinds of collective action problems that are used to justify the 
need for the state within the liberal tradition.  
I adopt this third approach in advancing the thesis of this book, but the 
point of the current section is not to show that we do in fact have moral rea-
sons for action of this kind. Instead the aim is simply to show that it can 
make sense to see the difficulties in securing cooperation to address global 
warming as a collective action problem. As such the moral claim I have 
made thus far is very weak. Still, one might object to this weak claim by 
arguing that the appeal to other-regarding moral reasons for action intro-
duces some new line of reasoning that is not found among the common ar-
guments within the liberal tradition for why we need the state. In this tradi-
tion one invariably finds the argument that we should accept the state be-
cause of the benefits it affords us in terms of our own welfare and never 
exclusively because of the benefits it affords to some other people. It is not 
however the case that I have introduced some new way of justifying political 
order. The problem is instead that appeals to moral reasons for accepting a 
system of political order are regularly presented alongside self-regarding 
reasons for wanting a certain good. This can make it difficult to distinguish 
between the various kinds of reasons appealed to within the liberal tradition 
for why we need systems of political order. 
Take for example the collective good of law and order. As we have seen, 
the need for a system of political authority that provides this good is justified 
in part following a public goods rationale that appeals to each individual’s 
interest in the benefits associated with a unified political system of law and 
order. However, one also finds the argument that each individual should be 
afford the good of security within a given territory even if they cannot 
threaten anybody else’s security and cannot contribute resources to the sys-
tem of law and order. This argument for universal inclusion in a system of 
law and order does not follow a public goods rationale. We do not have self-
regarding welfare interests in including such individuals in a system of law 
and order. However, we do have other regarding moral reasons to do so. 
This gives us an additional reason for the public provision of law and order 
over market based provisions, but it is a reason that is independent from the 
Hobbesian argument for the state (i.e. economic public goods reasoning).  
We should note that there is a great deal of uncertainty on the level and 
timing of impacts from climate change and on the costs and effects of vari-
ous mitigation and adaptation strategies. It could, for example, turn out that 
existing individuals do have self-regarding interests to reduce total global 
GHG emissions or that the generation after ours has such an interest. If these 
conditions pertained one might be able to justify a global political project to 
 107
address this threat on Hobbesian grounds by appealing to individuals direct 
interests or to their indirect interests via some kind of overlapping-
generations rationale. However, I will not reflect over these more favourable 
conditions for drawing a comparison between the justification of the state 
and the global warming case here. Instead I will take it to be more plausible 
and more representative of current cost-benefits analysis to argue the exist-
ing agents do not have self-regarding welfare interests in reducing their 
GHG emissions (i.e. I adopt an empirical point of departure that makes it 
more difficult to defend the cosmopolitan thesis of this book). Even so we 
have seen that it can still make sense to justify the need for some system of 
supranational political order to address this threat following liberal premises.  
It is now clear how I think one could argue that global warming is as a 
collective problem for existing agents. However, I have used the term ‘col-
lective action problem,’ and this may still cause confusion without further 
explanation. Since I am not adopting the Hobbesian justification of political 
order it must be further explained why we should expect that free-riding 
would undermine voluntary efforts to provide the good of a stable climate to 
future generations. In what way am I making a comparison to the collective 
action problems normally used to justify the state? In what way can we say 
that a moral reason for existing agents to address the problem of climate 
change result in them having a collective action problem?  
 
Do existing agents face a collective action problem? 
If I can show:  
 
a) that it is not likely that existing agents will be able to cooperate 
through voluntary agreements to protect our climate because what is 
required is some way to ensure compliance to costly policies and 
b) that existing agents have decisive moral reasons to cooperate in pro-
tecting the climate, then 
c) it follows that existing agents indirectly have some strong reasons to 
create a global system for ensuring compliance to costly policies. 
 
In other words, one could offer a moral justification to existing agents for the 
global political duty defended in this work. 
Establishing a) is what is centrally important for Chapter III, and estab-
lishing this point in a way that can be used to advance a normative thesis is 
not particularly dependent on definitional issues like ‘what does and does not 
count as a collective action problem.’ Still there remains a question about 
why we should at a theoretical level think that achieving cooperation in this 
case is comparable in some way to the collective action problems often ap-
pealed to in justifying the state. Such a comparison is implied in the text so 
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far but not spelled out. In explaining I will present three scenarios on how 
likely it is that we will see large scale global cooperation on a collective 
mitigation strategy. These are: 1) the pessimistic scenario, 2) the optimistic 
scenario, and 3) the unrealistic scenario.  
The pessimistic scenario 
Because of the intergenerational structure of the global warming problem the 
likelihood that we will see meaningful global cooperation to reduced GHG 
emissions is less than for standard state level public goods. This is because it 
is largely future generations that will benefit from the current generations 
efforts. The claim that the cooperative problem in the global warming case is 
more difficult that the standard public goods case should not be taken as an 
attempt to introduce some new line of reasoning in formal game theory on 
what the most difficult kind of collective action problem is. 
In formal game theory a prisoners’ dilemma is the most difficult kind of 
collective action problem because although the parties would, if given such a 
choice, prefer to have the results from general cooperation over the results 
from general non-cooperation, there is no way to maintain a stable coopera-
tive strategy between players without some outside interference. Normally 
we expect such a preference for the results from cooperation to at least make 
it more likely that individuals will be able to successfully agree to some type 
of cooperation. Yet in the prisoners’ dilemma it does not appear to make a 
difference. Provision of goods like national defence or law and order are 
thought to have a prisoners’ dilemma structure, which plays a central role in 
justifying the need for coercive political institutions to secure cooperation in 
providing such goods. In the case of global warming the point I want to 
highlight is that we have less reason to think that existing agents will in fact 
have preferences for the expected outcomes from effective cooperation to 
mitigate the human impact on the climate than is the case for public goods 
like law and order. This is because their own welfare in not improved by 
such cooperative efforts. The implications for how difficult it is to secure 
cooperation in the climate change case follows logically.  
If we are trying to secure cooperation so as to provide something that is 
considered to be a good, for one reason or another, it is easier to do so if the 
agents in question have self-interested reasons to want the outcomes ex-
pected to follow from cooperation. It is harder to secure cooperation if they 
do not have self-interested, i.e. egotistical, reasons to want the good but in-
stead expect that cooperation will be a cost for them in relation to their self-
regarding welfare interests. In a standard collective goods case like national 
defence agents have an interest in free-riding but they also have self-
interested reasons for wanting the introduction of political institutions that 
can make cooperation in general stable. In the global warming case coopera-
tion is simply a cost in relation to self-interest. 
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We may a have convincing normative argument for the view that existing 
agents ought not to seriously pollute the atmosphere and that they ought to 
collectively provide the good of a stable climate for future generations. 
However, in a pessimistic scenario where individuals taken as a whole have 
a strong tendency to act on their partial interests and not for weighing in the 
interests of others they will follow their welfare incentives to avoid the miti-
gation outcome. In these circumstances we should not expect voluntary 
global accords to be effective. In fact, it is only logical to expect it to be 
highly unlikely that agents will see themselves as having reasons to support 
international agreements or the creation of political institutions that could 
secure global cooperation. 
If we have a clear normative argument showing that agents ought to do 
something about global warming and a clear empirical argument showing 
that they must cooperate with each other to achieve results, then we can say 
that it is a problem that they do not want to act collectively. But can we say 
that this is a collective action problem? Following the definition of a collec-
tive action problem in formal game theory the answer is no, and it is even 
more wrongheaded to suggest that they have a collective action problem that 
is more difficult to resolve than a standard prisoners’ dilemma. Instead what 
one should say is that there is no more of a collective action problem in the 
case of global warming than there is in the case of trying to get two people to 
cooperate in riding a tandem bicycle off of a cliff. However we must be care-
ful to note that this conclusion is not correct if it is supposed to indicate 
some normative standard for when agents ought and ought not to do some-
thing.  
There is nothing internal to formal game theory that can tell us when non-
cooperation ought to be considered a problem on normative grounds. Formal 
game theory simply adopts as a premise that agents have a collective action 
problem when they have preferences that would be better served by coopera-
tion but that can also make it rational for them to act uncooperatively indi-
vidually. However, in normative theory one cannot argue that X does not 
have a reason to keep his promises because X does not want to keep his 
promises, while Z does have a reason to keep his promises simply because Z 
wants to keep his promises. One could of course imagine a normative argu-
ment that did say this, but such a claim would have to be based or more that 
the simple empirical fact that X does not want to keep his promises. Yet, in 
formal game theory it is absolutely correct to say that X does not have rea-
sons to keep his promises and Z does if these are in fact their informed pref-
erences. This is not a criticism of game theory; instead the point is that for-
mal game theory does very little on its own to help us in developing norma-
tive arguments one way or another when the question is ‘ought X do Y.’191   
                               
191 In fact formal game theory does not even show that individuals ought to do something 
when this satisfies their preferences. 
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What then does this mean for the definitional issue in regards to what 
counts as a ‘collective action problem?’ In conditions where existing agents 
do not demonstrate preferences to provide future generations the good of a 
stable climate we cannot say that they face a collective action problem. 
However, we could say that global warming is a problem for which agents 
have moral reasons to act collectively. This later formulation will make 
sense if one can provide an argument showing that existing agents have de-
cisive moral reasons to cooperate in mitigating global warming.  
The optimistic scenario 
Let us now imagine a more optimistic scenario where existing agents do 
come to have relatively strong preferences for providing future generations 
with the good of a stable climate (i.e. they come to have preferences based 
on the moral conviction that it would be wrong to destroy the environmental 
conditions future generations will be dependent on). In such a situation we 
find a problem of free-riding. This is because individuals’ self-interested 
reasons for polluting have not magically disappeared. They still have reasons 
to pollute, namely their own economic welfare is best served when they can 
continue to pollute. For an individual agent that has both a preference for 
providing the good of a stable climate to future generations and an economic 
welfare based preference for polluting, the optimal outcome from their per-
spective is that others stop polluting (i.e. others provide the good) while they 
themselves free-ride on these efforts. This is optimal for the individual be-
cause they can continue to enjoy the benefits associated with polluting while 
others ensure that the good of a stable climate is provided to the future. Here 
we see that the problem has a prisoners’ dilemma/pure public goods struc-
ture. Individuals free-ride because they cannot be excluded from collective 
efforts, and this in turn means that adequate levels of cooperation are diffi-
cult to maintain. In the optimistic scenario we can say that agents face a col-
lective action problem comparable to those used to justify the need for the 
state.  
The analysis above is true if we accept a view of human nature in which 
people are strongly motivated to do things that benefit themselves in some 
way. The claim is not that people are only motivated by self-interest but 
rather that this is one of the central motivations individuals have. Accepting 
the liberal argument for why we need the state entails accepting this view of 
human nature because otherwise one could not point to free-riding problems 
to justify the need for coercive political institutions at the state level. If peo-
ple were not strongly motivated by self-interest such free-riding would not 
be prevalent and would not undermine more voluntary forms of social order 
and public good provision at the domestic scope. Thus those that think the 
state is justifiable following liberal premises should also accept that free-
riding will in fact be a problem in the optimistic scenario described above.  
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Given the lack of self-interested reasons for action our theoretical expec-
tations should be that states could not achieve a dramatic reversal in GHG 
emissions trends through largely voluntary international agreements like the 
Kyoto Protocol. Even if individuals and states did have some strong prefer-
ences to do something about climate change, the problem would still have 
the character of a tragedy of the commons collective action problem. The 
difficulties in achieving effective cooperation to prevent the worse effects of 
global warming are thus similar to the difficulties involved in providing col-
lective goods like law and order. What is worse, it is not even collectively 
worth the cost to live up to the demands of an international agreement that 
would entail large cuts in GHG emissions. This further undermines the like-
lihood that international accords with weak compliance mechanisms will 
result in meaningful levels of mitigation. Thus we should have a theoretical 
expectation that the good of global warming mitigation will be at least un-
derprovided through voluntary international agreements (note that in the 
following sections of this chapter I will introduce further support for this 
assessment from existing research). 
The fact that existing agents do not have self-interested welfare reasons 
for action that are pulling them in the direction of cooperation, as is the case 
in standard public goods reasoning, does mean that achieving cooperation is 
potentially more not less difficult than it is in the standard public goods sce-
nario. This claim is still not an attempt to introduce some new reasoning into 
game theory on how difficult a strictly defined collective action problem can 
be. Rather the point is that when we find ourselves somewhere between the 
pessimistic and optimistic scenario we have added reasons to doubt the ef-
fectiveness of voluntary global accords. As such the most optimistic scenario 
we should accept is that given enough moral motivation for action it could 
be possible to secure widespread global cooperation to address the threat of 
global warming. However, an effective arrangement could not be achieved 
without some institutional system aimed at credible collective compliance to 
coordinated policies that could help existing agents overcome their global 
collective action problems.   
The unrealistic scenario 
One might argue that if individual agents’ preferences for providing fu-
ture generations the good of climate change mitigation are strong then they 
must be willing to take on costs to achieve this end. When agents are willing 
to take on costs in this way we should not expect free-riding to be a problem 
in securing cooperation, which in turn means that agents do not face a col-
lective action problem at all. Free-riding is about efforts to avoid taking on 
costs, but if we take agents to be strongly morally motivated to do something 
about climate change they already have a willingness to take on costs not an 
 112 
interest in avoiding them. This way of reasoning amounts to an unrealistic 
scenario.  
If individuals’ self-interested preferences for free-riding in a cooperative 
situation can undermine collective efforts despite the fact that a collective 
effort best serves each agents’ over all self-interested preferences, why 
would we expect individuals’ self-interested preferences for free-riding to 
not undermine collective efforts that only serve their other regarding moral 
preferences? The unrealistic scenario seems to depend on the view that it is 
possible for agents to simply look beyond their own self-interest when they 
have a strong moral argument for contributing to a collective effort. Yet if 
we justify the state because not enough agents can look beyond their indi-
vidual short-term self-interest even though the collective effort will in the 
long-term best serve each agent’s welfare interests, it seems contradictory to 
claim that a global form of political authority is not needed because agents 
can simply act in the welfare interests of others without being affected by 
their own short-term welfare interests.   
The unrealistic scenario does describe a situation that is not a collective 
action problem. However, it is also based on a view of human nature that 
would make it difficult not only to justify a global form of political authority 
but any form of political authority. As such, those that think the state is justi-
fiable but not global forms of political authority cannot simply appeal to the 
unrealistic scenario and claim that political institutions are not necessary to 
achieve cooperation in the global warming case. It is inconsistent to deny 
that we currently face a global collective action in the case of global warm-
ing while still appealing to collective action problems for the production of 
public goods like law and order to justify the state.  
In my view we now find ourselves somewhere between the pessimistic 
and optimistic scenarios. I do think existing agents have a preference to pro-
vide the future the good of a stable climate. However, existing agents’ con-
cerns for the interests of future others may not weigh heavily against their 
partial interests in their own short-term economic welfare. This would best 
explain the adoption of weakly demanding global accords like the Kyoto 
protocol that have very weak compliance mechanisms. If we do currently 
find ourselves somewhere between the pessimistic and optimistic scenario it 
seems to me to be more accurate to describe the cooperative challenges we 
face as collective action problems. Yet, the argument here is not dependent 
on demonstrating how strong agents’ preferences for providing future gen-
erations with environmental goods are in relation to their own economic 
welfare interests. Rather the point is that if we are to secure large scale and 
effective global cooperation to reduce our impact on the climate we must 
approach the optimistic scenario. At the same time it is not reasonable to 
think that we could arrive at the unrealistic scenario. Thus the theoretical 
expectation I am advancing is that cooperation is possible, but only if we 
overcome some difficult global collective action problems.  
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The argument provided thus far defends characterizing the cooperative 
problems generated by the threat of global warming as a collective action 
problem, and this is the term I will use in the remainder of this work. One 
might complain at this point that I have taken the reader on an awfully 
roundabout path merely to confirm what economic theory and common 
sense told us from the outset. I can only agree. We have travelled quite far 
simply to arrive back to viewing the mitigation of global warming as having 
a public goods or tragedy of the commons structure. However, we can now 
see the intergenerational structure of the global warming problem, the role 
other regarding reasons for action must play, and that we should not expect 
securing cooperation to provide the good of a stable climate to be easier to 
do than for public goods like law and order but potentially more difficult.   
The remainder of this chapter will review existing research to assess the 
plausibility of the above theoretical assessment and the implication that fol-
lows from it; namely that providing the global collective good of a stable 
climate will require some supranational system to enforce coordinated policy 
at the global scope. Yet before moving on to this review it is worth pausing 
to examine a final and familiar critique of the claims offered thus far. The 
objection is that the global collective goods argument employed above is 
based on a faulty analogy with the domestic collective goods justification of 
the state.  
The domestic analogy 
Proposals for global forms of political order are often accused on making a 
faulty domestic analogy. The analogy is that states need a supranational form 
of political order to achieve some collective good for the same reasons indi-
viduals need a system of political order to secure similar collective goods. 
The implication of the analogy is that states and relations between states are 
like individuals and relations between individuals. The first suggested prob-
lem with the analogy is that empirical evidence does not support the view 
that states have the same kinds of difficulties in achieving order/collective 
action independent of an overarching political order as individuals do within 
a given territory. The other problem is that it is not accurate to suggest that 
the solutions to generating order and certain kinds of collective action be-
tween individuals at the domestic scope can be applied to relations between 
states at the global scope.192 It is worth noting where this analogy is not ap-
parent in this work, where it is apparent, and what implications this entails 
for the over all normative thesis I advance.  
I will argue that we need some supranational system for enforcing global 
policies that could for example generate a credible scheme of global prices 
                               
192 See Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 9-23, 165-96. 
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on carbon emissions. However this position does not commit one to the view 
that it is as difficult for states to adequately provide collective goods in the 
international sphere independent of a coercive global political order as it is 
for individuals to do so in large scale societies without a state. The argument 
of this work is only dependent on the claim that in the case of global warm-
ing it is not likely that states will be able to achieve adequate cooperation 
without some system for monitoring and enforcement of collective policies 
at the global scope. It is not necessary in defending my thesis that the reason 
for this be some close parallel between what individuals can accomplish and 
what states can accomplish in terms of collective action with other like 
agents. There is of course a parallel in the sense that the argument points to 
collective action problems both at the domestic and global levels. However, 
it obviously cannot be the case that an argument fails based on a faulty do-
mestic analogy as soon as one claims that there are collective action prob-
lems at the global scope. That would amount to a denial that we ever face 
such collective challenges, which is patently false.  
One might instead argue that the domestic analogy involved in this work 
is problematic largely because it prescribes a new supranational political 
arrangement with credible enforcement instruments. Robert O. Keohane and 
Joseph S. Nye argue that it is just not likely that peoples “in some two hun-
dred states will be willing to act on the domestic analogy for well into the 
new century.”193 The proposal for global forms of political authority is faulty 
because it is, 
state structures, and the loyalty of people to particular states, that enable 
states to create connections among themselves, handle issues of interdepend-
ence, and resist amalgamation…. Hence, world government during our life-
times seems unlikely, at least in the absence of an overwhelming global 
threat that could only be dealt with in a unified way.194  
 
I will defend the view that global warming could very well be the kind of 
overwhelming threat Keohane and Nye allude to.195 Furthermore, the over-
arching argument of this work is a cosmopolitan one about the applicability 
of certain duties of justice as the global scope. The willingness for action or 
lack there of does not obviously affect the plausibility of this type of norma-
tive argument.  
The view to be defended is that the justification that can be offered to in-
dividuals for why they should support the state also seems to justify the con-
clusion that individuals ought to support the creation of a global political 
                               
193 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Introduction," in Governance in a Globalizing 
World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 13-14. 
194 Ibid., 13. 
195 Note that the argument I advanced is based on the notion of divisible sovereignty and not 
on a world state or federation, which weakens the domestic analogy at least to some degree. 
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project to address the threat of climate change. This is what Hidemi Suga-
nami calls a “logical deduction from a normative proposition asserted to be 
valid in any human context, domestic international, or otherwise,” which is 
not an example of a faulty domestic analogy.196 For example, a theory on the 
moral reasons to keep promises can be applied at the domestic and global 
scopes and to individuals and states without making a faulty analogy.197  
There of course remains the problem of whether or not we could imple-
ment supranational political institutions with comparable functions to do-
mestic political institutions. Still, the supposed faulty logic of the global 
political prescription is based on the assessment that there is a lack of politi-
cal will to create the kind of supranational arrangements proposed. It is 
clearly not a compelling normative argument to suggest that some moral 
demand on X to do Y does not apply simply because X does not want to do 
Y. If people are not willing to support a political solution this may have an 
impact on our assessments of what a specific individual or even political 
society ought to do given this broader moral failure. However, such consid-
erations would not entail a move away from the general view that individu-
als ought to support a global political solution.  
The political economy of global warming  
Economic analysis increasingly points to the conclusion that the costs of 
investment in mitigation now and/or over the medium term are outweighed 
by the benefits associated with avoiding the warming that will occur over the 
next century and beyond if we do not make such investments.198 There is 
significant disagreement among economists on the most efficient level and 
timing of investment in mitigation.199 Still, many of the major studies in cost-
benefit analyses are predicting not only overall pay-offs from mitigation but 
also that the costs are relatively low or at least manageable.200 At the same 
time, the message coming for economic research is that such an efficient 
effort to mitigate global warming will require a common, coordinated and a 
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nearly global system for putting prices on green house gas (GHG) emissions, 
especially for CO2.201 Without such coordinated global policies the costs of 
mitigation will rise dramatically and the prospects for avoiding dangerous 
climate change will be considerably worsened.  
The most compelling research on the political economy and international 
relations of climate change points to the conclusion that states will not be 
able to implement an effective and coordinated global policy that directly 
sets deep emissions cuts or that generates efficient global prices on GHG 
emissions through voluntary or weakly enforced international agreements 
like the Kyoto Protocol.202 Here the evidence points to a lack of incentives 
for states and the current generation as a whole to take on the costs created 
by policies that would meaningfully reduce GHG emissions.203 Correspond-
ingly, this research suggests that even given a global agreement on mitiga-
tion policies it is not plausible that states will take on the direct and indirect 
costs involved in implementing a credible system of compliance to costly 
mitigation policies.204 Yet, it is precisely a credible system for monitoring 
and compliance that is central for the successful implementation of the kind 
of agreement that is cost effective enough to have a chance at success.  
The basic idea is that incentive structures are such that the effectiveness 
of mitigation agreements are undermined when there is a lack of strong en-
forcements mechanism. If this is true we would expect any treaty actually 
achieved to be hampered by non-participation, very weak emissions targets, 
failures to meet targets, delaying of emissions cuts to the future, and a lack 
of enforcement mechanisms, which are typical criticisms of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. In further assessing research on this problem it will be useful to look at 
existing experience in terms of the ability of international agreements be-
tween states to provide comparable environmental public goods.  
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Experience from existing global accords 
So far we have a fairly pessimistic theoretical picture of the possibilities for 
mitigating global warming,205 but it may be objected that real world efforts to 
produce global public goods undermine the analysis above. There are two 
clear strategies in the existing literature for demonstrating that this is not so 
in the case of global warming. The first is to compare climate change to pro-
tection of the ozone layer, another environmental good that in theory appears 
to be a pure public good. States have been able to significantly curb ozone 
depleting emissions and have been able to implement a successful interna-
tional agreement, the Montreal Protocol, in the absence of transnational sys-
tem of political authority to enforce abatement targets.206 Highlighting differ-
ences between the two cases supports the claim that a strategy for global 
enforcement is needed if significant reductions of GHG emissions are to be 
achieved. The second strategy is to show that the actual behaviour of states, 
in particular with regards to the Kyoto protocol, does in fact coincide with 
what we would expect given the theoretical analysis above.  
Global warming is not the new ozone 
What were the factors that made collective action to reduce ozone depleting 
emissions possible and that are not present in the case of global warming? 
First, twelve countries accounted for 78% of emission when the Montreal 
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Protocol was ratified207 and the numbers of economic activities associated 
with CFC emissions were limited. Just a few firms were responsible for a 
very large percentage of all production in the US, the largest emitter, and this 
meant that there we fewer parties and interests that needed to be satisfied and 
organised to produce a working agreement.208 Following standard theories of 
collective action one expects better prospects for success given fewer actors 
to coordinate.209 One of the most important contributions to the success of 
collective action on ozone depletion was that the US estimated that they 
would benefit from unilateral reductions of their emissions, and Belgium, 
Canada, Norway, and Sweden followed the US in imposing unilateral bans 
on CFCs early on.210  
Because the US took a leadership role in reductions the incentives for 
others to follow increased. Having the biggest polluter take the leadership 
role raises other countries’ confidence that their efforts will not be under-
mined by non-cooperating actors that have larger effects on total pollution 
levels. Both the cost-benefit structure and the ability to motivate vested in-
terests were helped by the availability of replacement technologies (e.g. 
HCFCs and HFCs). These alternatives made significant emissions cuts eco-
nomically feasible, practicable and of commercial interest, all of which 
helped support the conditions for political acceptance of deep emissions 
reductions in developed countries. Because several developed countries cal-
culated that they had an interest in cutting CFC emissions they were willing 
to make concessions and transfers to developing countries in the negotiation 
process to assist them in taking up new technologies. Correspondingly, de-
veloped countries that wanted to reduce CFC emissions also had incentives 
to use the threat of trade restrictions to influence non-members to the 
treaty.211 These policies entailed commitments to take on costs directly or 
indirectly to facilitate the broad adaptation of control measures and essen-
tially changed the structure of the game into one of coordination around a 
specific collective solution, i.e. transfer to a new technological standard.212  
Another key factor that favoured voluntary agreement between states to 
curb depletion of the ozone layer is that measurable recovery of the ozone 
layer was expected to arrive by 2025 with benefits from recovery arriving 
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already in 2050.213  This fact combined with a much more favourable cost-
benefit expectation than in the case of climate change over the short to me-
dium term means that the ozone problem does not involve the same kind of 
intergenerational challenge we face for climate change. Had the benefits of 
mitigating ozone depletion been far off into the future collective action 
would have been much more difficult to achieve.214  
One might argue that small a sub-group of high polluting countries could 
reduce GHG emissions enough to either unilaterally significantly mitigate 
future impacts or to facilitate global coordination around an aggressive 
abatement strategy. However, there are many more large players with deep 
economic interests in the burning of fossil fuels than was true in the ozone 
case. Developing countries currently account for 39% of world emissions 
and the International Energy Agency predicts that they will be responsible 
for three-quarters of the increase in total CO2 emissions that will occur be-
tween 2004 and 2030. Developing countries will 
overtake the OECD as the biggest emitter by soon after 2010.…China alone 
is responsible for about 39% of the rise in global emissions. China’s emis-
sions more than double between 2004 and 2030, driven by strong economic 
growth and heavy reliance on coal in power generation and industry. China 
overtakes the United States as the world’s biggest emitter before 2010. Other 
Asian countries, notably India, also contribute heavily to the increase in 
global emissions. The per-capita emissions of non-OECD countries nonethe-
less remain well below those of the OECD.215 
 
As Gardiner points out, cooperative efforts on GHG mitigation are particu-
larly vulnerable to being undermined when there are non-cooperating parties 
that have or potentially have a capacity to pollute at significant levels be-
cause of technical capacity or because they have a large population.216 The 
relevant interests for non-cooperation and the capacities to undermine the 
efforts of others are widespread in the case of global warming.  
Still, it is clearly not necessary to incorporate all countries in a global 
scheme in order to succeed in mitigating climate change. Countries that cur-
rently do not have significant GHG emissions, that have small populations, 
and that have little capacity for industrial expansion will not have an impact 
on agreements other states make. Yet countries with such characteristics are 
not influential internationally meaning that they do not generally have an 
impact on global collective  actions problems and that they have little oppor-
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tunity to not follow standards adopted by the rest of the international com-
munity. As Gardiner puts it, “the focus on partial compliance is thus at best 
misleading.”217 
A second argument is that states can create incentives for both partici-
pants and non-participants to accept significant emissions targets by includ-
ing in the next climate treaty a commitment to both make transfers to devel-
oping countries and to use trade sanctions against defectors and non-treaty 
countries that emit above the agreed to levels.218 Trade sanctions are one way 
to employ coercive economic mechanisms in achieving cooperation at the 
global scope, and may be a necessary tool in the design of a global system 
for coordination and enforcement of policies for achieving aggressive GHG 
reductions targets. Yet, sanctions have to be relatively mild in voluntary 
international agreements to give states reasons to both enter into and remain 
within the agreement. Sanctions are also costly to coordinate and impose, 
meaning that the implementation of sanctions itself becomes a public good 
subject to free-riding.219  
Following the logic of collective action we can say that in order for the 
threat of sanctions to be credible in a voluntary agreement like the Montreal 
or Kyoto Protocols it must be both collectively and individually rational for 
the relevant parties to impose them.220 To be optimistic about the ability of 
states to use trade restrictions in the context of an international environ-
mental treaty we need to find that at least one of the two criteria are met. 
However, for the case of climate change it is neither collectively nor indi-
vidually rational in the self-interested sense for any given generation to vol-
untarily employ sever trade restrictions to motivate significant GHG reduc-
tions.  
Sanctions must be harsh enough to change behaviour, but damaging trade 
sanctions on countries that have significant enough production to negatively 
impact mitigation efforts will almost certainly also harm cooperating parties, 
undermining the credibility of sanctions.221 Furthermore, unlike in the ozone 
case some key players expect that the costs of abatement outweigh for them 
the benefits over both the short to medium term.222 There is also a great deal 
of uncertainty about the effects of climate change, and some states may actu-
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ally calculate that they stand to benefit potentially creating the need for 
transfers in the agreement.223 Unlike with CFCs, GHG emissions are related 
to all sectors of the economy and this means that any strategy must address 
the interests of a vast array of actors (i.e. countries, provinces and states, 
industries, companies, and individual consumers) making collective action 
much more difficult. 
Another scenario is one where most countries have some incentive to re-
duce their emissions because they can reach a threshold where a few major 
and non-cooperating emitters’ decisions to continue to pollute or not will in 
fact determine whether or not we can achieve the collective benefit of miti-
gating human induced global warming. The idea is that the game is not a 
prisoners’ dilemma because countries have an added incentive to cut their 
emissions even when several large and/or high polluting countries are not.224 
If the threshold is reached the non-cooperation large emitters will be a great 
deal more likely to stop polluting because what they choose will actually 
determine whether or not negative climate consequences will be avoided. 
This is sometimes called a “step good”225 or a “weakest link”226 good. Cli-
mate change is a summation good but some have suggested that summation 
goods can be changed into a step good with the introduction of assurance 
contracts where signatories agree to provide the good should a certain 
threshold of participation be achieved.227  
In fact this is part of the strategy used in agreements like the Montreal and 
Kyoto protocols, but in the absence of a system for enforcement to guarantee 
that signatories accept the terms we must ask what incentives there are to 
honour such a global assurance contract. States reserve for themselves the 
right to unilaterally exit the Kyoto treaty meaning that there is nothing that 
prevents signatories from choosing a free-rider strategy once the large emit-
ter’s are on board. In general there are many difficulties with trying to turn 
n-person summation goods into step goods,228 and it is unlikely that a few 
countries could aggressively pollute the commons generating significant 
competitive advantages for themselves over any extended period of time 
without forcing those other countries trying to create cooperation incentives 
for key polluters back into the logic of a prisoners’ dilemma. 
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Kyoto as evidence for the expected under provision of mitigation 
Another complaint against the dreary description of the challenges involved 
in addressing global warming is that it is in obvious opposition to the inter-
national reality of cooperation. The Kyoto Protocol has been ratified, after 
all, by a majority of the world’s states. This is true but as empirical evidence 
the Kyoto Protocol tends to support the pessimistic view not the optimistic 
one. If it is true that the problem of climate change leads to collective action 
problems that tend to undermine attempts at cooperation between states we 
would expect an international treaty to be hampered by non-participation, 
very low emissions targets, delaying of emissions cuts to the future, and a 
lack of enforcement mechanisms. Each of the expectations is descriptive of 
the current climate treaty.  
The United States (US) is the largest single emitter of GHGs and with-
drew from the protocol in 2001, demonstrating a non-cooperative strategy. 
Australia followed the US in leaving the agreement (after a change of gov-
ernment Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December of 2007), and 
other countries, particularly Russia, re-negotiated their commitments down-
grading their targets. Developing countries including one’s that will increas-
ingly have a major impact on climate change such as China and India have 
refused to accept emissions limits. Non-participation means that the actual 
reductions we can expect from Kyoto are somewhat limited, but we should 
also note that we have seen a watering down of the original reduction targets 
for participants as well.  
A conservative estimate is that the Kyoto commitments for Annex I coun-
tries have been downgraded to a 2% cut from 1990 levels, and Nordhaus 
(2001) estimates that the emissions reductions will only result in a 0.8% 
decrease from the do nothing scenario.229 We do not yet know what the ac-
tual impacts of Kyoto will be, but we do know that the level of emissions 
reductions following from the Kyoto Protocol are low and very low com-
pared to what the IPCC expects in necessary. Furthermore, these low im-
pacts should be understood in the context of the time it took to actually reach 
a binding agreement. The Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC) was initially adopted during the 1992 Earth Summit with 188 coun-
tries ratifying the agreement, but it was not possible to bring into force a 
binding agreement until Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2004.230  
Thinking about these delays must also be considered in the context of the 
IPCC’s claim that stabilising human induced global warming at levels low 
enough to avoid the more serious negative impacts would require over the 
                               
229 William D. Nordhaus, "Global Warming Economics," Science 294 (2001). Another study 
that expects very marginal actual reductions, if any at all, from the Kyoto protocol is Babiker 
et al., "The Evolution of a Climate Regime: Kyoto to Marrakesh and Beyond." 
230 For a summary of the process leading up to the Kyoto Protocol see Barrett, Environment 
and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making, 366-73. 
 123
near term that emissions be reduced 50-85% below current levels by 2050. 
At the same time, even if the Kyoto commitments are achieved the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that energy demand will have increased 
by 60% between 2002 and 2030, with fossil fuels meeting 85% on this de-
mand. Total global emissions of CO2 are expected to have increased by more 
than 60% over the same period!231 
Getting as many states as possible to accept the agreement has been 
bought at the cost of keeping ‘reduction’ targets low. Likewise, the Kyoto 
protocol has a very weak set of sanctions and the parties can simply opt out 
of the agreement three years after implementation.232 Those that fail to meet 
their 2008-2012 targets will be required to take on an additional 30% of 
emissions reduction above the emissions targets set for 2013-2017.  How-
ever,  
there is no procedure for enforcing the compliance agreement. Second, the 
emission limits for the second control period have yet to be negotiated. A 
country that worries that it may not be able to comply in the first control pe-
riod may thus hold out for easy targets in the second control period—so that 
the punishment, if triggered, doesn’t actually bite. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, a country can always avoid the punishment—by not ratifying a 
follow-on protocol for 2013-2017, or even by withdrawing from the Protocol 
at a later date.233 
 
Weak sanctions and sanctions that arrive only in the future are also what one 
would expect when the current generation does not suffer the consequences 
of its pollution while it enjoys the benefits of energy consumption. We need 
to ask ourselves what motivations there will be in the future to accept the 
sanctions associated with previous inaction.234  
The problem of state sovereignty 
We have identified clear theoretical and empirical reasons for thinking that 
the climate change problem is not less problematic than the coordination 
problems used in the liberal tradition to motivate creating political society 
but at least as problematic if not more so. When negative environmental 
externalities from economic activities are widely dispersed territorially and 
temporally and there are no political institutions that can ensure that states 
will internalise the environmental costs of economic growth we should ex-
pect the relevant actors to continue producing these costly environmental 
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externalities.235 The chief barrier we have identified to a programme of ag-
gressive global GHG emissions reductions is the lack of a global system for 
enforcing emissions targets or coordinated global instruments to put 
prices/costs on GHG emissions.  
In essence what we find by looking at international political economy and 
international relations work on these problems is a wearing conflict between 
two central research results pulling in opposite directions. These are that 
mitigation is worth the effort and that it is plausible to make a large differ-
ence to future environmental conditions without seriously undermining our 
own welfare given a globally coordinated strategy. At the same time such an 
efficient global strategy is not likely to be achieved in the kinds of interna-
tional agreements states produce. As a result we find a myriad of proposals 
that try to incorporate lessons from both results. Examples of some broad 
approaches include: improving on the existing Kyoto Protocol, club ap-
proaches that call for limiting negotiations to the top polluters, multiple-club 
approaches that abandon the grand coalition strategy in favour of several 
regional and/or sub-group treaties, domestic strategies where policies and 
instruments are applied only within states that in turn try to coordinate their 
domestic policies, and those that argue for the abandonment of emissions 
targets and price instruments altogether in favour of investment in techno-
logical research and agreements on climate friendly technology standards.236  
These policy prescriptions are serious compromises in view of the analy-
sis on the nature of the collective action problems generated by efforts to 
mitigate global warming. They either cannot adequately address the need for 
coordinate policies and incentive structures or cannot adequately address the 
need for compliance mechanisms to achieve the proposed coordination.237 
These kinds of policy proposals do however make sense when one takes the 
political constraints associated with the state system as a necessarily endur-
ing fact about global conditions.238 It is also telling that those proposals that 
do see enforcement to be paramount in order to implement a global plan for 
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reducing GHG emissions tend to recommend a focus on investment in tech-
nological solutions instead of political solutions.239 One of the main benefits 
of this alternative approach is that once economically feasible alternative 
technologies are available a smaller group of states that are large players on 
the international stage will have much better opportunities to try to get the 
rest of the world to coordinate around these more sustainable sources of en-
ergy by unilaterally adopting them.  
In this study I do not take the maintenance of state sovereignty as a prem-
ise in the prescriptive analysis but propose the creation of a supranational 
form of political authority that changes the authority structures of existing 
states. The mandate of this global political arrangement would be to design 
and enforce policy on the mitigation of global warming. In the absence of 
widespread voluntary transition to environmentally friendly technology in 
existing markets it seems that imposed GHG emissions reductions or prices 
that create genuine incentives to conserve and to invest in new technology 
are necessary policy instruments. This is because even if we are confident 
that we can develop commercially viable energy alternatives these efforts 
will require extensive political will and economic and institutional change. 
In order to understand why I defend such a political proposal we can identify 
three central objections to the argument. Addressing these will help to make 
it clear why a supranational form of political authority is thought to be 
needed in the morally relevant sense necessary to get the normative thesis of 
this book off the ground.  
Too much reliance on rational choice theory 
The first objection is that the analysis relies too much on game theory, which 
in turn is based on the assumption that agents are only motivated by rational 
self-interest. In reality we have other moral motivations that must greatly 
improve the prospects for cooperation. After all the only reason we are inter-
ested in the problem in the first place is because of the widespread concern 
over the environmental damage we are imposing on the future. Furthermore, 
if the rational self-interest assumption were a true reflection of our actual 
motivations there would be little benefit from creating a global form of po-
litical authority because we would not use this institutional structure to co-
operate on costly mitigation programmes. This objection misunderstands 
how results from research in international political economy are used in the 
analysis.  
The argument I advance is about what it is possible to achieve in the ab-
sence of political institutions designed to assure cooperation. It is argued that 
the self-interested reasons we do have for inaction will undermine the effec-
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tiveness of trying to use voluntary interstate accords to mitigate global 
warming despite the kind of political authority that can be exercised by sov-
ereign states. What is lacking is a supranational system that can secure com-
pliance. This argument does not amount to a denial that people are motivated 
by other regarding reasons for action. It is other regarding moral reasons that 
must be appealed to in motivating people to support a new global political 
project to address the human impact on our climate. The argument is instead 
that in the absence of the appropriate political institutions the conflict be-
tween self-interested reasons for inaction and other regarding reasons for 
action will undermine attempts to address this problem.  
The objector might counter that instead of showing the need for a supra-
national political arrangement the analysis simply shows that we are not 
currently being moral enough. What is needed is a change in our attitudes 
and not some global form of coercion. However, the point of the game theo-
retical analysis was to argue that addressing global warming entails solving a 
very difficult set of collective action problems that are at least as difficult as 
those used to justify the need for the state. One can of course argue that all 
we have to do is change our preferences so that we can cooperate through 
voluntary arrangements. However, if we can simply change our preferences 
and implement a just and voluntary programme for mitigating climate 
change why could we not also have voluntary and just social orders in the 
territories now governed by states? The argument that we can resolve collec-
tive action problems like those generate by the threat of climate change sim-
ply by choosing to emphasise moral preferences actually has anarchist im-
plications that the objector either does not intend or that entails a radical 
view on social order that is not particularly compelling.  
The charge of utopianism 
The second objection moves in the opposite direction and argues that the 
proposal I offer relies too much on individuals’ moral motivation to accept 
the kind of supranational arrangement I propose. Although we should not 
expect voluntary international agreements like Kyoto to result in meaningful 
levels of mitigation, global forms of political authority are not realisable and 
we should focus on more realistic options. In particular one finds several 
arguments along these lines that call for a focus on technical solutions and/or 
adaptation. In addressing this objection we should first note that there are 
broadly four different strategies to pursue in order to avoid the most danger-
ous impacts from global warming: 
 
1. Sovereign states achieve meaningful collective action via voluntary 
mitigation agreements.  
2. The discovery and/or implementation of system changing techno-
logical solutions. 
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3. Successfully learning to adapt to global warming.  
4. States seed some of their sovereignty to overcome their collective 
action problems and use collective politics to affect large scale GHG 
emissions reductions.  
 
Based on the analysis above 1 is going to seriously underperform. Approach 
2 appears to be a second best proposal, but it is not clear why this is sup-
posed to be less utopian.    
Note that the argument for a supranational form of political authority is 
not in opposition to a technical solution. If we choose to reduce our impact 
on the climate it will be to a significant extent through technical and organ-
isational change and innovations. Few expect that the developed world will 
be willing to move far away for the kinds of benefits we can currently asso-
ciate with high levels of energy use or that developing countries will be will-
ing to forgo these kinds of welfare gains. At the same time, the analysis that 
collective action between states cannot be achieved through voluntary means 
is based on a broad argument that individuals, companies, industries, and 
states do not have compelling enough self-interested reasons to invest in 
mitigation efforts. This means that under current conditions there is a lack of 
incentives for acting now to take on the costs of the technological and infra-
structural change that is thought to be necessary to avoid dangerous levels of 
warming. Thus it is odd to on the one hand accept the argument that volun-
tary international agreements will not lead to significant reductions in GHG 
emissions and then to argue on the other that we should rely on technological 
innovation.  
One could imagine some unexpected technological advance that markets 
would shift to simply out of economic self-interest. The hope is that new 
technology will be so commercially attractive that it will cover or at least 
severely reduce the costs of radically changing the energy structure of our 
economies and appeasing vested interests. But the discovery of such a magic 
bullet technology is not clearly less utopian than the prospect of a suprana-
tional political authority. 
Alternatively, the proposal might be limited to an argument for state in-
vestment in existing alternative energy sources and new energy sources. 
Surely such investment is both necessary and will help facilitate technologi-
cal change. Still it seems unrealistic to expect a level of state investment that 
could, on its own, change incentive structures within markets if we do not 
think that wealthy states are willing to unilaterally take on the costs of sig-
nificant GHG emissions cuts. Rather, the goal must surely be to harness 
market forces in order to get the broad scale global transitions in energy 
sources that are necessary. It seems reasonable to expect that markets will 
adopt alternative energy sources and invest in low carbon innovations in 
much more extensive ways than is currently true when there are high enough 
costs associated with GHG emissions (e.g. through emissions taxes or by 
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way of emissions caps and trading of credits). Such market focused meas-
ures are particularly important given the short time span over which changes 
must arrive in order to keep global warming at the lower end of predicted 
temperature increases.  
The third option is based on the view that we will not be able to avoid 
sever impacts from global warming and that the best way we can help those 
in the future is through economic growth and investments in adaptation. If 
we accept economic cost benefit analyses showing strong negative impacts 
far into the future from more severe levels of warming, then this proposal 
simply entails accepting substantial costs for future people. One could argue 
that given economic growth and innovation we will be able to avoid a large 
share of these predicted costs through adaptation. This question is an impor-
tant area of environmental and economic analysis in its own right, and 
clearly adaptation is something we must invest in given that we are already 
committed to some levels of global warming.  However, given uncertainty 
about both the effects of global warming and our coping capabilities we do 
not know how well we will be able to adapt to global warming. Furthermore, 
efforts to avoid global warming by reducing GHG emissions will benefit all 
of the world’s regions while adaptation will take place locally, and it is no 
less utopian to expect wealthy states to devote significant amounts of their 
own resources towards adaptation in poorer regions. The adaptation ap-
proach would likely entail imposing disproportionate costs on poor regions 
that face the impacts of global warming before they achieve the growth ex-
perienced in more developed countries.  
Option 4 is certainly technically feasible in the sense that we understand 
relatively well how to use policy measures to create market incentives for 
GHG emissions reductions. Still implementing a global system for assuring 
compliance to effective policy efforts may not be probable because of the 
problems of political will and workability noted in the introduction of this 
book and that follow from the analysis above. However, we can see that the 
other options also appear utopian in important ways at this shifts the debate 
somewhat.  
Global warming represents an enormous challenge and our response to it 
either now or in the future will also have to be considerable. In thinking 
about our options we must be aware that it is expected that by 2050 the 
world’s population will have increased from six to nine billion, global GDP 
will have more than tripled from today’s $35 trillion, and total global CO2 
emissions will be nearly 100% higher that current levels following current 
trajectories.240 At the same time the IPCC is calling for global CO2 emissions 
to be reduced to by 50-85% below 2000 levels by 2050. The challenge ahead 
involves reversing and decoupling powerful trends that are tightly bound up 
with each other over an extremely short period of time. The scale of the task 
                               
240 Bank World, The Road to 2050 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006). 
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and the speed with which it must occur combined with the expected conse-
quences of inaction do speak for the intervention of coercive political institu-
tions should we want to address this threat.  
The low cost of mitigation and moral motivation 
The final objection agrees that we need a globally coordinated policy to 
radically reduce global emissions, and it also agrees that this will be a net 
cost for the current generation and in the near to medium future. However 
because these costs are so low we do not face the intractable collective ac-
tion problem described above. Instead given both the low costs of mitigation 
and the widespread public concern over global warming the prospects for 
voluntary international agreements are good. In support of this view we can 
recall the cost estimates from the Stern Report and point to the IPCC’s 
Working Group III summary report “Mitigation of Climate Change” released 
in May of 2007. Here the IPCC predicts that we can achieve its most aggres-
sive plan for reducing GHG emissions at a yearly cost of only 0.12% of 
global GDP, which amounts to a 3% reduction of global GDP by 2030 com-
pared to a business as usual scenario (Figure 2).241  
Figure 2: The effect of a 0.12% reduction in global GDP growth 
GDP - business as 
usual 
GDP - most aggressive 
IPCC mitigation scenario
GDP
80% 
growth
present
77% 
growth
2030
 
These cost estimates do appear low when we think of them in terms differ-
ences in GDP growth trajectories.  
The IPCC predictions are very new and there is not yet sufficient critical 
review of these findings. However, what we can say is that in making these 
assessments the IPCC assumes a global carbon price that will create incen-
tives for greater energy efficiency, adoption of low carbon technologies, 
infrastructural commitment to alternative energy sources, and further innova-
                               
241 IPCC, "Mitigation of Climate Change - Summary for Policymakers," 16. 
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tion. Thus, the IPCC emphasises the importance of a carbon trading and/or 
carbon taxes that generate such incentives on a global scale.242 Crucially, the 
report states that  
models use a global least cost approach to mitigation portfolios and with uni-
versal emissions trading, assuming transparent markets, no transaction cost, 
and thus perfect implementation of mitigation measures throughout the 21st  
century…Global modelled costs will increase if some regions, sectors (e.g. 
land-use), options or gases are excluded.243  
 
This means that the IPCC’s position is that once there is a global scheme that 
sets at prince on GHG emissions the costs of mitigation will be more than 
manageable. However as soon as we move away from this model the costs 
of mitigation rise, probably very significantly.244 Thus we clearly cannot 
make the conclusion that because costs are low we do not need a global 
scheme.  Rather the conclusion to draw is that given a global scheme costs 
will be low.  
The recommendation for a system in which we have global prices on 
GHG emissions is exactly in line with the argument of this chapter. Achiev-
ing the low costs predicted is dependent on the interference of political insti-
tutions in markets to create incentives for mitigation. Achieving this by way 
of global limits on emissions through a system of permits and trading and/or 
taxes on emissions as two of the most important instruments requires a 
global policy on emissions and a global system for assuring compliance to 
the system. In this regard a BBC report on final changes to the wording of 
the Working Group III report just prior to publication is telling. The article 
reports that,  
reference to a "global" carbon market became merely an "international" mar-
ket, and a reference to the importance of "regulatory and financial incentives 
and international co-operation" in climate policy was removed altogether, 
with approval for the effectiveness of "voluntary agreements" inserted in-
stead.245 
 
A political retreat from the implications of the IPCC’s findings and changes 
in the words we use cannot hide the implications of the IPCC’s findings. 
What these changes do indicate is that states appear to continue to have 
strong interests in protecting the existing norms that guide international rela-
tions. Sovereignty continues to be a barrier to our ability to address the threat 
from global warming. 
                               
242 Ibid., 28-29. 
243 Ibid., 11. 
244 Nordhaus, "The Challenge of Global Warming: Economic Models and Environmental 
Policy," 174. 
245 Richard  Black, "Climate Curbs: Who Will Buy?", BBC News website, 4 May 2007. 
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What if states do a much better job than expected?  
Obviously the argument that global warming can give rise to a duty to sup-
port a global political project that will limit the sovereignty of states is very 
sensitive to the empirical fact of the matter with regards what political and 
institutional conditions are necessary to achieve meaningful mitigation of 
global warming. The idea that global warming generates a natural duty of 
justice could be undermined already at the empirical level before even be-
ginning to address the normative issue. If states show themselves to be able 
to address this threat independent of global arrangements that can credibly 
enforce compliance to coordinated policies we would not have a global natu-
ral duty of justice to accept limits on state sovereignty.  
I will not defend the empirical claim further, and we will not know the 
empirical fact of the matter until sometime into the future. For these reasons 
one should conceive of my overall thesis as a study on the normative impli-
cations of one of the central perspectives within existing research on what 
the empirical fact of the matter is. Note however that the general normative 
argument that we could have natural duties of justice at the global scope to 
support supranational political arrangements is not as sensitive to the empiri-
cal fact of the matter in the case of climate change. This normative argument 
is more general and amounts to the claim that given certain kinds of collec-
tive action problems at the global scope over certain kinds of threats to hu-
man wellbeing a duty to support global forms of political authority can arise.  
Summation  
This chapter has addressed the first of the two main tasks identified as neces-
sary to defend the position that global warming has generated a natural duty 
of justice. As we have already seen, climate change threatens the basic secu-
rity and welfare of humanity while there are very strong incentives to pollute 
instead of cooperate in reducing GHG emissions. This threat is the kind of 
environmental problem for which we could justify the interference of coer-
cive political institutions. Furthermore, it would be difficult under current 
conditions to achieve a significant reduction in total emissions at the level 
envisioned by the IPCC by way of an international agreement with no or 
very weak enforcement mechanisms, such as those of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Given these two empirical assessments we can say that we need the pro-
posed supranational political project in order to have a reasonable chance at 
succeeding with cooperative aims to address our impact on the climate.  
We have seen that for liberals the state is justified, in part, based on its 
ability to provide security and welfare. Because it appears that states may 
very well fail to secure these goods either independently or multilaterally 
through international agreements for the case of climate change the logic of 
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the liberal justification of the state forces us to ask if we ought to create a 
supranational form of political authority that could help use avoid the huge 
negative impacts on human welfare expected from global warming. This 
question arises because there does not appear to be some inherent reason for 
why the general liberal justification of political order cannot be applied to 
political projects at scales both narrower and broader than existing states. 
The empirical assessment outlined in this chapter on the prospects for global 
collective action to achieve global warming mitigation establishes a neces-
sary condition for justifying such a global political project. Namely, that we 
have good reason to expect that we would need a global form of political 
authority in order to achieve the dramatic levels of GHG emissions reduc-
tions the IPCC argues are necessary over the very short time frames the 
IPCC estimates we have to avoid dangerous levels of global warming.  
Even though the liberal political conception of justice is anti-
cosmopolitan in the sense that it rejects the idea that under current conditions 
individuals have demanding duties of global justice, it can accept the claims 
above. It can accept that global warming is the kind of collective problem for 
which one could justify the interference of political institutions and it could 
even accept the view that really doing something about this problem would 
require a political project at the global scope that would alter the authority 
structures of exiting states. As Nagel argues, “Globally there are a number of 
ways in which greater international authority would be desirable…. Global 
public goods like atmospheric protection and free trade could obviously 
benefit from increased international authority.” However, he goes on to ar-
gue that “An authority capable of carrying out these functions and imposing 
its decisions would naturally be subject to claims of legitimacy, pressures 
toward democracy, and pressures to apply standards of justice in the distri-
bution of burdens and benefits through its policies.”246 The problem with this 
is that on the political conception of justice a state’s members “are not mor-
ally obliged to expand their moral vulnerabilities in this way.”247  
According to Nagel the only way out of this conflict is to try and invent a 
form of global governance that lies somewhere between international agree-
ments and a supranational form of political authority. This is because the 
later will give rise to legitimate demands that the arrangement be subject to 
standards of political and distributive justice comparable to those in the state. 
If we cannot have a duty to take on arrangements that entail such a broad 
expansion of our duties of justice, we must invent a different kind of ar-
rangement. Nagel does not see any solution along these lines because any 
move towards a form of global governance that entails a credible system for 
securing compliance from states to collective global endeavours will give 
rise to legitimate claims of justice among subjects comparable to those that 
                               
246 Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," 144-45. 
247 Ibid.: 144. 
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members of states have on each other.248 Alternatively peoples could simply 
consent to a supranational political project which would make it legitimate, 
but they could not have a duty to do so.  
The dilemma Nagel highlights demonstrates the force of the political con-
ception of justice because it shows how it challenges cosmopolitan theories 
on two fronts. It challenges the cosmopolitan view that we have demanding 
duties of justice independent of the kind of political relations that exist be-
tween individuals within the state, and it challenges the view that we could 
have duties to enter in comparable political relations at the global scope. 
Most cosmopolitan theorists have contested the political conception on the 
first front but in this work I take on the second argument.   
In this chapter I have shown that we have good reason to think that a cen-
tral element of ‘doing something about climate change’ entails working to-
wards and/or supporting global political and institutional arrangements that 
are aimed towards devising credible strategies for enforcement of coordi-
nated mitigation policies. At a normative level this would require that we 
accept some weakening of state sovereignty. However, on the current inter-
pretation of the political conception of justice it is only consent to such an 
arrangement that could make the proposed expansion of our demanding du-
ties of justice legitimate under current conditions. The upshot of this view is 
that we cannot have a duty of justice to solve the global collective action 
problems generated by the threat of climate change.  
I will argue that even following the political conception of justice we al-
ready now have a duty to support a global political response to the threat of 
climate change that would alter the authority structures of states. In other 
words, we do now have demanding duties of global justice independent of 
existing institutional arrangements domestically or globally. Obviously one 
cannot point to consent or reciprocity in arguing that we have such duties. 
The question is then what reasons do I suppose we could give to show that 
agents ought to enter into a global political project following the normative 
commitments embodied in the political conception of justice. This is the 
second necessary task in defending my thesis and will be the subject of the 
next two chapters. 
  
                               
248 Ibid.: 145. 
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Chapter IV  
 
Defending the idea of a natural duty of justice 
Thus far I have defended the claim that we would need a supranational form 
of political authority in order to act collectively to address the threat global 
warming. Conditions at the global scope with regards to climate change are 
the kinds of conditions that are necessary in order to justify the need for 
some system of political authority following liberal premises. We are now 
moving on to the second task of justification, namely identifying reasons for 
why individuals ought to support this type of political project.  
The initial step in this second task is to examine the justifications offered 
by liberals for political duties within the state. This chapter will show that 
neither consent nor fair reciprocity is foundational in justifying to individu-
als that they have non-voluntary political duties. In particular, I will show 
that the political conception of justice rightly relies on the notion of ‘a natu-
ral duty of justice’ to justify political duties. As we will see, a natural duty 
approach amounts to the idea that in order to treat others as our moral equals 
we must under certain conditions accept a set of demanding political duties. 
Once the arguments in this chapter are established I will be able to take the 
second necessary step for justifying global political duties in the case of cli-
mate change. In Chapter V I move on to argue that following the political 
conception of justice one cannot simply appeal to what a political commu-
nity consents to or what duties of reciprocity individuals have in assessing 
whether or not the problem of climate change has expanded the scope of 
political justice. Even if in the absence of active consent to a global political 
project and even give a lack of direct benefit from such an arrangement, 
treating others as moral equals can require of us that we support a global 
political effort for mitigating global warming.   
It is important to note that the purpose of this current chapter is not just to 
identify how the political conception of justice argues for non-voluntary 
political duties in existing states. There is also a second aim, which is to 
throw into doubt generally the typical theoretical views on political duties 
used by those liberals that reject cosmopolitanism; namely appeals to con-
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sent and fair reciprocity.249 To achieve these two aims much of Chapter IV is 
focused on showing that a workable liberal defence of non-voluntary politi-
cal duties is dependent on a justification that points to the interests that oth-
ers have in the maintenance of a just political order. In other words, a liberal 
defence of political duties cannot rely solely on self-interest, consent, fair 
reciprocity or any combination of the three. In order to justify non-voluntary 
political duties within states as they exist today one must at a foundational 
level appeal to a natural duty of justice. This does not mean that self-interest, 
consent and fair reciprocity play no role in a liberal justification of political 
duties. The claim is only that they cannot justify political duties independent 
of natural duty reasoning.  
Defending the natural duty of justice as the foundational source for indi-
viduals’ political duties also requires that I address and rebuff voluntarism. 
The voluntarist argues that we could have a state system in which individu-
als’ political obligations are genuinely voluntary, i.e. based on actual consent 
to the state’s authority. Such a proposal amounts to the view that the non-
voluntary systems we have today are not necessary and could be replaced by 
voluntary states. If this were true both the general natural duty theory and the 
specific application of it to the case of global warming would be highly im-
plausible.  
It is worth recalling here why defending the natural duty of justice against 
competing theories is important for the over all argument of the book. As the 
political conception is usually interpreted we do not have demanding duties 
of global justice because there are no coercive global political institutions. 
The strength of this form of anti-cosmopolitanism is that it limits the scope 
of justice by appealing to a notion of fair reciprocity that only exists among 
members of a state. Appeals to fair reciprocity are also common in liberal 
thinking about why we should obey the state and support a domestic system 
of distributive justice. Furthermore, the political conception of justice rejects 
the notion that we could have a non-voluntary duty to expand the scope of 
political and distributive justice. This argument appeals to a second common 
concept in liberal thinking, namely that our associations with others should 
be, as far as is possible, based in voluntary consent. For these reasons alter-
native perspectives on the source of individuals’ political duties based in 
consent and reciprocity are the most important challenges to my cosmopoli-
tan thesis. By defending the natural duty of justice from the challenges 
mounted by voluntarists and fairness theorists and the level of general theory 
I am also able to cut off arguments that could be employed by a wide range 
of liberals against my cosmopolitan thesis. Namely, that we could only have 
                               
249 However it should be clear that challenging the grounds anti-cosmopolitan liberals typi-
cally appeal to does not show that every instance or even most instances of liberal anti-
cosmopolitanism are not defensible. 
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global duties of justice given consent or given certain kinds of reciprocal 
relations at this scope. 
If political duties in existing states cannot be justified to individuals sim-
ply be appealing to fair reciprocity or consent, the lack of the ‘right kind’ of 
reciprocity or consent at the global scope does not rule out the possibility 
that we could have global political duties. If other regarding duties can give 
us a reason to accept demanding duties of justice within the state it becomes 
clear that we could on the same reasoning have non-voluntary duties to sup-
port political orders that are not yet established, even at the global scope. 
This chapter is dedicated to showing that it is other regarding duties and not 
consent or fairness that are foundational in justifying to individuals their 
state-level political duties. The next chapter is dedicated to developing the 
argument that these same other regarding duties can generate global political 
duties in the case of global warming.  
I will begin this chapter by giving a summary of the traditional liberal ap-
proaches to justifying political obligations or duties. For each I will explain 
why these are widely held to fail to offer an adequate justification. I then 
move on to what I take to be two important contemporary theories based in 
consent and fair reciprocity and defend the natural duty approach against 
these competing views. Note that in developing these arguments this chapter 
focuses almost exclusively on political duties within the state because it is 
here that we find developed theories. In the following chapter the general 
argument for natural duties of justice will be applied to the case of global 
warming.  
As was noted in Chapter II, I have limited my reasoning on political du-
ties to the natural duty theory and its main opponents. As such the discussion 
to follow does not attempt to fully address debates over political duties in 
political theory. Nevertheless, this chapter goes into some detail in relation 
to several technical points on the problem of political duties. This will both 
take some time and will draw us away from the focus on global issues the 
rest of the book is dedicated to. I will throughout the chapter pause to sum-
marise why specific arguments are relevant to the overall thesis of the book. 
Still, the discussion to follow is rather long given that I will be taking on one 
of the most central and classic problems in political theory. The task requires 
both a review of where the literature stands today and an extensive treatment 
of my own arguments in order to be convincing. This places a certain 
amount of burden on the reader to keep in mind the reasoning I have already 
offered for why it is important for advancing my cosmopolitan thesis to ad-
dress current debates over the source of political duties. Before moving on to 
the main body of the argument it will be helpful to first break down the justi-
fication of political duties into two more specific problems.  
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The problems of demandingness and particularity  
First, we must explain why individuals should accept the demanding duties 
of justice that we normally associate with states. Note that the aim here is not 
to justify any state but rather liberal democratic states as the best candidates 
from a liberal perspective for having moral legitimacy. This does not mean 
that the argument to follow denies that one could have political duties within 
illiberal political communities, but only that I leave this more complicated 
question aside for the purposes of this chapter. Neither is the intent to argue 
for the moral legitimacy of whatever actual liberal democratic states do but 
rather those features of a political society that we would expect to be present 
in any just liberal democratic state. For example a system of law and order, a 
state backed system of individual rights and private property, taxation to 
provide collective goods, some system of distributive justice (e.g. welfare 
and opportunities), and democratically guide public institutions. What we are 
looking for are normative reasons that support the claim that individual sub-
jects have obligations or duties to accept the kind of public regulation and 
demands of justice we would normally expect to find in a political order with 
the aforementioned features. I will call this the problem of demandingness.  
One might object to the description of political society as demanding 
since it is its benefits to human welfare that are foundationally central to its 
justification. However, even if we can justify the need for a system of politi-
cal order on the grounds that most individuals benefit from these types of 
political arrangements, all such systems use institutionalised coercion. Indi-
viduals in states as we know them are for the most part subject to the state’s 
authority through no choice of their own, and the absence of individual 
choice to this type of coercive arrangement is itself an example of demand-
ingness. Furthermore, even though we expect that most individuals will 
benefit from political order generally, in any realistic political order nearly 
all individuals will also be compelled to accept specific laws and instances 
of coercion that they do not benefit from.250 Likewise, although democratic 
government is widely held to be the form of government that is most benefi-
cial to most citizens it nevertheless requires that individuals subject them-
selves to the will of others in ways that inhibit their liberty. The burdens of 
distributive justice are also clearly demanding for many. Thus, it is appropri-
ate to describe the burdens of justice on the individual within an actual state 
as demanding even though we recognise the benefits of this arrangement.    
A second question that must be answered is why we are thought to have 
demanding duties of justice in some specific political community where we 
                               
250 It also seems implausible to claim that every possible individual will benefit more from 
participation in a just political society than from the absence of political society. Given the 
enormous diversity, actual and potential, between how human lives can go it seems much 
more appropriate to claim that the vast majority of individuals do better where people are 
organised in political communities.   
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enjoy citizenship status. What reasons are there for believing that our politi-
cal obligations or duties within ‘our own’ state should be considered more 
demanding than duties to support any just state or our moral duties to any 
individual regardless of citizenship status? The same question in the con-
verse is what could explain that our claims in justice against others are 
stronger within ‘our state’ than they are generally. This question is often 
called the problem of particularity.251  
Conventional justifications of political duties in liberal 
thought 
Given the individualistic underpinnings of liberalism and its presumption in 
favour of individual liberty from coercion, what arguments do liberals typi-
cally appeal to in order to justify the coercive nature of political order within 
the state? In this section we review familiar arguments within liberal politi-
cal thought for the source of political duties and the main problems with 
these approaches. 
Rational self-interest 
As we have seen, on Hobbes’ account individual subjects should view them-
selves as having political obligations within actual political orders even 
though they never consented to the creation of this order or to the authority 
of the state. The source of political obligations on Hobbes’ account is that 
individuals recognize that they would have consented to creating such an 
order in a state of nature if they were given a real chance to do so.252 The 
answer to the problem of demandingness is supposed to be that it is in my 
own self-interest to take accept these demands given that I benefit much 
more from political order than its absence. But can rational self-interest give 
each individual a reason to obey political authority once a political commu-
nity is established? When I have an interest in not obeying and can avoid the 
risk of punishment would not I actually cease to have a political obligation to 
obey following the argument from rational self-interest? Correspondingly, 
would not the state’s dictates cease to have moral legitimacy for me when 
they are not in my self-interest?253  
                               
251Klosko, Political Obligations, 12.  
252  In the state of nature as Hobbes describes it the choice between creating a state or not 
could not arise. See Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
253 If there is a sovereign that can make disobeying too costly a strategy for every individual 
in every decision then the challenge above may be dissolved following Hobbes’ reasoning. 
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Hobbes calls this a fool’s challenge, and argues that breaking laws or not 
living up to agreements when punishment is not a risk still leaves one vul-
nerable to the insecurity of the state of nature because such a strategy signals 
to others in the community that you cannot be trusted.254 Other’s rational 
self-interest will leave the fool isolated and vulnerable. David Gauthier fa-
mously takes this Hobbesian line and argues that even when it is directly 
utility maximizing for me to defect from my political obligations I have a 
more long term interest in being deposed to keep agreements and obey the 
directives of the state. I have a self-regarding interest to signal to others that 
I am an “eligible partner” within political society. This signalling is to my 
long-term benefit while the opposite signal is to my great detriment.255 Ra-
tional self-interest thus generates a self-interested form of reciprocity among 
members of a state, and this in turn gives each member reason to support and 
obey the state. However, as has been noticed by several commentators, the 
individual will encounter situations where she can break covenants and dis-
obey authority without affecting the degree to which others see her as eligi-
ble partner in political society, especially within a large scale political or-
der.256 
Sometimes it really will be in my self-interest to ignore political authority 
and to break agreements because I will be able to do so without seriously 
risking punishment or being seen to be untrustworthy. We cannot accept 
Hobbes’ reply to the fool if it amounts to the claim that every person in 
every conceivable situation does have a self-interested reason to obey politi-
cal authority and keep agreements. Such a view is nothing more than a de-
nial that free-rider problems exist.257 It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
examine what Hobbes actually intends,258 but what we can clearly say is that 
                                                                                                                            
Yet, this is a deeply implausible description of any system of political order we might find 
ourselves subject to, even if we imagine a highly authoritarian state. 
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to provide an adequate reply to Hobbes’ fool one must appeal to something 
other than each individual’s self interest in each situation.  
Not every act of free riding can undermine society. However, to say that it 
is morally legitimate for me to disobey whenever I have an interest in doing 
so and do not risk punishment does undermine the idea that I have political 
duties within a system of political authority. Alternatively, to say to that I 
have an obligation or duty to obey a political authority even when it is not in 
my own self interest because otherwise society would be unworkable is the 
same thing as saying that I have some other-regarding normative reason to 
obey. As we will see in the rest of this section the other regarding reasons 
liberals usually appeal to are, keeping commitments to arrangements one has 
consented to, doing one’s fair share in a reciprocal political relationship, and 
supporting political order because others need it. What does seems clear to 
most liberals is that a theory based solely on rational self-interest is poten-
tially a candidate for justifying the need for a state but it is not a candidate 
for establishing that individuals have duties to accept the kinds of universal 
and demanding political obligations we associate with membership in a state.  
Consent  
The main difficulty for a liberal theory of political duty is that states invaria-
bly limit individuals’ liberties and impose on them laws and demands which 
they may object to. Liberal arguments aiming to justify the moral legitimacy 
of political authority must show that genuine concern for individuals’ moral 
equality and liberty is central to the theory and for this reason consent, direct 
or tacit, has traditionally been used to explain why individuals ought to ac-
cept a set of political obligations within the state. Consent is a likely candi-
date because it is able to answer both the problems of demandingness and 
particularity in straight forward ways that clearly respect the individual’s 
moral status.259  
If we consent to political authority we have a clear understanding of why 
the individual should be viewed as having an obligation to obey. They have 
freely chosen to subject themselves to the authority of the state and have a 
moral obligation to accept the demands of political society that flows from 
their informed acceptance of the terms for access to the benefits of political 
society. We also have a clear understanding of why the individual in ques-
tion has an obligation to some particular political community. Each individ-
ual only has political obligations within the political system(s) he has con-
sented to. Likewise, a political authority can only legitimately demand ful-
filment of political obligations from consenting subjects.260  
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Despite the benefits of the consent approach it is quite clearly not a feasi-
ble approach in establishing political obligations in states we find ourselves 
subject to or, many would argue, any realisable political system. Direct con-
sent does not work for states as we know them because the overwhelming 
majority of people never actively consent to them but are instead born into 
their citizenship status in some state. Locke famously argued that simple 
residence in a just state’s territory means that we have given our tacit con-
sent to the state and that we are therefore “obliged to obedience to the laws 
of that government….”261 Following Locke, residence in a country means 
that we enjoy the security and protection of our rights and property, and if 
we accept these benefits of the political society we incur voluntary political 
obligations through our choice to remain in the state. However, Simmons 
argues convincingly that for an act to count as consent, direct or tacit, it must 
be given intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily.262 These requirements do 
not appear to be met for those born into their citizenship status, nor does it 
seem plausible to called continued residence in a state genuine tacit consent 
in states as they currently operate.  
The most obvious problem with the idea of tacit consent is that states as 
we know them have sovereign authority over a certain territory and do not 
seek consent for the scope of this authority. David Hume asks, “Can we seri-
ously say, that a poor peasant or partisan has a free choice to leave his coun-
try, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to 
day.”263 Emigration need not be as dangerous as it is for the peasant to un-
dermine the idea of residence as tacit consent.  Simmons notes that “Most 
men will treasure home, family, and friends above all things,” and these 
bonds to a specific community within a certain territory are themselves not 
chosen.264 States have sovereign authority over a certain territory but do not 
even attempt to seek consent for the scope of this authority, while individu-
als have never had the opportunity to give their consent, direct or tacit, to the 
territorial scope of states.265 Thus, if consent is supposed to be the basis of 
legitimate authority we can rightly counter, as Christopher Heath Wellman 
argues, that existing states have “no right to insist that citizens must play by 
the state’s rules or leave” the territory.266 If on the other hand the territorial 
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scope of an existing state is morally legitimate, “the state’s imposition is not 
justified in the simple fashion that consent theorists advertise.”267  
It is not only that we are forced to accept political duties within states and 
that we do not have an exit option from these duties that would not also force 
us to actually move to a new territory, we are not even free to simply choose 
which state we want to be a member of in the existing global state system. 
For Simmons the only conclusion a consent theorists can draw is that exist-
ing states do not exercise morally legitimate authority over the vast majority 
of subjects. This is because actual consent, direct or tacit, is the only way to 
show that any individual has demanding political obligations within a spe-
cific political community.  
As we will see, Simmons argues that we could make states voluntary in a 
morally relevant way if individuals were given a genuine exit option from 
these collective political projects that would not require that they leave the 
territory. What is clear already here is that consent is not a compelling basis 
on which to justify to individuals political duties within states of the form we 
know today. What I will make clear in my comments on Simmons’ proposal 
for a genuinely consensual political order is that this is also not a workable 
alternative. The problem here is that a genuinely consensual relationship 
must give members’ a robust right to exit on relatively free terms over the 
course of the relationship, while an attempt at political order based on such 
terms cannot succeed in achieving the task we set out for it. Namely, resolv-
ing collective action problems for the provision of essential collective goods.   
Fairness 
For those that do think that individuals can have political duties within exist-
ing states, a common argument is to claim that because we all benefit from 
political society to various degrees fairness demands that we all contribute to 
supporting this cooperative venture.268 If a group of people accept limits to 
their liberty in order to create political institutions and provide a set of col-
lective goods, then even those who do not want to accept the demands of 
political society have a duty to contribute their fair share to the collective 
project when they have benefited from it.  Fairness demands at a minimum 
that we pay our taxes and obey the laws, and when individuals fail to live up 
to these demands the state has the moral legitimately to coerce them. Impor-
tantly, on the fairness account our political obligations are acquired obliga-
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tions. This means that although we did not consent to the formation of the 
state, we do accept the benefits of membership in a morally relevant way and 
it is through this active acceptance that we acquire political obligations. The 
fairness argument is thus supposed to be a better representation of what lib-
erals really mean when they appeal to consent in justifying to individuals 
that they have demanding political obligations in the states they are members 
of.     
The main advantage of the argument from fairness is that one need not 
demonstrate that we actively or tacitly agree to the state as such, but only 
that we accept its benefits. The fairness approach is also able to address the 
problems of particularity and demandingness in a straightforward way. I 
have political obligations in the state where I receive those benefits we nor-
mally associate with a liberal democratic political order, and I have an obli-
gation to contribute to and support the state I benefit from (i.e. the state that 
chiefly provides me with essential collective goods like law and order). One 
will receive the morally relevant benefits largely from the state were one 
permanently resides, although on the fairness theory it is possible to have 
similar political duties in more than one state if an individual divides resi-
dency among more than one state. There remains a host of other normative 
difficulties over how to justify the boundaries that determine who does and 
who does not benefit from some specific political community, but we only 
need this basic picture for our purposes here.  
The main problems with the fairness approach are that it is unlikely that 
every single individual the state professes to have authority over experiences 
more benefit from this arrangement than they might from some other ar-
rangement, it is implausible to say the we have obligations to support ar-
rangements just because they benefits us, and it is implausible to claim that 
most citizens of modern states actively accept benefits in a morally relevant 
way. If we look first at the last and likely most serious problem we can start 
by noticing that many of the benefits of political society are not benefits we 
can easily avoid because they have the characteristic of non-excludable pub-
lic goods. Common examples include the system of law and order, national 
defence, and environmental protection. If it is the voluntary acceptance of 
benefits that generates obligations within a state but we cannot avoid benefit-
ing from the state it is difficult to establish that we have actually accepted 
these benefits.269  
We are simply born into a state and a world divided up among states, and 
we are never asked if we want to participate in a cooperative political project 
with others to provide the benefits of political society. Therefore, as Sim-
mons notes, in order to claim that we have an acquired obligation based in 
benefits accepted one must show that we have certain attitudes towards these 
goods. He says “we must understand that the benefits flow from a coopera-
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tive scheme…. And we must…think that the benefits we receive are worth 
the price we must pay for them, so that we would take the benefits if we had 
a choice….”270  We should expect most individuals, on their considered 
judgements, to see many of the benefits of the state as worth their cost and to 
see political society as a collective and cooperative project at least to some 
degree. However, given the non-voluntary nature of our membership in the 
state it is dubious to claim that most actively accept all the collective goods 
the state provides or that individuals have a realistic exit option from just 
those aspects of the state that they would rather not support.  
Of course the aim of a liberal account of political authority based in fair-
ness is not to show that only those people with a certain attitude in any given 
territory have political obligations. The aim is to show that all or nearly all 
residents of a given territory have these obligations. A situation where only 
those with the requisite attitude have obligations to pay taxes in support of 
state provision of public goods seems in fact to be antithetical to the very 
idea of fairness. As a result, there is a temptation for liberals attracted to the 
fairness approach to abandon the requirement that benefits be voluntarily 
accepted and instead to appeal to hypothetical consent. Political obligations 
are not generated by the benefits we actually accept but rather we have an 
obligation to do our fair share in contributing to all those state benefits we 
would choose if we had to select a set of benefits but did not know which 
benefits we ourselves would want. This is Rawls’ hypothetical choice situa-
tion which was presented in Chapter II, and this choice situation is designed 
to help us think about what standards of justice we should accept if we are 
motivated to treat each individual within a community as a moral equal.  
What we choose in the hypothetical choice situation might be justifiable 
to individuals, but few accept that hypothetical consent can generate obliga-
tions in the same way actual consent can.271 One might be able to show that 
in a hypothetical choice situation I would agree to give twenty percent of my 
net income to a charity but this hardly means that some charity can legiti-
mately demand payment because my hypothetical consent amounts to my 
actually sanctioning the demands that would have followed from an actual 
commitment to pay. The force of hypothetical consent theories is not based 
in notions of what we have committed ourselves to but in some other moral 
consideration for why we ought to accept the kinds of choices that are con-
structed for agents in the hypothetical choice situation. Thus hypothetical 
consent theories do not give a consent based justification for the political 
obligations individuals are thought to have in existing political orders. In-
stead they are offering some other kind of justification. This interpretation is 
                               
270Ibid. 
271See Ronald Dworkin, "The Original Position," in Reading Rawls, ed. Norman Daniels 
(New York: Basic Books, 1975), 17-21, Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy (Boulder: West-
view Press, 1997), 65-66. 
 146 
particularly strong when we notice that liberal theories based on hypothetical 
consent regularly construct a choice situation unlike a real choice situation 
an individual might find themselves in order to emphasise other regarding 
reasons for accepting certain principles of justice. As we have seen this is 
what Rawls is doing in his original positions construction.  
What about grounding political duties on the non-voluntary receipt of 
benefits? There are also clear problems with this strategy. As Nozick fa-
mously agues, such a principle would result in the absurd view that individu-
als have duties to support all kinds of ventures that happen to benefit them 
simply because some group of people decided to implement the venture.272 
Acquiring duties to support collective endeavours in this way seriously un-
dervalues individuals’ liberty claims. Nozick gives the example of a group of 
neighbours who build a public address system and then insist that even those 
that did not want to fund this project must pay because everybody ‘uses’ the 
system when they listen to announcements or music. Acquiring duties to 
support collective endeavours in this way seriously undervalues individuals’ 
liberty claims. The idea that we can simply be forced into some group pro-
ject and commitments of fair reciprocity by having benefits imposed on us is 
just wrong if we care about individuals’ freedoms and rights.273 In the ab-
sence of actively accepting benefits fairness does not generate any duties to 
support such a collective endeavour, while a commitment to each individ-
ual’s liberty does prevent us from trying to manufacture duties for them to 
contribute to these endeavours by creating a situation where they will ‘bene-
fit’ whether they accept or not. Nozick’s highlights the decidedly paternalis-
tic implications of appealing to the non-voluntary receipt of benefits in justi-
fying political duties. It is far too easy for a state or some other organisation 
to paternalistically claim that the endeavours it undertakes are for the benefit 
of citizens, undermining the individual’s ability and right to decide what 
benefits they value for themselves.  
George Klosko has in recent years made a detailed attempted to recon-
struct a fairness argument based in non-voluntary benefits. He argues that 
the critique of the fairness approach dissolves if we focus on what he calls 
“presumptive benefits.”274 In order to make the fairness approach seem im-
plausible critics like Nozick and Simmons give examples based on benefits 
that many individuals clearly do not need, but if we focus on those functions 
of the state than are essential for any individual to lead a decent life and that 
can only be provided by a state it is not as easy to reject the argument from 
fairness. If the state is the only entity that can provide a certain collective 
good, its provision is non-excludable, and this good can be shown to be 
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needed by all, then, following Klosko, we can say that any person will bene-
fit from a state that provides them with the good. Thus, even when some 
person does not actively accept state provision of law and order we can rea-
sonably say that they benefit from the system and that their lives would go 
much worse if there was no state that served this function. If presumptive 
goods are properly described as benefiting any agent that enjoys citizenship 
in a well-ordered state then, Klosko argues, fairness demands that each citi-
zen contribute his share in the collective project.275 In addressing Klosko’s 
theory I will show that the kinds of demands we can make on any individual 
residing within a given territory based on presumptive benefits are not ulti-
mately founded in fairness but on each individual’s natural duties of justice. 
This debate aside, we can see here that the standard argument from fairness 
is not a compelling basis on which to justify to individuals that they have the 
kinds of political duties we normally associate with membership in a state.  
Natural duty 
We have seen how the standard liberal arguments based on consent and fair-
ness both fail to support the notion that citizens of a modern state have po-
litical obligations or duties, but there remains another way to use the benefit 
theory to argue for political duties. Wellman puts it well when he says that, 
“the only non-paternalistic way to suppose that the advantages of political 
society permit a state to coerce all those within its borders is to maintain that 
the perils that others would experience in a state of nature can limit our own 
moral rights.”276 Rawls recognized the difficulties with the received benefits 
approach and abandoned the idea of founding our political duties in fair re-
ciprocity, appealing instead to a natural duty of justice “to support and to 
comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us.”277 Each member of a 
political community has moral duty to accept and support the state’s political 
institutions for the sake of others because the vast majority of people need a 
political order to secure human goods regardless of whether or not any spe-
cific individual actually needs or prefers this order.  
The natural duty of justice is based in Kant’s argument that we have a 
moral responsibility to leave the state of nature and enter into a political 
community with others. The negative effects we can have on each other in 
the absence of political society and a commitment to each individual’s equal 
moral worth generates an other-regarding moral duty to support the creation 
of and maintenance of a political community in the territory in which we 
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reside.278 Taking moral equality seriously means accepting demanding duties 
of justice within the state we happen to find ourselves in, as long as it is 
minimally just, because we have a moral duty to support the political condi-
tions necessary for others to achieve security, welfare and the protection of 
individuals’ rights. Thus, the coercive state is not being justified to individu-
als paternalistically based on the benefits they receive from it.279 Instead, a 
positive argument is advanced that it is unreasonable and morally objection-
able to act in a way that prevents others from securing the benefits of politi-
cal community. Because, it is claimed, such a political order’s proper func-
tioning is dependent on all residents having political duties it is also unrea-
sonable not to accept these duties.  
Basing such a ‘moral ought’ in a natural duty of justice may appear to be 
incompatible with Rawls’ general claim that we should conceive of society 
as “a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the 
next,”280 because obligations flowing from cooperation are based in reciproc-
ity not natural duty.  But there is nothing inherently contradictory about con-
ceiving of political society as a cooperative venture while ultimately basing 
the most foundational reasons for each individual’s political duties in a natu-
ral duty of justice. Confusion on this point is common given that Rawls fo-
cuses almost exclusively on the issue of fairness among citizens that are 
simply assumed to have political duties within a specific state. However, this 
theorising over what fairness demands among members of a political com-
munity is itself dependent on the precondition that individual subjects actu-
ally have a ‘moral ought’ to accept the demands of a political society where 
these principles of justice will be applied.  It will be helpful here to look 
closer at how natural duty fits together with notions of self-interest and fair 
reciprocity in a liberal justification of political duties.  
Recognizing that political society is a cooperative project with clear bene-
fits over conditions in the absence of political order we can expect that all 
individuals will have rational and self-interested reason to accept political 
conventions and obey the state. At the same time this self-interested form of 
reciprocity does not amount to a political obligation and will invariably fail 
to motivate in specific cases for all individuals. Yet individuals with self-
interested reasons to want political order will also often have other-regarding 
moral reasons to support this collective political project. This is because on 
their considered judgements they do often accept the benefits of political 
society on the premise that they are members of a cooperative venture. 
Where this is the case there is an other-regarding form of reciprocity based 
in fairness. My respecting other’s in this cooperative venture as moral equals 
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gives me a moral reason to contribute my fair share to the project. At the 
same time fair reciprocity is not enough to establish universal political obli-
gations in a non-voluntary state.  
Some individuals will not, at least on some occasions, have obligations of 
fairness based in their acceptance of some specific set of benefits. Even 
when we can be sure that some non-voluntary benefit of an actual state is an 
accurate reflection of what individual subjects need, the paternalism of 
grounding individuals’ political duties on benefits imposed on them does not 
sit well with liberal premises. When other regarding reciprocity fails to ex-
plain why individual subjects have duties to obey the state there remains an 
other-regarding duty to support the state as a cooperative venture because 
others depend on this system. It is because our political duties are supposed 
to be general meaning a general duty to support the system and not only a 
duty to support those aspects we personally benefit from that we can say it is 
an other regarding natural duty of justice the underpins political duties at a 
foundational level. Thus we have a natural duty to do our share in achieving 
the good of political order at the very least for other members’ sake. 
Self-interest, fair reciprocity, and other-regarding natural duties of justice 
produce a package of reasons individuals have for taking on their fair share 
of the burdens that are necessary to support a cooperative political project. 
Still, it is the natural duty of justice that lies at the foundation for the claim 
that there is for all individuals within a just political community a presump-
tion in favour of obeying the directives of the state and supporting society as 
a political project. Following Rawls’ Kantian constructivism it is the com-
mitment to the equal moral worth of individuals and to treating individuals 
with equal concern and respect that dictates how to construct the original 
position. In the same way, it is a conviction in the principle of moral equality 
that gives us reason to accept the principles of justice arrived at in this hypo-
thetical choice situation in the real world. This explains why those that can-
not contribute to the production of collective goods are still viewed as eligi-
ble partners in political society with rights in a system of distributive justice. 
If our political duties were founded strictly on a principle of fair reciprocity 
it would be difficult to motivate including those that cannot contribute into 
the system of distributive justice. However, the original position is con-
structed in such a way so that those that cannot contribute will still be incor-
porated into the system of social justice. We have reason to accept this con-
struction because we take it to be a good representation of what it means to 
treat each individual as having an equal moral status. Likewise, it is not 
strictly fair reciprocity that gives each individual general political duties to 
obey and support the state within a just political order. Rather, it is a duty to 
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give equal concern for others as moral equals that gives our political duties 
this general character.281  
If we have a natural duty to support the state then it is not problematic 
that the demanding duties of justice in any existing liberal democratic state 
are acquired involuntarily. It also does not necessarily matter that the state 
we are born into is arbitrary because accepting its authority and duties of 
justice to fellow members is simply to accept, as Nagel says, the “conditions 
of peace and a legal order, with whatever community offers itself.”282 Na-
gel’s use of the phrase the political conception of justice is simply a term for 
a contemporary Kantian that aims to explain how arbitrary and non-
voluntary circumstances can generate demanding duties of justice within 
states.283  We can also now see why the natural duty theory could support my 
argument for a global form of political authority to address the threat from 
global warming. On this view we can have demanding political duties inde-
pendent of what we consent to and even independent of conditions involving 
fair reciprocity. This is not only possible within existing political institutions 
but also prior to the creation of institutions that ought to apply to us, as 
Rawls has explained.  
Critics argue that invoking a natural duty to contribute to a collective po-
litical project and obey the law appears to be nothing more than a convenient 
way of saving liberal theory from an embarrassing inability to establish po-
litical obligations within states in their existing form. It is the philosophical 
equivalent of pulling a rabbit out of your hat, or more precisely a dead rabbit 
because the natural duty of justice fails to give a satisfactory account to both 
the problems of demandingness and particularity.  
Simmons argues that even if we accept that a system of political authority 
is necessary to achieve the benefits commonly associated with the state, it is 
clearly empirically false to claim that every single individual in a territory 
must be subject to this authority for the state to fulfill its function. It is only 
by making this clearly false empirical claim that the natural duty theorist can 
argue for universal non-voluntary duties to obey the state as opposed to his 
proposal where universal compliance is not necessary. Instead a realistic 
empirical analysis of how many people within any given territory must par-
ticipate as full citizens of the state shows that it is possible to implement a 
political system based in voluntary obligations. Simmons argues that there 
are clear non-utopian options for making political order voluntary in morally 
significant ways. One can offer “…various classes of citizenship (and resi-
dent non citizen) options, training and support to make emigration and reset-
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tlement a more realistic option…,” combined with a “a more formalized 
choice process….”284 Furthermore he argues that, 
it is simply not at all obvious that the best way open to me for attempting to 
provide security and welfare for others is by consenting to membership in 
and obeying the laws of the state that claims authority over me. If I live in a 
stable political society, I might well do better to scrupulously avoid under-
mining the security of others (and the viability of my state) while privately 
aiding the needy than I would do to simply obey the law and pay my taxes. If 
I live in an unstable society, dutiful compliance with law may be vastly infe-
rior to private action as a way of respecting others’ rights.285  
 
If it is true that a voluntary political order is feasible and that we can act 
individually to satisfy our share of the demands of justice then the basis for 
insisting on the need for all to accept non-voluntary general political duties 
is seriously undermined. If Simmons is right the natural duty approach to the 
problem of demandingness will be unconvincing.     
Klosko adds a different but equally strong argument for the view that a 
natural duty of justice cannot give an adequate answer to the problem of 
demandingness. He notes that contractualist thinkers regularly view natural 
duties, such as the duty to offer assistance to others in distress, as weak du-
ties. An example of a weak duty is a duty to assist others when this assis-
tance does not entail any cost for us or when the cost is very low in compari-
son to the aid we can give. But if natural duties are only binding when the 
costs are not significant the natural duty of justice cannot support the de-
manding duties of justice we normally associate with citizenship. Klosko’s 
criticism does reflect how contractualists such as Rawls, Scanlon, and Nagel 
describe our other-regarding moral duties and duties of justice. For example 
we can think of Scanlon’s Rescue Principle which states that “if you are 
presented with a situation in which you can prevent something very bad 
from happening…by making only a slight (or even moderate) sacrifice, then 
it would be wrong not to do so.”286 Scanlon’s theory of “what we owe to each 
other” is weak in comparison to the demands he argues would follow from 
utilitarianism, and in general it is this rejection of the perceived demanding-
ness of utilitarianism that is central to moral contractualist thinking.  
Utilitarians like moral contractualists argue that we have other regarding 
moral duties that are owed simply in virtue of each individual’s status as a 
moral equal. However, the contractualist rejects the implication found in 
much of utilitarian thought that our other regarding duties can, depending on 
circumstances, entail forgoing all or most of our partial interests. Nagel ex-
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plains this theory in a way that makes it clear why contractualists are de-
scribed as defending weak duties. He says, 
Each of us has a primary attachment to his own personal interests, projects, 
and commitments, but this is restrained by our occupation of the impersonal 
standpoint in two ways: first, by the recognition of the equal objective impor-
tance of what happens to everyone, and second, by the recognition of the spe-
cial importance for each person of his own point of view and the reasonable-
ness of some natural partiality. So we are simultaneously partial to ourselves, 
impartial among everyone, and respectful of everyone else’s partiality.287  
 
It is this weighing of other-regarding and self-regarding reasons combined 
with an impartial argument for the general moral value individuals’ self-
regarding interests can have that allows for a weaker conception of our du-
ties than the simple summing of impartial reasons for action indicative of 
utilitarianism. Nagel, like Scanlon, argues that when we weigh impartial 
consequentialist reasons for action against legitimate partial reasons at most 
we can argue that it is “unacceptable to fall below a modest overall level of 
aid to others….”288 Beyond this level of sacrifice our duties to others are 
either unclear (given moderate sacrifice) or legitimately limited (given sig-
nificant sacrifice).  
Duties of justice are often understood to be more demanding than the ba-
sic moral duties we owe to others. This is the basic idea behind the political 
conception of justice were we have demanding duties of distributive and 
political justice within a shared political community that are stronger than 
the moral duties we owe to all others. Still it should be clear that the natural 
duty of justice is a moral duty to accept the more demanding duties of justice 
that exist in a political community. This helps to explain why Rawls argues 
that the natural duty of justice can require us to contribute to the creation of 
political institutions “not yet established, at least when this can be done 
without too much cost to ourselves.”289 This insistence that natural duties of 
justice should not be costly follows the same logic as Scanlon’s and Nagel’s 
argument for why duties to aid should not be overly costly. The critic of the 
natural duty justification argues that in order to plausibly claim that indi-
viduals’ duties to create or support political society are not on balance more 
than a modest cost they will have to appeal not only to the costs individuals 
will incur but also to the benefits they will receive in such an order. Here 
Klosko makes a crucial point. 
If the natural duty theorist tries to balance away the demandingness of po-
litical society in this way it appears “that far from being a moral requirement 
owed by everyone to everyone, a workable political duty is owed by recipi-
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ents of essential state benefits to their fellow citizens who provide them.”290  
In other words, political duties are not ‘natural’ but fundamentally dependent 
on the fact that we receive benefits from political society. This conclusion 
would explain why far reaching political and distributive duties should be 
accepted by members of a political community.  However, it would mean 
that the theory is foundationally based in a principle of fair reciprocity and 
not natural duty, and would thus still need to address the challenges faced by 
fairness approaches. Klosko’s interpretation would also undermine my use 
of the natural duty of justice to justify duties to support a supranational form 
of political authority in the case of climate change. As I have already shown, 
we could not benefit from such an arrangement in a self-regarding way and 
as a result we cannot be said to have political duties based in fair reciprocity 
for benefits received in the case of global warming.  
The apparent inability to address the problem of demandingness is bad 
news for the natural duty theorist and things do get worse. The natural duty 
of justice approach is said to be equally unconvincing in its treatment of the 
problem of particularity. Recall that the natural duty theorist is attempting to 
explain why citizens have demanding duties of justice within some actual 
state, but Simmons wonders how we could have special political duties and 
claims of justice within a political community we happen to be born into. 
These boundaries are surely arbitrary from the perspective of justice follow-
ing the premise that what matters is each individual’s equal moral worth. 
Given that the natural duty of justice is a general duty we owe to all others to 
support or at least not undermine the institutional conditions they depend on, 
how can we say that an individual has demanding political duties within 
some state simply because they happen to be born there. One might argue 
that this arbitrariness is not problematic because all one needs to show is that 
we have political duties within the institutional scheme that, in Rawls’ 
words, ‘applies’ to us. For Simmons this amounts to forcing obligations 
upon individuals.  
As Nozick and Simmons have shown in a series of examples,291 we do not 
normally think that we have morally binding obligations to institutional ar-
rangements that are simply imposed on us. This is so even if the institutions 
are designed for our sake or to satisfy moral reasons we have for acting. In 
order for political institutions to apply to me in a strong sense it is not 
enough that 1) I happen to live in a territory where 2) an institution wants to 
subsume me into its system of burdens and benefits. I must actually give my 
consent or actively accept the benefits of society. Otherwise we could be 
forced to contribute to any institutional arrangement that promotes justice 
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and claims to apply to us. 292 This is a convincing argument when we com-
bine it with Simmons plausible claim that if an individual simply avoids 
violating others rights they may very well be able to do more to advance 
others security and wellbeing of others individually instead of by simply 
accepting a set of political duties associated with citizenship. In other words, 
on this view there are clear opportunities for individual action that would 
amount to one’s fair share of the collective moral project of securing justice.  
Klosko takes a different tact on the problem of particularity and argues 
that we do have strong political duties to some specific state, but only be-
cause these duties are not natural. We have political duties in some specific 
political community because we chiefly receive the benefits associated with 
citizenship from our own state. Rawls is correct to claim that our state’s in-
stitutions apply to us in the strong sense but only because it is the political 
scheme that we chiefly benefit from. Thus, to solve the problem of particu-
larity for any individual we must point to the benefits they have received. 
Otherwise we end up back in Simmons’ criticism above and cannot explain 
the individual’s supposed strong connection to ‘her’ state. Taken together 
Simmons’ and Klosko’s arguments for the failure of the natural duty theorist 
to adequately address the problems of demandingness and particularity rep-
resent a thorough rejection of the natural duty approach. Obviously these 
challenges also represent serious problems for the application of the natural 
duty approach to the problem of global warming and to theories about global 
justice. 
Despite the apparent weakness of the natural duty approach I will argue 
that it is the most plausible theory from a liberal perspective for why all resi-
dents of a just state have political duties within this political project. I will 
first show that Simmons draws far too wide reaching conclusions about how 
individuals can and cannot satisfy their other-regarding duties from the fact 
that states do not need universal compliance to fulfill their function. I will 
show that Simmons brand of weak philosophical anarchism is not a tenable 
position and that his premises force him to adopt a more radical form of an-
archism or to accept the natural duty theory of political duties.  
Second, I will demonstrate that Klosko’s notion of presumptive benefits 
does not save the argument from fairness. Instead, once properly understood 
his theory actually supports the natural duty approach as the foundational 
reason in support of political duties, although fairness plays a central role 
once this duty is established. In further response to Klosko I will demon-
strate that natural duties are not necessarily weak duties by advancing a more 
nuanced account of how contractualist reasoning approaches the problem of 
demandingness generally. Finally, I will argue that the natural duty approach 
has not been able to address the problem of particularity in a satisfactory 
way largely because its main advocates have tried to use it to show that we 
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are strongly tied to the state we are born into. I will argue that natural duties 
of justice only weakly tie us to the state we reside in. Once we understand 
this we can see that the natural duty approach has a plausible answer to the 
problem of particularity while it can at the same time be applied at the global 
scope should the appropriate conditions arise.  
The incoherence of weak philosophical anarchism 
To begin it is important to recall why Simmons’ voluntarist theory is a par-
ticularly strong challenge for my broader thesis; namely that global warming 
has generated a global natural duty to support the creation of a supranational 
system of political authority to address this problem. Following Simmons’ 
theory the need for a state or even a supranational form of political authority 
can be justified along the lines adopted in this book, but this does not mean 
that these forms of political authority have the moral legitimacy to exercise 
authority or to expect obedience and support from individuals. The state only 
has moral legitimacy when those it exercises authority over give their con-
sent to being subject to the state’s authority. Correspondingly individuals can 
only have political obligations when they give their active consent. Philoso-
phical anarchism follows the standard anarchist view that no existing states 
have moral legitimacy. However, the philosophical anarchist distinguishes 
himself from the strict anarchist by arguing that the state can be justified on 
a collective goods argument. Simmons brand of philosophical anarchism 
also distinguishes itself from strict anarchism in that he argues that a volun-
tary state is feasible and that such a state could have moral legitimacy be-
cause it is needed, yet only when subjects consent to it. What is called for 
following Simmons are the reforms that will make this possible form of vol-
untary political order a reality.  
Philosophical anarchism accepts that political authority can be justified 
but denies that we can have non-voluntary political duties. The philosophical 
anarchist could accept the argument that we cannot achieve the kind of co-
operation that is necessary to mitigate global warming without coercive po-
litical arrangements at the global scope. It could also accept that mitigating 
global warming is the kind of good for which one can justify the use of po-
litical institutions to secure cooperation. However, the fact that my proposed 
institutional arrangement is justifiable in this way does not generate duties to 
support it. Only voluntary consent could generate such duties. Philosophical 
anarchism makes the parallel between the classic liberal collective goods 
justification of the state and the global collective action problems generated 
by efforts to mitigate global warming somewhat immaterial to the question 
of our global political duties. We may, following philosophical anarchism, 
have an individual moral duty not to pollute the atmosphere. However, we 
could not have a non-voluntary duty of justice to support a system of politi-
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cal authority simply because it could secure cooperation in addressing some 
global environmental problem.   
I will begin my critique of philosophical anarchism by assembling a posi-
tive proposal from the arguments Simmons advances for why non-voluntary 
states are not necessary and for how voluntary states might work. I will then 
show that Simmons’ weak philosophical anarchism is an untenable position 
and that he must choose between a more strongly anarchist position or ac-
cept that individuals can have non-voluntary political duties. The central 
problem with Simmons’ proposal is that weak philosophical anarchism ade-
quately described amounts to a denial that we face the kinds of collective 
action problems in achieving the collective goods that were described in 
Chapter III.   
Simmons’ positive proposal 
Consent cannot be the source of political obligations in states as we know 
them because most individuals are simply born into their status as citizens 
and have next to no genuine alternatives to membership in some political 
order. At best the governing authorities of states attempt to secure consent 
for how they exercise this authority but not for their right to do so in the first 
place. In order to advance a reformed consent-theory of political obligation 
for the modern state one must show that other possible forms of political 
association at this scale could incorporate some morally significant system 
for seeking consent.  Alternatively the consent theorist must argue that indi-
viduals could never have political obligations in large scale modern states 
because such states could not avoid those non-voluntary features that cur-
rently make them illegitimate. This second approach leads to a strong form 
of anarchism while Simmons takes the first approach and advances a form of 
weak philosophical anarchism. On this view it is possible to give individuals 
a credible exit option within a modern state in a way that could give such 
states the moral legitimacy they lack today.  
Simmons argues that instead of trying to link simple residency in a state 
to political duties we could have institutional mechanisms that give indi-
viduals the opportunity to choose a resident non-member status. This option 
would provide individuals with a genuine exit option that is not dependent 
on their giving up family and social relationships or the cultural environment 
they were born into. Presumably the terms of exit would allow the individual 
to keep private property including land, maybe with some exit tax based in 
reciprocal fairness where appropriate. One could also imagine differentiated 
forms of citizenship depending on how deeply integrated into the state indi-
viduals want to be.   
What makes Simmons’ anarchism distinct is that he accepts the claim that 
political order is justifiable but at the same time argues that a strong form of 
voluntarism is possible in such orders. Simmons says that, 
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We all know why the contractarians believed it necessary to have states. We 
know the ‘‘Hobbesian” reasons: the state of nature produces frequent ‘‘Pris-
oners’ Dilemmas’’ in which ‘‘anticipation’’ (hence conflict) is the dominant 
strategy, and it produces ‘‘coordination problems’’ (which require the salient 
solutions of the state). And we know the ‘‘Lockean’’ reasons: people are bi-
ased in their own favor, they get carried away by their passions, they don’t 
always know what’s right, and they lack the power and impartiality to en-
force the right even where they do know it. And we know the ‘‘Kant-
ian/Rousseauian’’ reasons: in the state of nature persons lack a certain kind of 
freedom (or autonomy), and true justice cannot be established. The problem 
facing the Kantian is that none of these reasons, quite plausibly offered in 
support of having states, translates naturally into a reason why any particular 
contemporary person must become or remain a member of some state…all of 
these problems of life without states can be solved without unanimous par-
ticipation…States can be made without the participation of all in particular 
territory, and they can be maintained without participation of all in their ju-
risdictions [my emphasis].293 
 
As we have seen, Simmons argues that if we were serious about making 
political society as consensual as possible we could create a resident non-
member status with few or no political obligations. We could create genuine 
and formal choice procedures for acquiring citizenship status and try to sup-
port and promote a much more open system of emigration, i.e. to further 
incorporate a robust system of choice for the individual regarding their po-
litical associations.294  The idea here seems to be that only a state can assure 
access to necessary collective goods but there remains a great deal of room 
for non-participation, partial participation, and choice between political or-
ders. This ability to incorporate market like elements of voluntarism into the 
political system in turn undermines the justification for a non-voluntary 
natural duty to participate in some specific political society on a set of non-
voluntary terms.  
The non-member resident proposal appears to be an attempt to make po-
litical society as voluntaristic as possible without requiring that each new 
generation give their consent to state boundaries. I will take it as uncontro-
versial to claim that an implementable voluntary state system would never-
theless need to have a fairly high level of territorial consistency over time in 
order for these states to function properly. Following Simmons’ Lockean 
perspective this resident non-member status does not mean that non-
members can do whatever they please. They will still be bound by natural 
law and have negative duties to refrain from violating others rights or un-
dermining the morally permissible political community others have con-
sented to. What they are free from then is the demandingness of the political 
community in the sense of having positive duties to contribute to the collec-
tive project in the same way citizens do. These resident non-members would 
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not, as far as is possible, benefit from state services, while the political com-
munity would still be bound to respect non-member residents’ rights. If we 
could reform political society in this way we could have well functioning 
political communities where the legitimacy of the community’s authority is 
founded in consent and there are genuine exit options.   
It is crucial to be aware that Simmons’ proposal is dependent on the em-
pirical claim that individuals can meet the demands of justice independent of 
the state. He says “it is hard to see why membership in a state is necessary 
for advancing goods like justice. One can, for instance, support just ar-
rangements in other ways than by specially binding ourselves to one of 
them…If we can act morally without accepting membership in a political 
community, the Kantian cannot successfully argue that the state is for each 
of us ‘morally necessary.’”295 Even if we assume that the state is the most 
efficient means of securing essential collective goods Simmons argues that 
“On the Lockean view, others have rights against us only that we do our fair 
share in contributing to acceptable levels of security and well-being for all. 
Thus understood, the rights of others can be respected by us individually.”296 
The main thrust of Simmons’ argument is that not every individual needs to 
accept the demandingness of membership in a state to fulfill their share of 
the other-regarding task of ensuring that essential collective goods like secu-
rity and welfare are available in a morally acceptable way.  Together the 
various proposals for exit would make citizenship as voluntary as is possible 
in a workable modern system of political association and could secure the 
moral legitimacy of the authority justifiable states exercise over their citi-
zens.  
I will argue that in a voluntary state any limits on exit must be relatively 
mild if society is to be conceived of as a genuinely consensual relationship. 
However, once we recognise that following Simmons’ proposal individuals 
must have a robust right to exit a territory’s cooperative political project it 
becomes evident that such a state we will not be able to provide the essential 
collective goods it was instituted for, as Locke well understood. I will further 
argue that the fact that states do not need universal compliance and/or sup-
port simply does not sustain the further empirical claim that collective goods 
such as collective security can be satisfactorily provided for when individu-
als have the option to avoid the demands of political society.  
Locke’s inconsistent rejection of the robust right to exit 
An alienation relationship with a governing authority would entail that indi-
viduals have alienated from themselves the right to self-government and 
their right to reclaim self-government should they disapprove of the way the 
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governing authority goes about its business. It is this kind of alienation con-
tract that Hobbes famously proposed is necessary to secure peace, order and 
welfare.297 However, following Jean Hampton’s influential interpretation 
Hobbes’ theory actually amounts to an agency relationship were individuals 
acting together sanction the Leviathan’s authority over them but retain the 
right to revoke their endorsement of the governing authority should the Le-
viathan fail to provide the level of security and order it was established to 
provide.298 Locke, unlike Hobbes, overtly argues for an agency relationship 
between the people and the governing authority, and much of his theory 
involves working out the implications of such an agency relationship. How-
ever, Locke also adds an additional stage to his contract theory were we first 
agree with others to create political society and then create a single authority 
to govern over political society. For Locke’s the choice to enter into political 
society is genuinely consensual but one can only abandon her political obli-
gations if political society should become unjust, is otherwise dissolved, or if 
civil society releases her from these bonds.299  
The reason that Locke advances a two stage contract theory is that he 
wants to allow for a people’s right to revolt against their own government 
while at the same time guaranteeing the stability of a just political commu-
nity for all those individuals that are dependent on it. To this end Locke ar-
gues that,  
every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one 
government, puts himself under an obligation to everyone of that society to 
submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else 
this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, 
would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no 
other ties than he was in before, in the state of nature. For what appearance 
would there be of any compact? What new engagement if he were no further 
tied by any decrees of the society than he himself thought fit and did actually 
consent to? [my emphasis]300  
 
If each law, decree or adjudication was dependent on each subject’s consent 
the authority’s moral basis for demanding obedience would be undermined. 
Individuals will often not want to follow specific state directives and initia-
tives and if each individual could decide for themselves when and when not 
to obey and/or contribute their fair share of support we would not be able to 
avoid political chaos. Locke’s point is that when the moral legitimacy of the 
state’s demands is dependent on consent for each specific decree there is in 
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fact no political relationship at all. To make individual consent amount to a 
genuinely political relationship Locke proposes that the moment I make the 
free choice to enter political society my relationship with this society liter-
ally ceases to be consensual. 
The problem with Locke’s approach is, as Hampton notes, that 
Just as Hobbes’s psychological views of human nature are such that he can-
not insist that people not reclaim their right to govern themselves if obeying 
their ruler’s commands puts them at risk, so, too, Locke’s premises preclude 
him from insisting that people cannot reclaim the right to govern themselves 
if the majority in their political society approve governments whose policies 
put them at risk....the premisses of  his argument commit him to an agency 
rather than an alienation relationship between individuals and their political 
society. 301 
 
If the political relationship gains its moral legitimacy from the consent of 
subjects then we should agree with Hampton that “Locke must admit that 
each individual has the right to recall her loan to the political society if that 
society (in her view) fails to live up to its side of the bargain. [my empha-
sis]”302 In fact it is difficult to see why individuals should not be able to exit 
their political relationships simply on the grounds that they no longer want to 
be a part of political society.  
If political society is a consensual relationship can individuals be bound 
by political obligations over extended periods of time based on a single op-
portunity for consent giving? If we answer no to this question we are faced 
with the problem of showing how we can “secure each subject’s obligation 
to the majority’s determination in the political society, even while maintain-
ing an agency relationship between each subject and the political society.”303 
If we answer yes and say that a single act of consent binds me to society in 
perpetuity we undermine the plausibility of calling political society a con-
sensual relationship. We would not call any other kind of relationship with 
this kind of limit on exit consensual.  
I will argue that when the source of a community’s morally legitimacy is 
the consent of its members it would be wrong to limit the right to exit to 
when the governing authority or civil society fails to fulfill its function, acts 
unjustly in some way, or to when the community decides that an individual 
member can be released from the relationship. These kinds of limits under-
mine the plausibility of describing political society as genuinely consensual, 
which in turn undermines the moral legitimacy of the collective from a vol-
untarist perspective. However, allowing for a robust right to exit will under-
cut the state’s attempts to exercise the kind of coercive authority necessary 
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to guarantee security, law and order, and the public provision of essential 
collective goods.   
Voluntarism as dependent on a robust right to exit 
There must be a robust right of exit if we want to claim that it is consent that 
makes the claims and burdens of membership in a society morally legiti-
mate. It is true that consensual relationships are often also contractual rela-
tionships, and adding contractual conditions is often intended to establish the 
terms of exit. However, it is rather difficult to appeal to contractual or prom-
issory obligations in limiting an individual’s right to exit a community of 
consent. Take for example communities such as Hutterite or Amish commu-
nities in North America that isolate themselves from the larger society in 
collectively owned agricultural communes and defend the moral legitimacy 
of their hierarchal rules, regulations, and norms (i.e. religious and social) on 
the grounds that membership is consensual. The opportunities for exit from 
such communities can be rather limited. Children may not be given the 
knowledge or skills necessary to make life outside the community a conceiv-
able option. The threat of banishment or the choice of exit can entail the 
enormous cost of abandoning all of one’s personal relationships and all of 
the value created by one’s productive labour over the years. The costs and 
hurdles to exit can be so high that they undermine the plausibility of calling 
the relationship consensual which in turn undermines the moral legitimacy 
of the community, at least in the eyes of those committed to liberal princi-
ples of equal moral worth and liberty.304  
Let us imagine an isolationist community with strictly hierarchal gender 
roles were women are viewed as the property of their husbands. I will not 
here development and argument for or against the possibility of justifying 
such isolationist communities. What is clear is that the voluntarist and non-
voluntarist liberal should both agree that at the very least the only plausible 
way to secure the legitimacy of the group from a liberal perspective is to 
guarantee a robust right to exit for its members. Lets us suppose that our 
isolationist community provided all children with the tools and experience to 
make a genuine choice about whether or not they want to live by the com-
munity’s rules in adulthood, and this choice is clearly understood by all par-
ties (the individual, the isolationist community, and the wider liberal state) to 
be a voluntary act of consent. Does this act of giving consent mean that a 
woman at thirty should have a weaker right to exit in any significant mean-
ing that she did when she was eighteen?  
A reasonable intuition is that the eighteen year old consenter should have 
a right to exit at thirty and probably at twenty. One might argue that we have 
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this intuition because of the illiberal nature of the isolationist community, 
which is generating this robust right to exit. On this view consent to a liberal 
state could generate a much stronger form of political obligation and limit 
the right to exit in a much more extensive way than what is possible in the 
illiberal community. However, the consent theorist must be very careful here 
to not go too far in allowing the justness of the political relationship to be the 
reason why we are bound to support the arrangement over a long period. 
Doing so moves the theory far too close to the way the natural duty theorist 
defends non-voluntary political duties. If consent is to be the primary source 
for an individuals political obligations how much weaker is the need for a 
robust right exit even when the state succeeds in treating individuals as 
moral equals? 
Consenting to liberal political society could be advertised as a long-term 
contract to a justifiable political order. By joining this social contract we 
promise to accept a set of political obligations over an extended period of 
time baring some foundational changes in the conditions of political society 
that existed when we entered. However, this strategy will not help one avoid 
the requirement for a robust right to exit. This is because a just state would 
not back this kind of contract between individuals within the state, making it 
odd to think that this kind of contract could serve as the foundation of a just 
political order.  
Imagine an organisation, Charity, dedicated to pooling resources that are 
then contributed to relieving poverty. Charity was formed because its mem-
bers did not think that poverty relief via the state was doing enough, and 
membership in Charity is only offered to individuals that agree to give 
twenty percent of their net income to the collective project. Let us further 
suppose that Charity binds it members to a one year contract. Every year 
each member will have the choice to renew his or her membership or leave 
the group. Following liberal premises it seems that it would be morally ob-
jectionable for the state to prohibit individuals from binding themselves to 
such a contract and the state ought to enforce it. Furthermore, it also seems 
morally objectionable for members to renege on their promises. The follow 
up question is can a just state allow for the enforcement of a Charity contract 
if the terms are for five years, twenty years or fifty years? At the very least 
the longer the contract the more the greater community is justified in being 
concerned that those that are willing to limit their future liberty over their 
own resources to such an extent are being unjustly bound by Charity. Maybe 
the organisation is preying on vulnerable individuals and using some brain-
washing techniques to trick people out of their money? Certainly many states 
would not recognise as valid a contract signed by an eighteen year old to 
give up twenty percent of her net earnings to a voluntary organisation over a 
twenty year period. One of the few ways that Charity could appease the 
greater community’s concerns and demonstrate that members genuinely 
continue to share the organisation’s values is to show that the obligations of 
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membership are indisputably voluntary. Achieving this will likely require 
that contract periods be kept short and that members have regular opportuni-
ties to exit the group.  
If a short-term Charity contract is an example of exercising liberty why 
should a long-term contract amount to an unjustifiable limit on liberty? The 
answer is that limits on liberty must be quite short-term with regards to exit 
in relationships that are supposed to be consensual. A liberal state cannot 
sanction an individual’s contract to alienate from themselves the right to exit 
a relationship because, as Samuel Freeman, explains such a contract means 
that,  
Moral and legal duties of mutual respect, protection from unwanted harm, 
and mutual assistance of others in distress are suspended, and society’s mem-
bers are obligated to apply their collective force to compel another’s “prop-
erty” to comply with contractual obligations. By embracing alienation 
agreements as matters of enforceable public right, we accept a mandate to co-
erce and harm certain people against their will, and to regard and respond to 
them as if they were things.305 
 
This why John Stuart Mill rejected a legal system that treated women as the 
property of their husbands without an easy avenue for exit even when the 
choice to marry is voluntary and despite his particularly strong scepticism of 
paternalistic limits on free choice.306 The problems with state enforced alien-
ation contracts is also why the liberal state must insist that illiberal and hier-
archal isolationist communities must go very far in demonstrating that mem-
bers have genuine exit options, and why the state cannot sanction an organi-
sation’s attempts to use contracts to prevent individuals from exiting regard-
less of the good aims of the organisation. If it is a violation of a commitment 
to each individual’s status as free and equal and a mockery of the moral 
force of voluntary acts to use political society to sanction alienation con-
tracts, it is surely also impossible for the voluntarist to found political society 
on a contract that alienates from individuals their right to exit just one kind 
of special political relationship.  
A robust right to exit and providing collective goods 
I have belaboured the argument for a robust right to exit as a necessary ele-
ment of the kind of voluntarism proposed by Simmons because it highlights 
a fundamental inconsistency in weak philosophical anarchism. Any imagin-
able system of political authority will entail imposing legislative and execu-
tive decisions on individuals that are costly to them and a significant portion 
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of the population will at some point over the course of their lives have a 
strong interest in avoiding costs by withdrawing their consent from all or 
some aspects of the collective political project. Incentives for free-riding, 
short sightedness, and the limits of individual judgement on the needs of 
others combined with the opportunity for all individuals to opt out of politi-
cal society creates real risk that the collective security and welfare functions 
we normally associate with the state will not be provided to all those within 
a territory that want and need these goods.  
As we have seen, Simmons appears to accept the reasoning behind the 
claim that we need a political order to provide collective security, manage 
common pool resources, and provide other essential collective goods. Yet, 
he insists that since the state does not need universal support for its aims it 
ought not to insist that it has the authority to demand support and compliance 
from all residents. Once we see that this right to exit must be robust if politi-
cal society is to gain moral legitimacy in a meaningful way following the 
logic of voluntarism we can immediately see that weak philosophical anar-
chism is a contradictory position. It fist accepts that providing essential col-
lective goods needs to be done through a coercive political structure to over-
come a set of coordination problems while at the same time it tells us that the 
state cannot legitimately insist on compliance to its directives because this 
kind of authority is not needed for the state to fulfill its function. However, 
what we now see is that when each citizen has a robust right to resident non-
membership and partial non-support in the kind of voluntarist state Simmons 
proposes the conditions that make free-riding likely and that undermine the 
achievement of collective action are secured.  
It is true as Simmons’ argues that no single individuals’ contribution to 
political society is necessary for the state to function, but the collective 
goods justification of the state is not based on the absurd claim that universal 
contribution is necessary. The claim instead is that we need to coordinate 
around a single set of rules and a single political authority if we are to 
achieve the kind of collective security and system of law and order that can 
sustain a productive large scale social order. Everybody within the territory 
must be included under this scheme because we need the vast majority of 
residents to both support and contribute to the political order if it is to fulfil 
its function.  States can, and invariably do, accept a certain degree of free-
riding and can exempt some individuals or groups from many of the de-
mands of political society without undermining the collective political pro-
ject. However, the state insists on the right to dictate which residents must 
support the collective political project and in what ways because following 
the logic of collective action if individuals can unilaterally decide if, when or 
how they will support the provision of collective goods these goods will not 
be provided, will be underprovided, or will be provided in morally unaccept-
able ways. As Wellman puts it, 
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the perils of a lawless environment can be eliminated only by virtually every-
one foregoing their individual discretion in favor of the laws of their state, 
and hence not only must people make sacrifices, but they also may not as in-
dividuals choose the form these sacrifices will take. (Or, more accurately, 
part of the sacrifice is having virtually no say in determining how one must 
sacrifice.) 307 
 
Following the logic of collective action even if individuals are motivated by 
mutual self-interest to cooperate and by other regarding moral duties to treat 
others in certain ways they will fail to achieve these goals in the absence of a 
political authority that can assure coordinated cooperative efforts.  
The weak philosophical anarchist will now object that what they have in 
mind is not individuals choosing to avoid the costs of political society when 
it suits their personal interests. Rather the idea is that when individuals can 
contribute their fair share to security, welfare, and justice independently of 
the political order they should be a liberty to do so. When they do not prefer 
to benefit from some collective good or prefer private provision of this good 
and can opt out without undermining the rest of society’s ability to collec-
tively provide these goods individuals should have this option. In those cases 
where there is no feasible way for the individual to contribute other than by 
obeying some state’s directives then, according to weak philosophical anar-
chism, individuals have a moral obligation to obey although this is not a 
political obligation. However, Simmons notes that in stable states there will 
be ample opportunity to live up to one’s non-political moral duties outside of 
the political system.308 For example it seems plausible to expect that an indi-
vidual will be able to do more to address others wellbeing by using what 
they would normally pay in taxes to help bring food or medical services to 
the poorest of the world. The state can continue as before literally unaltered 
if I choose resident non-membership and avoid “undermining the security of 
others (and the viability of my state),” I will be doing enough to support this 
collective political project while also satisfying my other regarding moral 
duties in an individualistic way.     
There is a fairly basic confusion as work here. Even when it is true that 
individuals can act individually to satisfy other regarding duties and it is also 
true that any particular individual’s choice does not affect the stability of 
political order in a territory, these facts do not mean that it is also true that a 
political system where individuals can unilaterally decide if and when they 
will accept the demanding duties of justice is workable. My choice to opt out 
of political society does not undermine this project, but it is only intelligible 
to say that I do enough by satisfying a negative duty not to undermine politi-
cal society if we assume that the vast majority of others remain within this 
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order and accept a set of political duties.309 Setting aside the question of the 
fairness of passing the burden of providing political order onto others, we 
can now see that Simmons’ position is simply a denial that there are the 
kinds of collective action problems that are commonly appealed to in the 
collective goods justification of the state. The collective goods justification 
of the state is based on the claim that in market like conditions where indi-
viduals have a unilateral robust right to exit all or some schemes for creating 
social order essential collective goods will be underprovided or provided in 
morally objectionable ways (the reasoning was described in detail in the first 
half of Chapter III). Simmons emphasises the fact that individuals can sat-
isfy the demands of justice individually. Yet this in no way shows that when 
society is based on a system where individuals are at liberty to choose state 
or non-state forms of association that essential collective goods will actually 
be secured in a given territory.    
If we accept the collective goods justification of coercive political author-
ity it will not be possible to let individuals or groups decide unilaterally if 
they should have resident non-members status and at the same time secure 
the ability of the state to provide essential collective goods. Certainly we can 
imagine situations where it would be unreasonable to prevent an individual 
or group from enjoying resident non-membership status. However it must be 
the governing authority itself that has the right to sanction an individual or 
group as having a reasonable claim to resident non-membership status. Indi-
viduals’ independent assessments of whether or not they have a reasonable 
claim to resident non-membership can be mistaken or they may be motivated 
by self-interest. If individuals have a right to simply declare their resident 
non-membership status and the rest of society is morally bound to accept this 
claim we are back to the problem highlighted by Locke, “the coming into 
society upon such terms would be only like Cato’s coming into the theatre, 
only to go out again.”310  
Simmons can of course be right that individuals can act individually to 
secure peace, order and justice. Yet, if one can show that an authentically 
voluntary cooperative venture can supply essential collective goods and that 
individuals can coexist peacefully in a territory despite the fact that they are 
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not subsumed under a single system of political authority, then it is difficult 
to understand Simmons’ claim that some possible state could be justified. If 
people can cooperate on the terms of genuine voluntarism we do not need a 
coercive political authority to ensure cooperation, which should logically 
undermine the justification of political order following the premises Sim-
mons employs.  In other words, if the state is not needed we should move 
away from weak philosophical anarchism were some potential system of 
coercive political authority could be morally legitimate to a stronger form of 
anarchism were no such order is ever justified. If we combine the view that 
non-state and non-coercive forms of social cooperation are possible with the 
liberal presumption in favour of freedom from coercion the logical outcome 
must be an argument in favour or strict anarchism.311   
Simmons is interested in the terms of cooperation for large scale modern 
societies and argues that we have an obligation or a duty to obey the state, 
“if [but only if] either (a) we have interacted with the state in a way that 
grounds a special moral relationship of that sort, or if (b) accepting member-
ship in a state is the only way that we can fulfill one of our other moral obli-
gations or duties.”312 Simmons takes (b) to be obviously false because an 
individual in a working modern state could potentially act individually with-
out undermining the state. We can now see that this fact is very far from 
demonstrating that (b) is false. If we accept the collective goods justification 
of the state (b) is true and individuals can only satisfy their other-regarding 
duties to secure peace and welfare in the territory in which they reside by 
accepting non-voluntary political duties. Simmons’ weak philosophical an-
archism does not challenge the argument for a natural duty of justice. Such a 
challenge can only come from strong anarchists that deny the collective 
goods justification of the state.  
Notice as well that we have now avoided the original concern about how 
philosophical anarchism could undermine the argument in this work for a 
global form of political authority. The concern was that the collective goods 
argument used to show that we need a global form of political authority to 
address the collective action problems generated by global warming could 
not be the foundation for a non-voluntary political duty to support such an 
arrangement following voluntarism. Now we can see that if we can only 
fulfill our moral duty to treat all others as moral equals by accepting such a 
global authority then the parallel between the domestic and global collective 
goods arguments is relevant. In the following chapter I will advance the 
claim that respecting others as our moral equals does generate a non-
voluntary political duty at the global scope.  However, before moving on to 
this argument there remains another perspective on political obligations that 
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must be addressed. Having cut of an important argument from voluntarism 
on the source of political duties at a foundational level the natural duty the-
ory I adopt is still vulnerable to a foundational objection from fairness theo-
rists.  It is also still necessary to give a better account for how the natural 
duty theory can deal with the problems of demandingness and particularity 
than has been offered in previous work. In the next section I address the 
view that it is fair reciprocity and not natural duty that is the source of our 
general political duties.   
Presumptive benefits; natural duty not fairness 
As we have seen, Klosko argues that there are certain goods that can only be 
provided by a state and that all individuals need to lead decent lives. If each 
individual needs the state in this way Klosko argues that we can also pre-
sume that any individual that receives these goods from the state also bene-
fits from state provision in a way that generates political duties based in re-
ciprocal fairness. David Lefkowitz interprets Klosko’s fair play principle to 
be a duty “incumbent upon agents as a result of their being a certain way, 
rather than their doing something. Whether a person violates the fair play 
principle depends not on the agent’s beliefs or preferences, but rather on the 
factual question of whether the agent receives indispensable benefits that are 
worth his effort to provide from that scheme.”313  
Before critiquing this approach it is important to recall why a successful 
argument for basing political duties in reciprocal fairness would undermine 
the cosmopolitan thesis I am advancing for the case of global warming. 
Klosko’s theory is important to address because although he does accept that 
we can have non-voluntary political duties, he argue that we can only have 
demanding political and distributive duties of justice when we receive the 
benefits of membership in a specific political order. If this is true my argu-
ment for a global political duty will fail because we do not currently have a 
global political arrangement that could generate such a duty based in fair 
reciprocity. Given that the institution I propose does not yet exist we cannot 
logically be said to benefit from it in the morally relevant sense. More im-
portantly individuals living today are not the kinds of agents that could re-
ceive indispensable benefits that are worth their effort from the global ar-
rangement I argue for in a self-regarding way. This is because the costs of 
aggressive mitigation efforts and a global political arrangement that could 
facilitate such mitigation are not comparable to the benefits we receive in 
terms of our self-regarding interests. If Klosko’s presumptive benefits theory 
were correct it would not leave room for the strictly other regarding duties I 
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will rely on to justify a global form of political authority and demanding 
duties of justice at the global scope.  
In challenging the presumptive benefits theory I will focus on a particular 
problem involved in constructing such a theory. This is that the theory ap-
pears to amount to the idea that each individual has a duty to do what is in 
their own rational self-interest. A presumptive benefit is something that we 
can from a rational and objective perspective reasonably claim that anybody 
needs regardless of their other interests. Thus, if I have a duty of fairness to 
contribute to the provision of presumptive benefits this amounts to a duty to 
contribute to a collective project I need. A non-voluntary duty to accept du-
ties to contribute to a set of benefits simply because one needs them is diffi-
cult to reconcile with liberalism. This is because liberals place a high value 
on the individual’s right to decide for himself what he does and does not 
need. Given this feature of liberalism, Klosko’s attempt to justify to an indi-
vidual the demandingness of political society based on what others presumes 
he needs seems to be a rather weak principle on which to found political 
duties within the state.   
Klosko tries to avoid this problem by allowing for the possibility that 
some people will have beliefs or preferences that “could well relieve their 
possessors of political obligations they would otherwise have.”314 Here he is 
thinking of conscientious objections to the demands of the state (e.g. paci-
fists objecting to military service) as “a class of reasons, presumably rooted 
in subjects’ deeply held moral convictions, that would free them from obli-
gations they would otherwise have.”315 Those with certain beliefs do not have 
duties in fairness to support a collective political project that provides pre-
sumptive benefits because they do not benefit in a morally relevant way. Still 
it is thought that such attitudes towards the benefits of the state will be so 
rare so as to be inconsequential to the functioning of the state. Now we can 
see that on Klokso’s theory nearly all do benefit from political society in the 
sense of needing what the state can provide. Some may claim or think that 
they do not, but we presume that their claims or beliefs are misleading or 
false unless there is evidence of some special and rare circumstances such 
that an individual genuinely does not benefit in the morally relevant way.  
By examining how Klosko’s presumptive benefits argument for non-
voluntary political duties deals with these special cases we can see that he 
must also ultimately appeal to a natural duty of justice when pointing to his 
core presumptive benefits to justify political duties.316 
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Presumptive benefits and other-regarding political duties 
Imagine that Ophelia learns that she has a life threatening infection. She can 
easily afford the treatment and needs it if she is to lead a life at all. However, 
Ophelia claims to have a moral objection to medical treatment. Furthermore, 
she refuses to undergo a psychological assessment even though she knows 
that without it the law requires the hospital to treat her despite her objec-
tions. There is no evidence whatsoever of mental illness aside, maybe, from 
the current situation. Ophelia simply insists that she does not want any kind 
of treatment. The hospital follows procedure and imposes treatment.  
Once she has been coerced into a course of action that she explicitly did 
not want to undertake could the hospital now claim that because Ophelia has 
received treatment she needs it is only fair that she pay the hospital? The 
answer seems to be no. In fact, forcing treatment on the patient seems highly 
questionable from the start because it infringes on the individual’s freedom 
to treat her own body as she wishes. Following liberal premises we should 
do every thing we can to make sure that Ophelia is making an informed 
choice, but barring some extenuating circumstances it is objectionably pater-
nalistic to force Ophelia to undergo medical treatment. A further demand 
that she pay for the unwanted treatment is just adding insult to injury.   
The only way to make a case for coercing Ophelia into taking the treat-
ment she needs seems to be to argue that any rational person would want 
treatment and therefore it is justifiable to use force against her because her 
refusal appears to be irrational. This is at least a difficult argument to make 
from a liberal perspective. It is not clear on what basis we can say that indi-
viduals ought to act in their own rational self-interest when not doing so only 
harms them and nobody else. Moreover, it seems to be even more implausi-
ble to say that because Ophelia would if she were rational want treatment she 
has in actuality committed herself to pay for the treatment we force upon 
her. If this is true we cannot argue that Ophelia has an obligation based in 
fair reciprocity to pay or help pay for her treatment.  Yet, this is exactly what 
Klosko appears to say to an individual that claims not to want the state ser-
vices they need when he invokes a fair play duty to contribute.  
At first glance it may in fact appear that Klosko is forced to advance the 
odd argument that individuals’ have moral obligations to act rationally and 
that it is this obligation that is the source of our general political obligations. 
Adding this ‘moral ought’ condition to the standard rationalist argument for 
the state seems to be necessary to get from rational interests to political obli-
gations because on the standard account, As Lefkowitz notes, 
In the absence of any moral obligation to act prudentially, benefit to the indi-
vidual can serve only as the basis for a Hobbesian mutual advantage account 
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 171
of quasi-moral norms. Such an account, however, cannot show that citizens 
have an obligation to obey the law when not doing so is to their advantage.317 
 
We have seen that the problem with the Hobbesian approach is that it just is 
not empirically true that it is always prudentially more beneficial to obey the 
law in a large scale state. This in turn means that the Hobbesian argument for 
justifying a general political obligation to obey the state on rational self-
interest does not appear to work. Klosko bases his theory on a principle of 
fair reciprocity and not the implausible Hobbesian assessment. This means 
that Klosko is moving from what is in each individual’s rational self-interest 
to political obligation in a different way than Hobbes. Klosko wants to ap-
peal to what is in each individual’s rational self-interest, i.e. how they benefit 
from the state, to show that each individual has general moral obligations to 
support state provision of collective goods. But to advance this kind of ar-
gument one seems to be forced to incorporate at some level the implausible 
view that individuals have a moral ought to do what is in their rational self-
interest. This seems to be the only way in which my rational self interest can 
create for me a moral obligation to accept general political obligations when 
I do not want to obey. However, Klosko does have a cleaver way of getting 
out of this mess.  
Because the characteristics that would show that individuals do not bene-
fit from the essential collective goods are so rare Klosko argues that the bur-
den of proof lies with the individual to show the state and the surrounding 
political community that they should be free from their political duties.318 
Argued in this way the theory does not have the implausible implications 
noted above. Instead what is argued is that central functions of the state are 
reasonably presumed to be beneficial to each subject. This in turn means that 
fair reciprocity generates prima facie political obligations that can only be 
overridden when the subject can show that their case is exceptional in some 
way.319 In the case at hand Ophelia failed to satisfy this burden of proof by 
undergoing a mental evaluation. As a result the authorities have no way of 
telling if she has a genuine moral conviction against medical treatment or if 
she has just figured out a devious way to get free medical treatment. I will 
argue that this burden of proof argument means that the presumptive benefits 
theory is foundationally dependent on natural duty reasoning.  
Imagine now that Ophelia’s life threatening disease is also highly conta-
gious, and in order to prevent a serious epidemic the hospital needs to quar-
antine and treat Ophelia’s illness. This is now a public health issue and an 
example of the kind of presumptive good Klosko argues only the state can 
adequately provide.320 In this case it seems that the hospital is justified in 
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coercing Ophelia, not because of the benefits she receives but rather because 
others need her to be treated so that they can secure the conditions for public 
health. Because Ophelia has deep seeded moral convictions against treat-
ment she lacks the subjective capacity to benefit from treatment.  
Forcing her to take the treatment is properly characterised as imposing a 
cost, but this is justified because she can not reasonably argue that the cost 
we impose on her is a sufficient reason to forbid us from securing public 
health for all those that will be infected by her. In fact Ophelia ought to rec-
ognise that her refusal of treatment is unreasonable and recognise the state’s 
authority to quarantine and treat her. If she fails to be moved by these other 
regarding moral reasons it is justifiable for the state to coerce her into doing 
what morality demands. A natural duty explains why the state is justified in 
forcing treatment upon Ophelia, but this is not a natural duty of justice.  A 
visiting tourist would also have a natural duty to accept the quarantine and 
treatment. We would need to explain why Ophelia should do more, like pay 
for the treatment, in demonstrating a natural duty of justice.  
Note that securing public health requires a set of institutions that can per-
form the required tasks, and the state needs to have the authority to coerce 
people into contributing to this public good. Otherwise free-riding could 
undermine the system and our access to a safe environment. Thus, part of 
supporting the conditions for securing public health is contributing to the 
collective project and further supporting the state’s authority to use coercion 
to ensure widespread contribution. Even if Ophelia was not infected and 
does not want to pay for some treatment that she will never want, she has a 
duty owed to others to contribute to creating and maintaining the conditions 
for public health. Making Ophelia pay for the costs to the hospital for saving 
her life may seem unjust because her preferences are such that she has not 
benefited from the treatment. However, making her contribute her share to 
the collective provision of public health through the state seems to be justifi-
able in the same way it is justifiable to impose treatment of her infectious 
disease.  
There remain two problems with this argument. The first problem is that 
although both the authority to quarantine and the authority to secure contri-
butions to the institutional apparatus for public health are needed it is only in 
the quarantine case that we know why we are justified in coercing Ophelia 
specifically.  It is true that Ophelia is a resident of the territory and she is 
much more likely to be the source of infection for others than the visitor, but 
all this tells us is that her duty to accept quarantine and treatment is much 
more likely to be activated in the state in which she resides. However, the 
answer we can offer for the funding of public health services generally is 
that we need political systems to adequately provide public health and 
Ophelia ought to recognise that any such system must have certain character-
istics if it is going to be able to carry out its function. 
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The system must have jurisdiction over a certain territory and it must be 
able to secure support from those that will principally benefit from its opera-
tion. The fact that we can only expect widespread support for a system from 
those that will benefit from it does not mean however that it is ultimately 
fairness that is the source of any individual’s political duties. Even though 
Ophelia does not have the capacity to benefit from the system she ought to 
recognise what political systems must be like in order for them to solve the 
coordination problems that arise for the provision of public health; the state 
must have the authority over permanent residents to impose demanding du-
ties of justice.  
A critic might argue that if Ophelia is a genuine conscientious objector to 
medical treatment (e.g. based on a deep religious conviction of the evil of 
medicine) we unnecessarily harm Ophelia by forcing her to contribute. This 
is because we can provide the good of public health without her contribution. 
However, even if it is true that Ophelia has a plausible claim to exemption 
this does not show that she does not have political duties.  
Because there are free-rider problems involved in the provision of public 
health the state must be able to distinguish between those that have a genuine 
moral objection to medical care and those that simply want to avoid paying 
taxes. It cannot be up to each individual to decide for themselves if they have 
an obligation to contribute to the political project because this would under-
mine provision of the good. Thus, although we can allow Ophelia to be ex-
cluded it must be the state that sanctions this special status. Furthermore, 
Ophelia ought to recognize that it would be unreasonable to object to the 
need for the state to have the authority to decide who does and does not have 
a reasonable claim to exemption. This seems to be what Klosko is really 
getting at when he appeals to presumptive benefits.  
As was noted, Klosko argues that state provision of presumptive benefits 
places a burden of proof on any individual that claims they do not actually 
benefit from essential collective goods to demonstrate that their preferences 
are based in moral conviction and not self-interest. Likewise, anyone that 
claims to be able to adequately provide essential goods for themselves 
through some non-state alternative without undermining other’s ability to 
ensure provision through a collective political project has a burden of proof 
to show that their proposal is workable for all those affected by it. This 
means that in order to accept any such proposal it must be shown that allow-
ing individuals in general to opt out of state schemes will not undermine 
access to the collective good for any of those that want or need the good 
within the territory (e.g. law and order). If instead the burden of proof was 
placed on the state we would secure the conditions that make destructive 
free-riding likely.321  
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The very fact that we place the burden of proof on the individual demon-
strates that there is a non-voluntary duty of justice to the collective political 
project that is not based in fairness. Even if Ophelia is exempted by the state 
from contributing, she is not exempted from her political duties to others. 
She has a natural duty of justice to secure the provision of essential collec-
tive goods and in her case this duty entails accepting that she has a burden of 
proof in relation to the state should she want to be exempt from the collec-
tive project due to religious convictions. There is a political duty to accept 
the judgement of the state in these matters as long as the state is making a 
reasonable attempt to distinguish between justifiable and non-justifiable 
exemptions.  
Notice as well that the reasonableness of Ophelia’s claim to exemption is 
dependent on the number of people who share her conviction being so small 
that even if all of them were exempted there would be little effect on state 
provision of public health.  However, if Ophelia’s religious beliefs should 
become so widespread that the exemption threatened the provision of the 
public good then, following Klosko’s reasoning, the believers’ political du-
ties would demand that they accept the judgment of the state that they should 
now pay. Public health is after all a presumptive benefit independent of what 
people prefer. In fact, even if the believers were more than fifty percent of 
the population there would remain the same other regarding duty to contrib-
ute to a collective political project to secure conditions for public health 
measures. Even though the believers are the majority the majority does not 
have the right to undermine the basic conditions necessary for securing oth-
ers’ physical security.  
Of course, if those that did not want state provision of public health were 
in the majority public health services would likely not be provided, but the 
natural duty to do so would remain. Because our living together and interac-
tion with each other creates the conditions for the spreading of infectious 
disease that threatens human wellbeing and ultimately our lives we each 
have a duty owed to others to do what we can prevent this harm. This duty 
remains even if we are not moved by self-interested reasons to secure public 
health. More importantly for Klosko’s argument, the duty remains even if 
the majority of the population cannot benefit from the good in the morally 
relevant way due to their religious convictions. It is not reasonable for me to 
appeal to my religious beliefs in avoiding doing what I can to ensure that 
others have access to a decent standard of public health.  
We can now see that Klosko’s notion of presumptive benefits and the way 
he uses it in his theory leaves natural duties of justice and not non-voluntary 
duties of fairness as the fundamental source of political duties. Even if we 
are not moved by rational self-interest and do not benefit from political soci-
ety in a morally relevant way there remains an other-regarding duty of jus-
tice to accept our political duties to contribute to the collective political pro-
ject of our just state. It is crucial to notice here that this is not some small 
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problem that we only find in extreme cases. Klosko argues that received 
benefits generate political duties when they “are (i) worth their costs to their 
recipients as well as (ii) presumptively beneficial. In regard to condition (i), 
the benefits and burdens under consideration are those of the relevant com-
munity as a whole, rather than of each particular member.”322 Thus when the 
provision of presumptive benefits outweighs costs for the community as a 
whole but not for the individual, the individual still has a political duty to 
accept the burdens involved in providing this benefit. Individuals may gen-
erally benefit from political order but most will not benefit from specific 
presumptive benefits at least at some point over the course of their lives. 
When this happens the presumptive benefits argument falls back on the more 
foundational natural duty reasoning in motivating why each individual has 
political duties.   
The original concern with the presumptive benefits theory of political 
duty was the idea that citizens have a duty to support the state only when it is 
objectively true that they benefit from political society in a self-interested 
way. On this reading the theory is ultimately founded in fair reciprocity. This 
would be a problem for my global theory of political duties because in the 
case of global warming it is not likely that most individuals today could 
benefit from the proposal in this self-regarding way. However, we can now 
see that to make the idea of an objective presumptive benefit serve as a justi-
fication of general political duties for nearly all members of a political order 
the theory must ultimately really on the other-regarding natural duty of jus-
tice.  Thus the argument here has gone some way in further supporting the 
natural duty approach. However, we should recall that Klosko also claimed 
that natural duties are only weak duties that cannot support the kinds of de-
mands placed on individuals in a political community. This challenge must 
also be met to complete the defence against the received benefits and fair-
ness approach.  
The natural duty of justice and the problem of demandingness 
Natural duties are described as only weakly demanding in the contractualist 
tradition because these theorists reject strictly consequentialist accounts of 
our duties to others. Following consequentialism we are asked to give no 
more weight to our own interests than to those of others. However, rejecting 
this level of demandingness is not the same thing as demonstrating that our 
other regarding duties are necessarily weak.   
Think for example of Scanlon’s contractualist theory which is one of the 
most well developed accounts of the moral reasoning underlying contractual-
ist thought generally, and which has had a great deal of influence on the 
political theories of those that advance the political conception of justice. 
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Scanlon’s argues for a Rescue Principle that is supposed to illustrate the 
contractualist rejection of utilitarianism.  On this principle, as Leif Wenar 
explains, the “rich man should give some money to the destitute family at his 
door. Yet the rich man need not give up his entire fortune if somehow this 
would provide the destitute family with only a single extra penny.” This is a 
fairly unhelpful principle because “Our judgements in these extreme cases 
are certain…. It is the cases between these extremes, where both complaints 
have weight, that make us uncertain. How much sacrifice is enough?”323   
Scanlon’s rather undemanding Rescue Principle may seem confusing 
given the strong egalitarian nature generally attributed to his brand of con-
tractualism. However, as Wenar explains, this is the result of deep “inde-
terminism within contractualism.”  He says, 
Contractualism locates the two most important factors in our reasoning about 
our duties to aid distant others: the benefit to the poor, and the amount of sac-
rifice from the rich. But it gives us no tools for understanding how to resolve 
the tension between these two factors.… It leaves the large area between the 
extreme cases (about which we were already certain) to be decided entirely 
by individual judgement. The fact that Scanlon’s judgement about tradeoffs 
(as expressed in his Rescue Principle) may be different from your own 
judgement highlights how little assistance contractualism gives in specifying 
our duties in the crucial ‘intermediate’ cases.324 
 
However, we should not be tricked into thinking that Scanlon’s Rescue Prin-
ciple is just one possible attempt to make tradeoffs in the area between the 
extreme cases even though Wenar may rightly interpret Scanlon’s intentions. 
The Rescue Principle is better understood as simply a restatement of contrac-
tualism’s more general rejection of two extreme moral stances, pure partial-
ity and pure impartiality.  
If we reject pure partiality I have at the very least a slight obligation to aid 
those in distress.325 A slight obligation to aid is the bare minimum we can 
expect of an agent that is “moved by the aim of finding principles that oth-
ers, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject.”326  What we owe oth-
ers in need is at the very least more than nothing. Once we understood the 
Rescue Principle in this way we can see that it is not about the extent of our 
obligation to aid but rather it is simply a confirmation that we have an obli-
gation to aid.   
When conceptualising the contractualist rejection of pure impartiality we 
need to imagine another type of extreme case for which Scanlon could have 
identified a ‘principle,’ the Demand Principle. If agents are moved to justify 
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principles to each other, then we cannot expect of an agent that she provide 
some much aid that she sacrifices all of her particular interests. This is be-
cause Scanlon’s contractualist construction does not only recognise the rea-
son giving force of the impartial perspective but also the reason giving force 
of the partial interests of any agent. The Demand Principle sets the limit on 
what we can require of a potential aid giver at less than what would be re-
quired by strict first-order impartial equality. As Scanlon puts it, it would 
“be reasonable to reject a principle that required us, in every decision we 
make, to give no more weight to our own interests than to the similar inter-
ests of others. From an agent’s standpoint such a principle would be intol-
erably intrusive.”327    
Wenar gives an example of the Demand Principle when he says that you 
are not obligated to give up all your wealth for the sake of giving one penny 
to a person in need. We do not need to give up all our partial interests to help 
the needy only slightly, and presumably Scanlon also wants to deny that we 
would be required to give up all of our partial interests for the sake of saving 
one person from starving to death. What is important to notice is that the 
Demand Principle leaves open how much of our partial interests we do need 
to sacrifice to aid those in need. Again this way of reasoning does not tell us 
anything about the extent of our obligations to others, but only that our par-
tial interests have moral force in contractualist justification. In essence then 
Scanlon’s Rescue Principle is like telling someone that they have to pay 
taxes and that the tax rate is somewhere between zero and a hundred percent. 
Hardly a satisfying result! 
The reason Scanlon’s theory of contractualism cannot support more spe-
cific arguments about the extent of our obligations to others is because he 
resists specifying the grounds for reasonable rejection. Scanlon spends a 
great deal of time arguing against theories that see the relative affects on 
well-being as the “fundamental” criteria for reasonableness. If calculations 
of relative well-being were determinative of the reasonableness of a proposal 
we would end up with something like the utilitarian notion of what we owe 
to each other. Against such “welfarist contractualism” Scanlon convincingly 
argues that the “the justificatory force of a given increment of well-being in 
moral argument is not constant in all situations, but depends on other factors 
of a clearly moral character.”328 Scanlon takes considerations of responsibil-
ity and fairness as examples of moral concerns that also have justificatory 
force and undermine the plausibility of utilitarian calculations of right and 
wrong.329  Scanlon is chiefly concerned with ‘the welfarist’ in his book but 
his criticism of the welfarist should also be understood as a more general 
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dismissal of any attempt to reduce what is to count as reasonable to a single 
or very narrow set of criteria. 
In addition to avoiding a narrow conceptualisation of reasonableness, 
Scanlon also wants to avoid various charges of circularity or redundancy that 
contractualism has traditionally faced. If we have a well developed and spe-
cific account of what is reasonable then justifying moral principles can ap-
peal directly to those substantive moral arguments about what is reasonable 
and unreasonable as such. We could do away with the contractualist con-
struction. With regards to being more specific about the grounds for reason-
able rejectability and “the method to be used in balancing these grounds 
against one another” Scanlon says “although this is a feasible aim with re-
spect to some specific areas of morality it is not likely to succeed at the level 
of generality of the theory I am currently offering here—that is to say… that 
large part of it that has to do with what we owe to each other.”330 This may 
be because part of what we owe to each other is being open enough to all the 
potential reasons people might have for rejecting a principle. Scanlon says 
“…the judgment that any consideration constitutes a relevant, possibly con-
clusive, reason for rejecting a principle in the context of contractualist moral 
thinking as I am describing it is a judgment with moral content.”331  How-
ever, what  happens when we keep what is to count as reasonable as open 
ended as Scanlon does is that we limit the theory to those principles that can 
be derived from the contractualist construction itself; namely rejecting those 
principles that are either examples of pure partiality or pure impartiality.  
Scanlon’s resistance to specifying what is to count as reasonable gener-
ates far too much indeterminism. As it stands his theory does not tell us what 
we owe but rather that we owe to each other moral consideration. The theory 
establishes that we do have other regarding moral duties but argues that they 
are not as demanding as those suggested by utilitarianism. Once this is estab-
lished there is something fundamentally problematic about turning the whole 
project around and saying that we ought not to get specific about how to 
weigh reasons for rejecting against each other.  
Resisting specifying what should count as reasonable is, I think, ulti-
mately a failure. One must and can argue for more specific criteria without 
undermining the integrity of the moral motivation contractualist construc-
tion. If one resists substantive attempts along these lines, we are left with a 
theory that is almost completely indeterminate in relation to practical reason 
(i.e. in terms of giving us a better idea of what we ought to do). However this 
debate is beyond the scope of the current discussion. What I hope to have 
shown here is that it will not do to appeal to caveats about natural duties only 
being weak duties in rejecting the natural duty approach to the problem of 
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political authority. The contractualist arguments underlying this widely held 
premise about natural duties are far too fragile to support such a conclusion.  
The duty to both support and, when necessary, help create the political in-
stitutions necessary to secure essential collective goods is a clear example of 
a demanding natural duty. This is because individual’s political duties are 
rightly described as demanding. We can now see that conceiving of natural 
duties of justice as demanding is not clearly in contradiction with the under-
lying contractualist reasoning on which the natural duty of justice is depend-
ent. 
When contractualists argue that our duties to others are weak there are 
simply saying that they are weaker than the demands of utilitarianism and 
that it is reasonable to weigh in a host of partial interests in determining what 
justice requires of individuals. Thus, what in fact should count as too de-
manding is not plainly born out by general contractualist statements likes 
Rawls’ when he says that we have natural duties of justice to support politi-
cal order “when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves.”332  If 
Klosko wants to defend the claim that natural duties can only be weak duties 
he must develop a positive argument to the effect that the demands entailed 
by the natural duty of justice to support political society because others de-
pend on it are unreasonably high. However, this will be rather difficult for 
Klosko to do. As we have seen, even on his presumptive goods argument for 
the state it is reasonable to expect individuals to accept general and demand-
ing non-voluntary political duties when they do not benefit from various 
aspects of political society.  
The natural duty of justice  
I have argued thus far that the natural duty of justice is based in our reason-
able expectation that others accept the authority of the state and contribute to 
a political project for the provision of essential collective goods. By looking 
more closely as Simmons’ consent approach we have seen that unless we 
accept the anarchist’s empirical claim that essential collective goods can be 
provide in a morally acceptable way independent of a state we should be 
persuaded by the claim that one can only satisfactorily live up to the other 
regarding duty to secure the conditions for security, law and order, provision 
of public goods, and respect for each individuals’ rights as a moral equals by 
accepting non-voluntary duties to contribute to a collective political project. 
We have also seen that the source of our political duties are not at their 
foundation the benefits we receive from political society. This is because 
even those that do not benefit in a morally relevant way have natural duties 
of justice owed to others to support those political arrangements needed to 
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secure the public provision of essential collective goods. Rational self-
interest and reciprocal fairness are also clear reasons for accepting the de-
manding of political society. However these reasons can only justify a gen-
eral prima facie duty to support political society together with the natural 
duty of justice.  
The role of fairness 
We should note that there are two ways in which an argument for a natural 
duty of justice is closely linked to fairness. As Janos Kis explains, 
a person who is duty-bound to contribute to a cooperative venture causes 
harm to the venture–and, in this way, to the other persons similarly bound–by 
failing to carry out her duty. The harm she causes consists in shifting the bur-
den she is required to assume onto others…This is wrong, even if we do not 
inflict harm on them, either directly or indirectly, by causing a setback to the 
cooperative venture in which we are involved with them.333 
 
We must take on our fair share of the other-regarding natural duty of justice 
and we treat others unfairly even when our failure to contribute to the collec-
tive does not have any effect on the aims of political society. When there is a 
surplus in the inputs demanded from participants in a collective political 
project no individual is justified in unilaterally deciding that her own contri-
bution is superfluous and inefficient and thus not demanded by justice.334 
Such a unilateral choice imposes on others one’s will that they continue con-
tributing to the provision of essential collective goods. Furthermore, no indi-
vidual has the right to unilaterally usurp surplus contribution to a collective 
political project. If the system is in fact inefficient then the collective should 
decide how the relief from payment should be distributed among the con-
tributors.335 Presumably if a society is distributing the burden of support for 
political institutions fairly then they will distribute the benefit of reduced 
taxes along the same criteria for fairness.    
There is also a second somewhat different way in which fairness comes 
into play and helps explain the range of things we normally associate with a 
just liberal democratic state, especially redistributive justice. Because our 
political duties are non-voluntary and others are justified in expecting politi-
cal authorities to use coercive means to ensure that essential collective goods 
are provided, each individual has a claim against the rest of political society 
that they be treated fairly within this institutional scheme. Readers will rec-
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ognise this notion of fairness from the description of the political conception 
of justice in Chapter II. The basic idea here is that demands of socio-
economic justice make sense in a shared political system because it would be 
morally objectionable if we were both forced to be part of such a system 
while at the same time the basic structure of the system lead to arbitrary ine-
qualities. A great deal of what a just state demands from us can be linked in 
the first to the political project for providing essential collective goods and 
then second to creating the conditions under which each individual is treated 
fairly by the basic structure, although this is far from giving moral legiti-
macy to everything actual liberal democratic states do. Notice that we must 
first establish the natural duty of justice to get the two identified notions of 
fairness off the ground.336  
The problem of particularity 
As we have seen, the natural duty of justice has been used by some of its 
main supporters, like Rawls and Nagel, to defend the position that individu-
als have special ties to their own states and special duties of justice to fellow 
citizens to the exclusion of other states and non-members. We have a non-
voluntary natural duty to those that we share political society with even 
though these boundaries are arbitrary. This is because others depend on the 
persistence of political order within the territory in which they reside. De-
manding duties of justice, it is argued, are only owed within existing politi-
cal institutions and our obligations to those that we do not share political 
society with are the requirements of morality. The requirements of morality 
are less demanding than the demands of justice among members of a state in 
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the sense that standards of egalitarian distributive and political justice are not 
owed across state borders. 
Many commentators have objected that if natural duties of justice are ul-
timately founded in an argument about what we must do to respect others as 
moral equals, we surely have a natural duty of justice in relation to all others 
and not simply those that I happen to be born among. I will argue that this 
criticism does not undermine the natural duty approach to justifying to indi-
viduals that they have political duties within the communities in which they 
reside. However, it does undermine attempts to use the natural duty theory to 
limit the scope of justice simply by appealing to the fact that compatriots 
share in certain kinds of political institutions. The natural duty of justice 
entails only weak ties to those with whom we share a state.   
The fact that we are born into a world where political membership is di-
vided among states has real normative weight. Even if the state we are born 
into is arbitrary accepting its authority and duties of justice to fellow mem-
bers is simply to accept, in Nagel’s words, the “conditions of peace and a 
legal order, with whatever community offers itself.”337 The idea here is that 
individuals are dependent on their being a set of what Jeremy Waldron calls 
“range limited” political duties that are owed to fellow members of a politi-
cal community.338 For my public health care system to work properly access 
to the system must be largely limited to those that share in the collective 
political project that makes the system possible. We have special duties of 
justice to those others with whom we share the state’s institutions because it 
is on these people that my resource use and legal standing has the most sig-
nificant effects. That we should have political duties in territorially bounded 
states in the first place is because “the Kantian approach implies that I 
should enter quickly into a form of society with those immediately adjacent 
to me, those with whose interests my resource use is likely to pose the most 
frequent and dangerous conflicts.”339  
As long as I continue to reside in a political community I will have politi-
cal duties to contribute to the collective project and accept the government’s 
need to have the authority to use coercion in securing justice. However, it is 
wrong to assume that the natural duty of justice simply binds us to the state 
we are born into and disregards the arbitrariness of state boundaries. To see 
this we can first note that the natural duty of justice does not seem to place 
many if any limits on the liberty to leave the state and take up residence in 
some other political community. Thus I am not naturally bound to contribute 
to some specific political community but rather generally duty bound to ac-
cept a set of political duties within the political project of those that I live 
among.  
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Furthermore, having a natural duty of justice does not appear to commit 
individuals to the boundaries of political communities as they stand. These 
boundaries could have been different and can be altered. Some other territo-
rial division between political communities could satisfy the aim of ensuring 
the provision of essential collective goods, and political communities could 
choose to change the scope of their political duties such as with the EU. Cir-
cumstances could also change altering the implications of our natural duties 
of justice.  
For example, because of the risk and reach of inter-state war and the cor-
responding effects for the basic security interests of all states and their citi-
zens there is a strong argument following from the natural duty of justice for 
creating political institutions to ensure the conditions for global collective 
security. This seems to be exactly the kind of reasoning behind the existing 
attempts to institutionalising just-war principles at the global scope within 
the United Nations framework. The normative argument for creating such a 
global political authority is not dependent on pre-existing institutional ar-
rangements at the global scope or even in existing cooperation. Instead, 
changes in the scope of our political duties to others are founded in changes 
in the kinds of real or potential effects we can have on each other. Our natu-
ral duties of justice are something we owe to all others, but the duty has dif-
ferent implications depending on the kinds of interaction and effects we have 
on each other. 
Sometimes my natural duty of justice to a certain group of people outside 
of my state will require no more of me than that I do not attempt to under-
mine their political order, and at other times and for different issues I will 
have a duty to enter into a new political project with these people. In the case 
of collective security among states our natural duty of justice could generate 
a duty to support a supranational form of political authority if states were 
shown to be unable to cooperate sufficiently to provide the goods of order 
and security at the global scope. It is far beyond the scope of this work to 
debate this issue, but it does remind us of how the natural duty of justice 
reasoning arises at the global scope.   
In the next chapter I will further defend the argument that our natural du-
ties of justice do not strongly tie us to the state. I will then argue that based 
on an adequate defence of non-voluntary political duties in existing just 
states we should also recognise an associative duty to create a new form of 
political authority at the global scope so that we can both make collective 
decisions on how to address the problem of global warming and credibly 
enforce these decisions. Following the natural duty of justice logic distinc-
tive kinds of interconnectedness at any scope can give rise to far-reaching 
demands of justice.  
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Summation 
In this chapter I have defended the natural duty theory of political duties 
against challenges from alternative theories based in consent and fair recip-
rocity. As has been noted throughout the chapter, developing these argu-
ments against alternative theories has been necessary to cut off expected 
objections to the central thesis of this book. The central thesis is that global 
warming has generated a duty of justice to support the creation of a new 
form of supranational political authority. The objections to this proposal that 
are undercut at least to some degree in this chapter are that we can only have 
political duties within arrangements we consent to or benefit from. I will not 
explain the reasoning for this chapter further here as it should be quite clear 
at this stage. However, one should note the underlying philosophical strategy 
involved in this book.  
The point of cutting off alternative theories on our political duties is to be 
able to advance a classic form of argumentation directed at the sceptical 
reader. This is simply to show that something the sceptic is already commit-
ted also entails the position you are trying to convince them of. In my case 
the argument directed towards the liberal sceptic of global justice is the fol-
lowing; if you think that we do have demanding duties of justice within the 
state then you are in fact already committed to the idea that we could have 
natural duties of justice at the global scope. This is because 1) the natural 
duty theory is the most plausible justification for the political duties you 
accept at the state level, and 2) natural duties are duties we owe to all others. 
This second feature means that we can have a natural duty of justice at the 
global scope when we are related to others globally in a way that gives rise 
to the collective goods justification of political order. This chapter has de-
fended the first point, at least in relation to the opposing views of most rele-
vance to this work. The first half of the following chapter will be dedicated 
to further defending the second point. In the second half of Chapter V we 
come to the culmination of my thesis. Here I will I identify what kinds of 
reasons we can appeal to in justifying to individuals that they have a natural 
duty of justice to support a global political project with a mandate to address 
the threat of human induced global warming.  
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Chapter V 
 
Global warming and our natural duties of 
justice 
The capacity that exists today to consume and destroy environmental ser-
vices is enormous and expanding rapidly. At the same time the welfare gains 
for any individual achieved through increases in consumption diminish once 
basic needs are met. Rapidly so, we should expect, for those with the kinds 
of wealthy living standards enjoyed in highly productive economies. With 
this in mind and further considering the fact that we have short lives in com-
parison to the time we can reasonably expect life to exist on our planet, it 
seems deeply morally problematic and wildly selfish to consume and pollute 
without any regard for people that will exist in the future. Following these 
intuitions the most straightforward way to argue that we have a duty to cre-
ate global political institutions that will facilitate radical reductions of global 
GHG emissions is to claim that we have a duty to future generations to take 
on this demanding political project. 
One might plausibly argue that we owe it to future generations to signifi-
cantly limit our consumption of fossil fuels and to radically reduce our GHG 
emissions because it would be wrong to seriously harm the environmental 
conditions humanity depends on. At some level the idea of a duty to future 
generations is relatively uncontroversial; a commitment to the equal inherent 
moral worth of all individuals must entail that we have some duties to future 
generations. However, that we should have any demanding duties of justice 
towards future generations is questioned in philosophical debate, and there 
are considerable disputes over how demanding our duties to future genera-
tions are if we do in fact have them. 
In this chapter I will not try to give an answer on what our duties to future 
generations actually are. Instead I argue that because of the kind of threat 
global warming entails it is morally required to create those institutional 
conditions through which we could act collectively to mitigate global warm-
ing. There is at the very least a natural duty of justice to create the institu-
tional conditions that make it possible to formulate an active and collective 
choice about what burdens we are willing to take on for the sake of future 
generations. I will argue that we can establish such a duty to support a su-
 186 
pranational form of political authority by appealing to two different kinds of 
other-regarding reasons. The first reason is based on the minimalist view that 
we owe future generations more than no consideration whatsoever. The sec-
ond reason for action is founded in reasonable disagreement over our obliga-
tions to future generations and entails an other-regarding duty owed to our 
contemporaries. 
However, before moving on to the final stage of the argument for a global 
natural duty of justice it is necessary to address why many of the central 
defenders of the natural duty theory of political duties, like Rawls and Nagel, 
rule out the possibility that we could have non-voluntary and demanding 
global duties of justice of the kind I propose. In Chapter II it was argued that 
the choice to focus on the political conception of justice was based in part on 
the fact that it takes the individual to be the basic unit of analysis. This was 
contrasted with Rawls’ approach to the problem of global justice where he 
takes peoples to be the basic unit of analysis. I have claimed that the indi-
vidualistic approach is more in line with basic liberal premises.  
Because I have yet to defend the above noted claim the overall argument 
of this book is open to the objection that Rawls has a more plausible inter-
pretation of what the natural duty of justice amounts to at the global scope. 
Namely that we have duties of justice to support the political societies peo-
ples need and that a supranational form of political authority would violate 
peoples’ morally legitimate interests in political autonomy. If it is plausible 
for liberals to follow this interpretation my overall project will only be con-
vincing for those that take the individualistic perspective and not the Rawl-
sian one. For this reason it is important to address Rawls’ theory and explain 
in more detail why I view it as unworkable from a liberal perspective. 
The argument to come against Rawls’ theory should not be taken to 
amount to the view that the interests of a social community taken as a whole 
are never of interest in our thinking about global justice. Nor should the ar-
gument be viewed as a rejection of the idea that because cultural context is 
important to individuals in various ways protection of a cultural context can 
also limit the demands thought to follow from a strictly individualist and 
impartial perspective on the problem of global justice. I do not reject such 
arguments nor do I attempt to show if or how far such arguments can be 
applied within a liberal theory of global justice. Instead the point is to argue 
that appeals to the interests of peoples cannot plausibly be used by those that 
adopt the premise of individual morally equality to rule out the idea that 
individuals could under certain conditions have duties to support a global 
form of political authority.  
Having established this fairly intricate argument against the usability of 
Rawls’ theory I will move on to Nagel’s alternative and more individualistic 
interpretation of the natural duty of justice. Despite what Nagel himself ar-
gues, I show that following his theory one clearly cannot rule out the possi-
bility that we could have global natural duties of justice. Once these two 
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points are established I will then be free to move on to the concluding argu-
ment of this book. In the second half of the chapter I explain how concern 
for the moral value of future generations and of contemporaries can lead to a 
natural duty to support a global political project with a mandate for imple-
menting public policy on the threat of climate change.  
Rawls’ non-liberal disqualification of global political 
autonomy 
In The Law of Peoples Rawls makes it clear that inequality between well-
ordered and decent societies does not require that we create a system for the 
global redistribution of wealth based on his “difference principle.”340 This is 
in part because Rawls accepts the empirical claim that the wealth of a politi-
cal community is not dependent on the existence of natural resources within 
its territory or global economic structures but rather on domestic policy and 
culture.341 Rawls’ empirical assertions have been widely debated and it is not 
important to assess their validity here. Instead I focus on what I take to be 
Rawls’ stronger general claim; namely that a system of global distributive 
justice or any other global form of political authority that would limit peo-
ples’ autonomy are morally objectionable.  
Rawls objects to a system of global distributive justice because it would 
not be sensitive to the economic and social choices that separate peoples 
make. Why, he asks, should a political community with defective economic 
and social policies or a society that simply chooses a less economically pro-
ductive system receive continual transfers from wealthier peoples that have 
chosen a more productive economic system?342 Rawls is appealing to what 
Ronald Dworkin calls the distinction between choice sensitivity and circum-
stance insensitivity.343 Following this distinction distributive justice is in-
tended to compensate members in a shared political system when their op-
portunities and access to resources are negatively affected by unchosen so-
cial circumstances or lack of natural talents. It is not intended to compensate 
choices that cause one to have fewer resources than others do.  
Notice that in his domestic theory Rawls is willing to violate choice sensi-
tivity to some degree to guarantee circumstance insensitivity. Following the 
difference principle welfare inequalities are only acceptable if they are to the 
advantage of those in the worst off position, thus even if my choices have 
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put me in the worst off position any increase in the resource gap between me 
and others within my society must also increase my absolute level of welfare 
to be considered just. Individuals may be overcompensated for their choices, 
but at the same time the difference principle is able to go a long way in 
breaking patterns of socio-economic class determining individuals’ life pros-
pects. To err on the side of equality in developing a workable strategy does 
appear to be in line with the normative the premises from A Theory of Jus-
tice, which are: 1) that individuals are moral equals that should be treated as 
ends in themselves not merely as means to others’ ends, and 2) individuals 
do not deserve the benefits or disadvantages associated with the social, eco-
nomic and natural endowments they are born into. Violating choice sensitiv-
ity to some degree makes sense following these premises because it is diffi-
cult to know the degree to which the choices people make are routed in so-
cial and natural circumstance. Thus, in applying the noted premises when 
justifying a coercive state to individual subjects Rawls arrives at a highly 
egalitarian theory for the distribution of benefits and burdens associated with 
the basic structure of society.  
The interesting question to ask is why Rawls chooses instead to err on the 
side of choice sensitivity for the international case? It would be surprising if 
Rawls’ resistance to the prospect of a global system for distributive justice 
was simply based on the empirical claim that global conditions do not sig-
nificantly impact on the wealth enjoyed in states.344 Associative cosmopoli-
tans have over a long period of time effectively pointed out that global con-
ventions, institutions, and interaction are at the very least important factors 
affecting political communities and conditions for their members. Further-
more, the conventions and institutions that reinforce the state system itself 
entail a clearly definable global basic structure that plays a major part in 
making where individuals are born so central for how their lives will go (e.g. 
this structure limits the free movement of people). To understand Rawls’ 
resistance to any proposed thick global political arrangement involving stan-
dards of global distributive we must first notice that he is operating from a 
different set of premises in The Law of Peoples compared to those adopted in 
his work on justice at the domestic scope. Most importantly Rawls argues 
that rules for regulating global relations must be justifiable to peoples and 
not individuals.  
Rawls argues that just like individuals in his domestic theory, peoples are 
“self-authenticating sources of claims.”345 In Political Liberalism Rawls ex-
plains that when individuals are not counted as self-authenticating sources of 
                               
344 For an interpretation of Rawls’ theory showing that his principles of international justice 
are not chiefly based on empirical assessments of the welfare effects of existing global eco-
nomic relations see Freeman, "The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and 
Distributive Justice." (epecially 63-67).    
345 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 33. 
 189
valid claims “their claims have no weight except insofar as they can be de-
rived from the duties and obligations owed to society, or from their ascribed 
roles in a social hierarchy justified by religious or aristocratic values.”346 In 
his domestic theory treating individuals as self-authenticating sources of 
claims means that social hierarchies are not relevant to the weight given to 
individuals’ interests. For the international case Rawls claims to be drawing 
a direct parallel to the way a domestic liberal theory of justice instructs us to 
tolerate individuals’ incompatible views of the good when they are suppor-
tive of politically liberal public institutions and laws.347 However on closer 
inspection we can see that the principle is not the same at all.  
On Rawls’ theory of international justice peoples primarily have an inter-
est in self-determination, meaning that they have a self-authenticating claim 
to not be subject to coercion from other peoples or from some global sys-
tem.348 Justice between peoples entails respecting these prime interests. Note 
that liberal and non-liberal but decent hierarchical societies must both toler-
ate each other as long as they respect the law of peoples. In regards to what 
Rawls describes as an ideal contractualist theory on relations between peo-
ples he notes that 
in discussing the arguments in the second original position in which the prin-
ciples of the Law of People are selected for liberal peoples, the parties are the 
representatives of equal peoples, and equal peoples will want to maintain this 
equality with each other…. No people will be willing to count the losses to 
itself as outweighed by gains to other peoples; and therefore the principle of 
utility, and other moral principles discussed in moral philosophy, are not 
even candidates for a Law of Peoples… this consequence will also hold for 
the further extension to decent peoples.349 
 
On Rawls’ international theory any system of coercive global political insti-
tutions is disqualified at the outset by the premise that peoples are owed self-
determination. Thus, there could not be a natural duty of justice to create 
global political institutions that changes the authority structures of existing 
political societies because global justice is above all else about securing the 
self-determination of liberal and decent peoples, which in turn secures the 
conditions for a plurality of political cultures.    
Rawls international theory is an attempt to identify reasonable terms on 
which peoples with differing values and political systems can peacefully 
coexist. To this end we must be willing to tolerate political orders where 
individuals from minority religious or ethnic groups, inferior classes, or 
women are denied the opportunity to hold important positions within that 
society. He states, for example, that in decent non-liberal societies “one re-
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ligion may legally predominate in the state government, while other relig-
ions, though tolerated, may be denied the right to hold certain positions.”350 
Rawls is as a matter of principle accepting political systems where the 
claims individuals can make are in important ways dependent on “ascribed 
roles in a social hierarchy justified by religious or aristocratic values.” 
Rawls’ international theory is about the interests of peoples in relation to 
other peoples, and as a result we see that the principles of equality between 
peoples are very different than the principles of equality between individuals 
that he advances for his domestic liberal theory of justice. The problem with 
all this from a liberal perspective is that one simply cannot simultaneously 
treat both individuals and a hierarchical society as self-authenticating 
sources of claims in the way Rawls suggests. 
Note that an objection one can advance here is that Rawls does not claim 
that non-liberal decent peoples have just political orders. Instead he argues 
that liberal political culture is superior in terms of justice and that it is rea-
sonable from a liberal perspective to hope that non-liberal peoples become 
liberal.351 As such one might want to claim that Rawls is simply advancing a 
pragmatic and not a principled defence of both liberal and decent peoples’ 
interests in self-determination. On this view Rawls is not offering a princi-
pled defence of hierarchal political cultures. His international theory is in-
stead about how peoples can co-exist in a non-perfect world. This interpreta-
tion does not seem to follow from what Rawls actually says, although it is 
true that Rawls also gives several pragmatic reasons for having a high level 
of respect for the self-determination of decent non-liberal peoples. 
Samuel Freeman, one of the most prominent interpreters of Rawls, notes 
that Rawls is clearly arguing that decent non-liberal peoples should be 
treated as equal to liberal peoples in determining the content of the Law of 
Peoples. To do otherwise in identifying standards of international justice by 
from the outset regarding   
all liberal rights as human rights and insist they should be enforced by the 
Law of Peoples is to impose upon nonliberal but decent peoples, for reasons 
they cannot accept, terms of cooperation that are universally at odds with the 
moral and political views of nearly everyone in that society. There is no justi-
fication within the public reason of the Society of Peoples for such meas-
ures.352 
 
This explains why Rawls brings decent hierarchical peoples into his theory 
in what he calls “the second part of ideal theory,” and not his reasoning un-
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der the heading “non ideal theory.”353 The ideal, i.e. principled, toleration of 
decent non-liberal peoples informs standards of justice within the Society of 
Peoples. It represents a general counter argument to liberal cosmopolitan 
arguments that would entail limiting the political autonomy of peoples.354 It 
is this normative implication that is important in our interpretation of 
whether or not Rawls views non-liberal political orders as morally justifi-
able. Rawls in his thinking about global justice takes as a principled point of 
departure the moral value of peoples and their interests in political auton-
omy in working out what justice can be at the international scope. It is for 
this reason he should be interpreted as advancing general normative rejection 
of cosmopolitan theories of global justice that have a starting point in the 
interests and moral value of individuals and view these interests as taking 
priority over peoples’ interests in political autonomy.  
What is distinct about Rawls’ project in A Theory of Justice and Political 
Liberalism is that he is trying to identify the principles on which political 
institutions must be based if political society is to be justifiable to individual 
members. However, in his global theory Rawls departs fundamentally from 
his combined appeal to rational-self interest, reciprocal fairness, and the 
natural duty of justice in explaining when political authorities are morally 
legitimate and when citizens have political duties. Instead what is required is 
that a political order meet a minimalist standard of basic human rights, have 
a non-arbitrary legal and political system, be governed according these es-
tablished principles of the political culture, and that it give citizens some 
outlet for contribution to political discourse.355  
These weaker requirements make room for the moral legitimacy of politi-
cal cultures where, as Rawls says, persons are “not regarded as free and 
equal citizens, nor as separate individuals deserving equal representation,” 
while they “can recognize when their moral duties and obligations accord 
with the people’s common good idea of justice.”356 Having political duties to 
support a political community’s goals even when these goals do not aim at 
treating individuals as moral equals is, as we can ascertain from the discus-
sion in the previous chapter, wholly foreign to liberal attempts to justify 
political authority. Many critics have objected to Rawls’ international theory 
because of the implications for theories of morality and justice that follow 
from abandoning individuals as the basic unit of analysis. Although I share 
many of these concerns, my purpose here is to point out a technical problem 
that arises in the context of Rawls international theory. The problem is that 
Rawls’ approach in his international theory reveals that he does not rule out 
the prospect of a global natural duty of justice to adopt some global form of 
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political authority in a way that can be compelling for those that adopt famil-
iar liberal premises.  This is because they way he justifies the moral accept-
ability of a people’s political authority and rejects the moral acceptability of 
limits to peoples’ political autonomy are not compatible with a workable 
liberal theory for assessing the moral legitimacy of existing or proposed 
forms of political authority.  
The Society of Peoples and existing practice 
In explaining what appears to be a drastic shift in Rawls’ thinking interpret-
ers of his work increasingly argue that we should think of both his domestic 
and international theories as based to a significant extent on existing prac-
tice.357 Coercive political order can only be justified to individuals living in 
liberal political cultures if they are treated as equals because this is part of 
the political culture. However, a coercive political order can also be legiti-
mate even though it does not treat individuals equally if the political culture 
embodies the characteristics of a decent hierarchical society. In the same 
way principles guiding relations at the global scope must also be based in 
existing practice so that they can be acceptable to all that are affected by 
them. 
As Wenar explains,  
analogously to the liberal domestic case, Rawls must draw on the global pub-
lic political culture to find ideas that can be acceptable to all…. The ideas that 
regulate the institutions of global society are concerned primarily with the na-
ture of nations and their proper relations—not with the nature of persons and 
their proper relations.… There simply is no robust global public political cul-
ture which emphasizes that citizens of different countries ought to relate 
fairly to one another as free and equal within a single scheme of social coop-
eration.358  
 
We can have political duties to support domestic political orders because 
within all the political cultures around the world we do find the idea that it is 
necessary to have some system of political authority in the territories in 
which peoples reside. We could not have any such duty to create a compara-
ble form of political order at the global scope because 1) at the global scope 
the political culture is populated by peoples not individuals and 2) from the 
perspective of peoples the idea of a global form of political authority is not 
found within their shared political culture. To the contrary what we find in 
the global political culture is the idea that peoples should be free from coer-
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cion from other peoples/states and the notion that decent peoples have mor-
ally legitimate political autonomy. 
These standards rule out the possibility that political communities could 
have a duty to enter into a global political project for the sake of some global 
system of distributive justice. As Freeman notes, 
Rawls’s rejection of welfarism is integral to his rejection of a global distribu-
tion principle. In the domestic case, the end of social justice is not individual 
welfare, but the freedom and equality of citizens. Similarly, in the interna-
tional case, the end of the Law of Peoples is not the total welfare of a people. 
(It is not even the welfare of its least-advantaged individuals, though all indi-
viduals’ basic needs are to be met so that they can participate in the social 
and political life of their culture.) The end of the Law of Peoples is equal po-
litical autonomy, or ‘the freedom and equality of a people as members of the 
Society of well-ordered Peoples’ (cf. LP, 118).359 
 
This is one straightforward way to argue against global natural duties of 
justice, i.e. the idea that we could have a duty of justice among individuals at 
the global scope to support the creation of a global form of political author-
ity. For example, what I am proposing in this book is that we have a non-
voluntary duty to support a global political project to address the threat of 
climate change. On this view peoples do not have the moral legitimacy to 
withhold their support from a global and collective political effort to address 
the threat of global warming. Following the Rawlsian approach peoples 
could choose to delegate authority to some global form of governance, but 
they would still maintain the moral legitimacy to exercise their political 
autonomy and thus could not have a duty to support or to continue to support 
a global form of political authority.  
Rawls does offer a clear way of rejecting the kind of cosmopolitan thesis I 
advance. However, the Rawlsian argument about what is acceptable within a 
pluralistic Society of Peoples is also clearly not a liberal way of arguing 
against the very possibility that we could have duties to support the creation 
of a supranational form of political authority. This is because the appeal to 
the existing political cultures of illiberal peoples and the Society of Peoples 
as described above is incompatible with any plausible liberal theory for how 
to go about justifying or rejecting political order at any scope.   
As we have seen, if we genuinely accept a presumption in favour of indi-
viduals’ freedom from coercion and the moral equality of individuals it is 
very difficult to show that individuals have political duties to support some 
existing political order (i.e. that the state enjoys moral legitimacy). Simply 
asserting that we can have political duties of a certain kind because this is 
existing practice is not persuasive at all within a liberal theoretical frame-
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work. This in turn seems to undermine the idea that we can, following liberal 
premises, look to existing practice in asserting that individuals could not 
have demanding political duties at the global scope. If Rawls’ theory about 
when we can and cannot have demanding duties of justice is to a significant 
extent based on what is thought to be acceptable within existing political 
cultures, his position does not seem to give those that adopt liberal premises 
a convincing justification of political duties within existing political societies 
or a convincing argument for the claim that individuals could not have po-
litical duties to support global forms of political authority. In reply to this 
argument one might want to suggest that I have misunderstood Rawls’ the-
ory. What he proposes is a two staged theory that can be genuinely liberal at 
the domestic scope but that can also accept illiberal political cultures at the 
global scope.   
First we have the more demanding argument for how to justify the state’s 
moral legitimacy to individuals when theorising about justice in a liberal 
democratic state. In this kind of political culture one must advance an argu-
ment of the kind found in the previous chapter to justify to individuals that 
they have demanding and non-voluntary political duties within the state they 
are members of. Second, we move to the global stage where we have a less 
demanding theory for justifying the moral legitimacy of well-order political 
communities’ self-determination. This is because there is no liberal political 
culture globally, and in order to advance a theory all can accept we must 
appeal to what can be share among various liberal a decent illiberal political 
cultures. This in turn justifies global principles that will secure the condi-
tions for a plurality of morally legitimate types of political orders based on 
different peoples’ conceptions of the ‘good political order.’ The problem 
with this two stage approach is that as soon as we say that we need some-
thing more than an appeal to existing practice to establish political duties in 
liberal political communities we must ask why only individuals that happen 
to find themselves in such states are owed this more demanding form of 
justification.  
There are two kinds of answers to this question. The first one is to retreat 
somewhat and to say that in both a liberal state and an illiberal state we are 
just appealing to existing political cultures in justifying these respective 
kinds of political order. We are not adding something extra when justifying 
political duties in the liberal state. What is happening instead is that in the 
case of the illiberal political culture one can justify political authority if its 
political institutions are well ordered and respects a notion of basic human 
rights all decent peoples could agree to. These rights are understood as a 
right to life, freedom from slavery and slave like conditions, property rights, 
and a right to formal equality (i.e. formal equality in the sense that similar 
cases are treated similarly).360 This standard of human rights still allows 
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room to secure the moral legitimacy of an illiberal state where the distribu-
tion of burdens and benefits in the basic structure is not founded on the 
premise of equal concern for each individual. In a liberal society the political 
culture does call for treating individuals as equals and that is why the moral 
legitimacy of the authority exercised by the state and its basic structure are 
dependent on individuals being treated as moral equals. 
This kind of argument does not appear to be available within the confines 
set out by the basic liberal commitment to the inherent moral equality of 
each individual. This is because appealing to what is and is not acceptable in 
a political culture in determining whether on not individuals are owed a cer-
tain kind of justification for political order means that when we do justify 
political authority based on an equal concern for all individuals we are doing 
so at a more foundational level because that is what existing practice calls 
for in the culture in question. In the liberal political culture we are not offer-
ing and individualistic justification of political order because individuals are 
in fact moral equals because in other contexts where the political culture is 
different political order is justified in some other way. The technical point to 
notice here is that this way of arguing seems to entail a rejection of the lib-
eral premise that all individuals are in fact moral equals.  
In responding to this problem another kind of answer the Rawlsian could 
offer is to simply accept the idea of different grounds for justification de-
pending on context as opposed to claiming that it is existing practice that is 
foundational in all contexts. In liberal states individuals are owed a strong 
justification based on their universal moral status.  Yet a move away from 
existing practice in this context forces us to ask why the existing global po-
litical culture is a trump over any liberal cosmopolitan argument for accept-
ing some set of demanding duties of global justice that would limit the po-
litical autonomy of peoples.  
A commitment to the idea of universal moral equality between individu-
als in thinking about political justice at the domestic scope makes it incoher-
ent to simply appeal to a political culture that does not embody principles of 
equal moral concern in justifying or rejecting various forms of political order 
in other contexts. This is because viewing some people as being owed con-
cern as moral equals and others as not being owed this kind of equal concern 
actually amounts to a defence of the inherent moral inequality between vari-
ous types of individuals depending on context or a rejection of the idea the 
there is such a thing as inherent and universal individual moral worth. If this 
is true it appears that liberals cannot merely point to the fact that suprana-
tional forms of political authority are in conflict with what we find in the 
political culture of the Society of Peoples to rule out the possibility that a 
global form of political authority could be morally required. The commit-
ment to moral equality in the domestic conception of political justice at least 
opens up the possibility that a supranational form of political authority could 
be justifiable on the same grounds that are applied at the domestic scope; 
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namely that respecting others as our moral equals can generate moral reasons 
to support the creation of a political order that ought to apply to us.   
Many commentators have argued that there is some inherent inconsis-
tency between Rawls’ domestic theory of distributive justice and his rejec-
tion of egalitarian distributive justice at the global scope. However, at least 
part of Rawls’ argument against the idea of global distributive justice is not 
internally inconsistent with his domestic theory. Rawls appeals to differ-
ences in the ways individuals are associated with each other within a single 
political community versus relations across political communities in defend-
ing his limits to egalitarian distributive justice. The moral status of all indi-
viduals can remain constant while the implications of this shared moral 
status differ depending on how we are associated with each other. This part 
of the Rawlsian view is what the liberal political conception of justice is 
founded on. However there does appear to be an internal inconsistency be-
tween Rawls’ domestic and international theories when it comes to how he 
justifies the moral legitimacy of political authority.  
As we have seen, Rawls offers a principled and not simply a pragmatic 
justification for the political autonomy of liberal and illiberal political orders, 
and a principled rejection of cosmopolitan demands of justice that would 
entail limits to peoples’ political autonomy. This position is based on what 
can be shared among decent liberal and illiberal political cultures in the So-
ciety of Peoples. However, in Rawls’ domestic theory political order is justi-
fied by appealing to the liberal Kantian idea that respecting others as our 
moral equals can generate a natural duty of justice to enter into or support 
political society. The point I am making is that one cannot easily shift from 
an egalitarian justification of political order in one context to some other 
standard of justification in another context. 
To rectify this apparent inconsistency one can of course adopt a theory 
based on existing practice across the board, but only at the cost of advancing 
a theory on the moral legitimacy of political authority that cannot be con-
vincing from a liberal perspective. It is not my intention to offer an analysis 
on the degree to which Rawls’ thinking about justice in general is founded in 
existing practice as opposed to a liberal commitment to the equal moral 
status of individuals. Nor is my claim that the interests of peoples to self-
determination are irrelevant to thinking about global justice. Instead the ar-
gument is that a coherent and general liberal argument for the justifiability of 
political order cannot see peoples interests to self-determination as a point of 
departure that necessarily rules out the possibility that morally legitimate 
political authority over some issue can reside at the global scope. 
 The upshot for the discussion at hand is that The Law of Peoples does not 
offer a general theory on when political authority is and is not justified 
founded in moral equality that could support a normative prohibition against 
global forms of political authority. Rather, Rawls’ anti-cosmopolitanism is 
based on a view where the value of maintaining the political autonomy of 
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peoples stands above other goals. Furthermore, the moral legitimacy of de-
cent peoples to autonomy appears to be grounded in existing practice within 
various kinds of political cultures and existing practice in relations among 
peoples, not on the equal moral status of individuals. Appealing to the inter-
ests of peoples to self-determination is one way to reject any proposal that 
would call for state sovereignty to be weakened. However it is not the kind 
of argument that an individualistic liberal theory of justice can appeal to.  
The cosmopolitan potential of the political conception 
of justice 
The political conception of justice as it is interpreted by authors like Nagel, 
Blake and Risse does not see the self-determination of peoples as an end in 
itself. The interests of peoples do not generate demands of justice that are 
more important than equal concern for individuals within or among these 
groups because it is individuals that are owed treatment as ends in them-
selves. As such, arguments for demanding duties of global distributive or 
political justice are not rejected at the level of general principle because they 
would undermine the political autonomy of a plurality of liberal and illiberal 
political orders. Still, the typical argument following from the political con-
ception of justice is that it is only from within an existing system of coercive 
political institutions that associative duties of justice arise. Since there is no 
such global political order there are no demanding duties of justice at the 
global scope. 
Nagel in particular makes it clear how this view upholds individualistic 
liberal premises. Instead of a prohibition on global forms of political author-
ity the theory only argues that it could not be morally required to create 
global forms of political association that give rise to distributive or political 
standards of global justice.361 However, once one abandons the Rawlsian 
principled rejection of global political projects that limit peoples’ political 
autonomy it is no longer logical to rule out of hand the possibility of non-
voluntary duties to support the creation of new forms of global political or-
der.  
On the political conception of justice individuals have a distinct set of 
rights,   
that arise only because we are joined together with certain others in a political 
society under strong centralized control. It is only from such a system, and 
from our fellow members through its institutions, that we can claim a right to 
democracy, equal citizenship, nondiscrimination, equality of opportunity, and 
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the amelioration through public policy of unfairness in the distribution of so-
cial and economic goods.362 
 
A citizen’s claim to these rights entails a corresponding set of demanding 
political and distributive duties within political society. As we have seen, 
defending such non-voluntary duties of justice within existing states is de-
pendent on a more general normative justification for 1) the need for politi-
cal order and 2) individuals’ duties to support such orders. Although argu-
ments from rational self-interest and fair reciprocity play an important role in 
justifying individuals political duties, the normative underpinnings of the 
political conception of justice are ultimately based in the argument that it is 
unreasonable and morally wrong to not accept the institutional conditions 
other people need to secure collective security, welfare, and the protection of 
individuals’ rights as moral equals.  
Recall that Nagel accepts the natural duty of justice at the state level,363 
but says that duties of justice will not arise at the global level unless states 
voluntarily create a world government or history otherwise takes us down 
this path.364  He states that,  
What creates the link between justice and sovereignty is something common 
to a wide range of conceptions of justice: they all depend on the coordinated 
conduct of large numbers of people, which cannot be achieved without law 
backed up by a monopoly of force…. Without the enabling condition of sov-
ereignty to confer stability on just institutions, individuals however morally 
motivated can only fall back on a pure aspiration for justice that has no prac-
tical expression, apart from the willingness to support just institutions should 
they become possible. The other-regarding motives that support adherence to 
just institutions when they exist do not provide clear guidance where the ena-
bling conditions for such institutions do not exist, as seems to be true for the 
world as a whole.365  
 
The problem with this view on the status of other-regarding moral reasons 
for action independent of global political institutions is that it is not com-
patible with the natural duty theory of political duties.  
If we have a general natural duty to support the political orders others de-
pend on and the specific problem we face at the global scope is a lack of just 
institutions that others need, it does not make sense to say that we have no 
clear guidance on what to do to satisfy our other-regarding motives. Clearly 
the answer is that we should create the needed political institutions. Our 
aspiration for justice is not thwarted by the lack of the right kinds of institu-
tions because we are not powerless in their absence. Political order is not just 
                               
362 Ibid.: 127. 
363 For further support for my reading of Nagel as supportive of the natural duty of justice see 
Nagel, Equality and Partiality, 33-40. 
364 Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," 121. 
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something we must relate to and support when it exists, it is also something 
we can actively create.  
Possibly what Nagel intends is that limited supranational forms of politi-
cal authority are not possible and that the only possible form of global politi-
cal authority is a global state. Then maybe the “enabling conditions” do not 
and could never exist, yet as we saw in the introduction the claim that a sys-
tem of divisibility of sovereignty is impossible does not appear to coincide 
with empirical evidence. What one has in mind in the case of global warm-
ing is a supranational political arrangement that could use policy instruments 
to create the incentives in markets all over the world for reducing GHG 
emissions. For example, a global tax or cap and trading system that could 
create global prices for GHG emissions combined with some credible means 
of assuring compliance to these policy instruments. Of course the claim is 
not that such an arrangement would be easy to achieve or even that it is 
likely, but it does not seem accurate to say that we lack any guidance about 
what we could do. Still, what might be intended is that there is simply a lack 
of political will to create the proposed institutional arrangement.  
It is not clear what normative implications Nagel could point to following 
the objection from political will. Let us assume in our case that we do have a 
clear moral reason to act collectively to address our impact on the climate, 
but that there is a lack of political will to create a credible supranational ar-
rangement for addressing this threat. In such a situation it is not that our 
moral motivation lacks a framework through which we could act on princi-
ples of justice but rather that we fail in our natural duty of justice to create 
the appropriate framework. In other words, on a proper understanding of the 
political conception of justice we can have a duty to build new forms of po-
litical order with those with whom we do not currently share such institu-
tions. Given such a duty a lack of political will is a moral failure not some-
thing that absolves us for not acting on our moral motivations. This can be 
true independent of what we consent to and of whether or not the proposed 
institutional arrangement is a benefit for us in a self-regarding way.  
To coherently defend the idea of a natural duty of justice to existing po-
litical institutions one must also accept the possibility that there can arise 
duties to support the creation of just institutions that ought to apply to us, 
even at the global level. Opposed to what is usually argued by those that 
adopt the political conception of justice we can be ‘morally obliged to ex-
pand our moral vulnerabilities,’ or more accurately we can be morally 
obliged to create new political institutions that match the already expanded 
scope of our moral responsibilities. In the case of global warming the reason-
ing for thinking we could be morally obliged in this way are that the threat to 
human welfare is of the right magnitude to warrant interference of political 
institutions and that mitigation efforts generate the kind of collective action 
problems that would warrant such interference at the supranational level. In 
the next section I add to this the argument that the potential benefits from 
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action for human welfare supports the conclusion that it would be unreason-
able not to at least create the political arrangements through which we could 
choose to collectively mitigate climate change. This reasoning does not seem 
to be affected in any way when some individual or political community sim-
ply states that they do not consent to having the scope of their duties of jus-
tice expanded. The scope of such duties is clearly not simply a matter of 
choice if we accept the justification of political duties offered in the previous 
chapter. 
Recall that on the political conception of justice it does not really matter 
that the state we are born into is arbitrary because accepting its authority and 
duties of justice to fellow members is simply to accept the “conditions of 
peace and a legal order, with whatever community offers itself.”366 Un-
planned and non-voluntary circumstances can generate real associative du-
ties of justice. For the case of climate change we have seen that the only 
community that can ‘offer itself’ is a global one. Given the kinds of affects 
we are having on each other globally and the kind of global collective action 
problems generated by climate change we are associated with each other 
politically at the global scope even in the absence of political institutions. In 
other words, should we have moral reasons to do something about global 
warming we can say that current conditions have generated a non-voluntary 
natural duty of justice to enter into a global political arrangement that can 
secure the conditions for meaningful cooperation.  
One should note that my argument for a global natural duty of justice is 
not some new interpretation of the natural duty theory. Kant argues that we 
have a natural duty to leave the state of nature and enter into political soci-
ety. The implication of Kant’s natural duty of justice argument is not chiefly 
about our duties in the state of nature but rather about the reasons individuals 
have to support political orders they find themselves subject to (at least ones 
that are just). Rawls uses this same natural duty reasoning in explaining why 
individuals should accept the demanding duties of justice associated with 
membership in a specific liberal political community. Rawls like Kant is 
simply advancing the argument that we have moral reasons to accept certain 
kinds of political arrangements that apply to us because treating others as our 
moral equals entails supporting these political institutions. 
In moving the natural duty of justice theory to the global scope I am ap-
plying the same reasoning. The only difference in the case of global warm-
ing is that the political arrangements that ought to apply to us does not yet 
exist. However, both Kant and Rawls were aware that such situations can 
arise. Kant shows this in his use of the state of nature image and Rawls 
shows this in his statement that the natural duty of justice “constrains us to 
further just arrangements not yet established….”367 The absence of the 
                               
366 Ibid.: 133. 
367 Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, 99. 
 201
needed political order does not mean that our natural duty of justice is also 
absent. We have a natural duty of justice if we have reason to either support 
or to enter into a political project with others. In the following section I will 
argue that respecting others as our moral equals does give us reason to at 
least create the conditions from which we could do something about the hu-
man impact on our climate. 
Two kinds of other-regarding duties  
The prospect of duties of distributive justice to future generations is a highly 
contested issue in political philosophy. The ways in which such duties are 
normally argued for face several problems when applied to the intergenera-
tional case. There is little opportunity for mutual cooperation between gen-
erations except for those generations immediately before and after the cur-
rent generation. As such, theories of justice that are dependent if not founded 
on notions of reciprocal fairness have difficulties advancing an argument for 
duties of justice that stretch several generations into the future. The current 
generation(s) cannot actively share a coercive political structure with future 
generations because they do not exist at the same points in time.  Even the 
Humean notion that the circumstances of justice are present where there are 
conflicts of interest over scarce resources is not obviously relevant. The cur-
rent generation can be a resource threat to future generations but future gen-
erations cannot harm past generations in terms of their access to resources. 
No mutually actable conflict arises. Furthermore, the very idea that we could 
harm future generations is thought to be deeply problematic.  
What is called the non-identity problem points out that who will be born 
in the future is dependent on the choices individuals make in previous gen-
erations.368 If we choose an unsustainable path the future will be filled with 
different individuals than if we choose a sustainable path. Thus, those people 
that will exist if we choose an unsustainable path have no basis on which to 
claim that they have been harmed by our choice. It was just this choice that 
lead to their existence. This problem of establishing that we can harm future 
generations makes it difficult to use a rights based argument to show that we 
have duties to future generations. If no matter what we do we cannot harm 
future generations in what is called ‘the person affecting sense,’ then we 
cannot violate the rights of individuals in the future.369 A lot of the academic 
work on the above philosophical problems attempts to modify how we con-
ceive of the circumstances of justice and harm to avoid the counterintuitive 
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conclusion that we do not have demanding duties to future generations.370  
Even given a successful argument demonstrating that we do have duties of 
distributive justice over many generations there remains a great deal of un-
certainty on what such distributive duties amount to in practice. I will not try 
to give an answer on how extensive our duties to future generations are or 
address the other philosophical and political debates noted above.  
I proceed in a more conservative fashion and avoid basing my argument 
for global political duties in a controversial assessment of how much we 
ought to invest in mitigating global warming. In leaving the central substan-
tive debates on intergenerational justice aside the aim is to insure that the 
reasoning of this work will not stumble at the last stage by adopting a view 
that the liberal sceptic can easily throw into doubt. The alternative strategy 
that I will employ is to argue that we can establish a natural duty of justice to 
support a supranational form of political authority based on 1) the minimalist 
view that we owe future generations more than no consideration whatsoever 
and 2) reasonable disagreement over our obligations to future generations.  
Future generations 
Gardiner explains that the difficult global collective actions problems gener-
ated by the threat of global warming provide, “each generation with the 
cover under which it can seem to be taking the issue seriously.” 371 The cur-
rent generation can institute,  
weak and largely substanceless global accords…heralding them as great 
achievements - when really it is simply exploiting its temporal position…all 
of this can occur without the exploitative generation actually having to ac-
knowledge that this is what it is doing. By avoiding overtly selfish behavior, 
earlier generations can take advantage of the future without the unpleasant-
ness of admitting it - either to others, or, perhaps more importantly, to itself. 
372 
 
The moral failure in existing attempts to address climate change through 
weak international accords is not only that we risk giving widespread 
choices for inaction the appearance of genuine concern. Following my thesis 
the status quo is a failure to support the kind of global political project that 
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could result in meaningful mitigation, which in turn is a failure much of any 
concern for the interests of future people.   
We have strong reasons to believe that in the absence of a system of 
global cooperation in which compliance can be collectively assured we will 
not be able to achieve the levels of GHG gas reductions prescribed by the 
IPCC in the timeframe the IPCC claims we have to make these changes. By 
failing to create a global institutional arrangement that would give us a real-
istic chance of mitigating climate change we are indirectly ensuring large 
scale inaction among members of the existing generations. This kind of inac-
tion is a form of strong, if not pure, generational partialism, and this kind of 
partialism is incompatible with the normative foundations on which the po-
litical conception of justice is grounded.  
Recall that even though there is said to be a problem of indeterminism in 
contractualist moral reasoning about how demanding our duties to others are, 
contractualism does offer compelling arguments for rejecting strong partial-
ism as a basis for determining what we owe to others.  We have also seen 
that on a contractualist theory of justice we can justify demanding other re-
garding political duties in order to secure the political conditions for human 
security and welfare. These two features of contractualism applied to the 
case of global warming do give existing agents clear moral reasons to sup-
port my proposal for some form of supranational political authority to ad-
dress human induced global warming. 
Non-support of the institutional conditions through which we could act 
collectively to mitigate global warming means that we are indirectly ensur-
ing that we will not achieve significant levels of mitigation. Thus by taking a 
stance in opposition to global forms of political authority for addressing this 
environmental threat one is choosing a course of action that makes it 
unlikely that  the exiting generations can make a significant positive differ-
ence to the conditions future generations will experience. The failure to es-
tablish or support the institutions that are necessary for meaningful action is 
a form of partialism for the interests of current generations that is unreason-
able on contractualist grounds because it is a failure to incorporate impartial 
considerations for future people’s interests into our actions.  
In order to credibly claim that we are making active choices based on as-
sessments of what our moral obligations to future generations are the mitiga-
tion option, one of the main policy options, must at least be made available. 
The threat of global warming is expansive and the prescribed changes in our 
economies are vast. To do something meaningful within the time frames we 
have to act requires a fundamental change from current patterns and trajecto-
ries of consumption. If we are going to be able to act on our moral convic-
tions under these conditions supranational political structures that can affect 
current patters of consumption at the global scope will be one of the things 
we need and we will need to start working towards such structures now.  
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If we do create the global institutional conditions through which we could 
make collective decisions on how to react to the threat of global warming it 
would be more difficult to pursue a policy of polluting now without limit and 
letting future generations suffer the consequences (i.e. strong partialism). 
Given a global political arrangement for setting and assuring compliance to 
public policy on mitigation inaction would require a much more overt policy 
of endangering the environmental conditions necessary to sustain human 
welfare in the future. Of course if the egoistic approach dominates future 
generations will suffer no matter what kind of institutional arrangements we 
have. Nonetheless, we do it seems owe it to future generations to at least 
make the option to take on the drastic changes required to address the human 
impact on our climate politically available.   
An important objection to this argument is that I have not established a 
clear enough picture of what our obligations to future generations are to sup-
port a proposal for a global form of political authority. Instead all that I have 
shown is that we have non-associative humanitarian duties to take into con-
sideration the interests of future generations. This may amount to a duty for 
individuals and political communities to reduce their GHG emissions, but no 
political duty follows. This objection misses the significance of the collec-
tive action problem involved in mitigating global warming. As we saw in our 
assessment of Simmons’ voluntarist theory of the state, we do not do enough 
to support the conditions for collective security and welfare simply by not 
violating others rights or giving them assistance when this is morally re-
quired. We must also do our share to underwrite the political institutions that 
others need to secure human goods.  
The objector might now say that this duty to underwrite a supranational 
political response to the problem of global warming is a humanitarian duty 
and not a duty of justice. This objection is based on the view that we can 
keep our non-associative moral duties clearly separated from our associative 
political duties of justice based on existing institutional arrangements. It is a 
rejection of my claim that the political conception of justice has cosmopoli-
tan implications under current conditions. However, this objection fails to 
see how the natural duty of justice is an instance of a general other regarding 
moral duty that can also be a duty of justice given certain circumstances.  
We have a general duty owed to all others not to act in ways that under-
mine the political orders they depend on for securing collective security, 
welfare and other pivotal human goods. Within our own state this amounts to 
an associative political duty to support the political order by obeying state 
directives and doing one’s fair share to support the provision of collective 
goods. In relation to other states, one’s duty not to undermine the political 
arrangements people need will often mean only that we should not interfere 
with the proper functioning of other states or similar institutions. Here we 
might say that we have a humanitarian duty not a political one because we 
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are not associated with people in other states through shared political institu-
tions. 
However, in the case of global warming although we are not currently 
bound together by shared political institutions we are bound together by a 
shared collective action problem that requires the creation of shared political 
institutions. As the natural duty theory of political duties shows it is enough 
to have such shared collective action problems to generate a natural duty of 
justice among a certain group of people. The problem of large scale envi-
ronmental damage and the need for systems of political authority to secure 
environmental goods is clearly encompassed within the collective goods 
justification of political authority employed in contractualist thinking. Global 
warming is a global example of this kind of problem where the group that 
has moral reasons to create a system of political authority is the world’s 
population. Thus, my interpretation of the political conception of justice as 
being able to have cosmopolitan implications prior to the existence of global 
political institutions remains intact.  
The argument advanced thus far could be made even stronger by showing 
not only that we must avoid strong partiality by making the mitigation option 
available but that the existing generation does in fact have a duty of justice 
to make large cuts in its GHG emissions. Following a liberal egalitarian no-
tion of justice we should expect that the interests of people living in the fu-
ture could justify demanding other regarding duties across generations. This 
is particularly true in the cases of non-renewable resource depletion and the 
deterioration of environmental goods in ways that will have a large negative 
impact on conditions that support human welfare and other human goods. 
However, I will not within the scope of this work be able to defend a more 
demanding intergenerational theory of justice. As we have seen, this phi-
losophical endeavour is filled with a host of difficult problems and it is not 
possible to say much that is useful in the space available here. As a conse-
quence a third and important objection to my argument is that I have not 
established a clear enough picture of what our obligations to future genera-
tions are to support such a radical proposal. Yet, even if we accept that there 
is significant uncertainty and debate over what is morally required of us in-
tergenerationally this reasonable disagreement speaks for not against a 
global political project.   
Contemporaries  
The question to ask is who should get to decide if we are going to aggres-
sively pollute the Earth’s atmosphere in a way that will impose significant 
costs on generations far into the future. Here we can identify a second other 
regarding duty in support of the thesis of this work. The argument is that no 
single country or group of countries can legitimately undermine efforts to 
create the conditions necessary for the rest of the world to makes choices 
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about how to deal with the threat of global warming. Imagine a people that 
resist the demand to support a global political project that would require 
them to weaken their state’s sovereignty. Instead this political society sup-
ports a government in their state that makes decisions that best serve their 
own economic self-interest. This political society appeals to the fact that 
they do not have anything to gain from cooperating with others in a collec-
tive political project. They justify this policy by arguing that they have sov-
ereign authority to decide what kinds of international cooperative efforts 
they want to participate in. The problem with this is that even though the 
citizens of this state give their political support to this policy this fact does 
not give moral legitimacy to their actions and non-cooperative choice. The 
scope at which the decision was made is illegitimate from the start.  
An unwillingness of a people to address the potentially devastating effects 
they, together with other peoples, can have on the environment cannot be 
justified to others by appealing to the moral significance of state sovereignty 
any more than an individual’s unwillingness to contribute to a system of 
collective security in their political society can be justified to others simply 
by appealing to one’s own liberty claims. If we accept the normative justifi-
cation underlying individuals’ non-voluntary duties to the state then we 
should also accept that individuals have a non-voluntary duty to support the 
creation of a global political authority (i.e. through their respective states) 
that does not currently exist but that ought to apply to them. A commitment 
to the moral equality of our contemporaries requires that we engage in a 
political project with all others, not just those within our own states. Like-
wise an appeal to ‘our society’s way of life’ or culture cannot be used to 
justify undermining efforts to protect the environmental conditions on which 
all human goods are dependent. 
Recall that one of the reasons I say that we need a supranational form of 
political authority and not simply an international arrangement for govern-
ance of climate change policy is because I argue that political legitimacy for 
this problem resides at the global scope. As we saw in Chapter II a differ-
ence between a system of international governance and a supranational po-
litical authority is that in the former system non-participation and non-
support are morally legitimate (e.g. the WTO) while arguing for a global 
form of political authority amounts to claiming that non-support is morally 
illegitimate. What makes this non-support illegitimate is in part based on the 
notion that we have at least some moral obligation to future generations. 
However, we can now see that the argument for global political authority 
also entails claiming that political legitimacy among contemporaries for the 
issue of global warming can only exist that the global scope. One political 
society or a group of states do not have the moral legitimacy to unilaterally 
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dictate for the rest the world’s climate future through inaction and non-
support of the global political system needed to address this threat.373 
Note that even when some states are reducing their own emissions their 
refusal to support a global project still amounts to a failure to live up to one’s 
global natural duties of justice. As we saw in the domestic case, not violating 
others’ rights is not sufficient to satisfy our other-regarding duties. This is 
because in order to secure essential collective goods there must be a political 
order with authority over the vast majority of individuals within any given 
territory. Doing our part means accepting a set of non-voluntary and de-
manding duties of justice because it must be up to the state to dictate when 
and how individuals contribute to the collective political project if it is to 
fulfil its function. The same holds in the global warming case. Satisfying our 
natural duties of justice requires that we accept the authority of a global ar-
rangement because it is this kind of political order we need if we are to ade-
quately address the problem of climate change. Putting one’s support behind 
this global political project is what it means to actually do something about 
the collective action problems involved in addressing the human impact on 
our climate.  
Summation 
I began this chapter by highlighting some problems with Rawls’ and Na-
gel’s attempts to rule out the idea that we could have duties of justice to en-
ter into a global political project comparable in demandingness to the state. 
In particular I argued that their arguments are not compatible with the con-
tractualist natural duty justifications of political order they offer at the do-
mestic scope. Rawls’ strategy in The Laws of Peoples for justifying the po-
litical autonomy of various kinds of peoples is itself foundationally in con-
flict with the natural duty argument he uses to justify political authority at 
the domestic scope. In his domestic theory each individual has natural duties 
of justice to support the political orders others depend on for the protection 
of their status as moral equals (i.e. equal rights, individual autonomy, goods 
to secure the former, and fair treatment within such a social order). In his 
international theory peoples and individuals within these groups have duties 
to ensure the conditions that allow other peoples to exercise their political 
autonomy. This move seems to force a shift in Rawls’ general theory on the 
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sources of political duties at any scope that is not easily made compatible 
with basic liberal premises. 
It is not only that liberal and decent political societies are bound by justice 
to respect peoples’ interests in political autonomy and that a political com-
munity and its members cannot have duties of justice to support global forms 
of political authority that would limit this autonomy. Following the logic of 
Rawls’ international theory, in some political orders social hierarchy and the 
interests of the community in maintaining such structures can be an accept-
able part of the justification offered to individuals for the demands of mem-
bership in their political society. What I have highlighted is that this princi-
pled argument for the justifiability of decent illiberal peoples’ political 
autonomy does not only have implications for the foreign policy of liberal 
peoples in relation to illiberal ones. 
A general theoretical view on when political authority can be justifiable to 
individuals also follows from Rawls’ argument in The Law of Peoples. This 
is that the source of legitimacy for political authority is actually found within 
the existing political culture as long as it satisfies basic human rights. In the 
same way the moral legitimacy/necessity of the kind of global political au-
thority I propose can be denied following Rawls argument. This is because 
my proposal lacks support in the political culture Rawls claims is the rele-
vant one to examine in considering relations at the global scope, namely the 
Society of Peoples. Those committed to basic liberal premises cannot avail 
themselves of this strategy to rule out the applicability of the natural duty of 
justice theory between individuals at the global scope for two reasons.  
First, Rawls justification of political order in his international theory is 
not grounded in the individualistic natural duty argument outlined in Chapter 
IV. Furthermore, the alternative he offers is foreign to general liberal theoris-
ing on what the source of a political order’s moral legitimacy can be. Sec-
ond, liberals have no reason to always depart from the premise that it is the 
exiting political culture of the Society of Peoples that is the source of moral 
legitimacy for relations at the global. This may be the case for some issues, 
but if we take individuals to be the basic unit of concern we must allow for 
the possibility that conditions can also arise where the interests of peoples to 
political autonomy lack moral legitimacy.  
Nagel does not rest his anti-cosmopolitan argument on the interests of 
peoples to political autonomy. Instead he argues that individuals have de-
manding duties of justice within certain kinds of institutionally tangible po-
litical associations (i.e. existing states). At the same time he argues that 
members of a political community cannot have moral duties to enter into 
new global political arrangements that would broaden the scope of their du-
ties of justice. The problem with this argument is that the associative justifi-
cation offered to individuals for their political duties to support the state does 
not allow for such a prohibition. Following the political conception of justice 
the existing political boundaries of states are arbitrary but their authority can 
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be justifiable because these political orders are necessary to secure essential 
human goods. Following such a justification one must at least allow for the 
possibility that when existing political boundaries fail to secure essential 
human goods and a global form of political association is necessary the po-
litical conception of justice can call for the institution of a global form of 
political authority.   
The remained of the chapter defended that claim that although there is not 
currently a global form of political authority to coordinate public policy on 
the threat of climate change the political conception of justice still entails a 
duty of justice to support the creation of such an arrangement. This was 
shown by demonstrating the normative significance of the parallel between 
the way in which non-voluntary duties of justice are defended at the domes-
tic scope and existing conditions in relation to the threat of global warming. 
We have good reason to believe that we need a global form of political au-
thority if we are to overcome the collective action problems that make miti-
gation of global warming currently so difficult to achieve. In addition to this 
empirical expectation we also would be failing to treat others as moral 
equals if we did not support such a global political effort. 
I have appealed to two ways in which existing agents fail to treat others as 
moral equals by not supporting the kind of global political project I have 
proposed. First, by not supporting a global political response to the threat of 
global warming existing agents would be failing to create the institutional 
conditions through which it would be possible to achieve significant levels 
of global warming mitigation. If we do not create the institutional conditions 
through which we could mitigate global warming we will not even have 
made the preliminary effort to make the choice to act on the interests of fu-
ture generations available. As such non-support for global political authority 
in the climate change case indirectly represents unreasonably strong partial-
ism for the interests of existing agents and a failure to be moved by the inter-
ests of future generations to any meaningful degree. Second, non-support for 
a global cooperative political project to develop and implement public policy 
on climate change is a failure to treat our contemporaries as moral equals.  
This is because political legitimacy on how the current generation should 
respond to the threat of global warming already resides at that the global 
scope. Given the nature of the global collective action problems we now 
face, non-support on the part of individual political communities have the 
character of attempts to dictate to the rest the world a course of action for the 
existing generation as a whole. What we ought to do is not a decision any 
single state or group of states can legitimately make for the world as a 
whole. As such respecting our contemporaries as moral equals requires that 
we engage in a collective political project with all others not just those we 
happen to share a state with. 
In closing we can note that I have not addressed how the global political 
project I propose will be designed institutionally or the more familiar dis-
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tributive debates about how the costs for mitigating climate change should 
be distributed between richer and poorer states. As such I have not said very 
much about what global justice demands in the case of global warming, 
choosing instead to focus almost exclusively on defending the preliminary 
claim that we do in fact have a duty to engage with each others in a thick 
political relationship to address this problem. I will not address more de-
tailed issues of political and distributive justice here except to note that once 
a supranational form of political authority is in place this political institution 
will, like any other form of political authority, need to be justifiable to those 
that are subject to it. Thus, we should expect that there will be reason to rec-
ommend standards of political justice that, if not genuinely democratic in 
character, do meet some standard of fair representation and standards of 
distributive justice based on the fair allocation of burdens in implementing 
emissions reductions, should we happen to choose this policy.   
 
 211
Chapter VI 
 
Conclusion 
This work began with the argument that global warming has bound us to-
gether world wide in a morally distinct way. Given the nature of the threat to 
human welfare from climate change and the difficulties in achieving major 
reductions in total global GHG emissions within voluntary or weakly en-
forced international agreements a normative and political question is raised. 
Ought we to diminish state sovereignty so as to create the institutional condi-
tions through which we could adequately address this shared threat? Given 
an accurate empirical assessment of the collective action problems involved 
in any meaningful effort to mitigate global warming, a proposal for a supra-
national form of political authority can quite readily be adopted by many 
cosmopolitan thinkers.  
If one begins with the view that existing political borders have little or at 
least not decisive moral significance, the prospect that global problems can 
give rise to demanding duties of global political justice is not difficult to 
accept. However, one of the central purposes of this project was to show that 
in the case of global warming this type of reasoning should also be compel-
ling for anti-cosmopolitan liberals that do see existing political borders as the 
central determinate of the scope of justice (e.g. Rawls and Nagel). The aim 
was to show that on a liberal normative framework shared by both cosmo-
politans and anti-cosmopolitans global environmental problems can give rise 
to demanding duties of justice comparable to those we associate with mem-
bership in a state.  
The first stage in this project was to place the specific case of global 
warming within broader debates over the problem of global justice, espe-
cially in liberal political thought. In Chapter II ‘the political conception of 
justice’ was argued to be the most important form of anti-cosmopolitanism 
to address in defending the view that following liberal premises global envi-
ronmental problems can give rise demanding duties of global justice. This is 
because the basic premises of the political conceptions of justice are closely 
shared with those adopted by liberal cosmopolitans. The political conception 
of justice is effectively individualistic in its approach to the problem of 
global justice while it nonetheless convincingly argues that under current 
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conditions demanding duties of justice are limited by the scope of existing 
political orders. Those that advance the political conception of justice can 
accept the cosmopolitan idea that we are part of a global moral community, 
or more precisely the claim that individuals have moral duties that they owe 
to all other individuals irrespective of culture or nationality. However, such 
moral duties do not give rise to demanding duties of egalitarian justice inde-
pendent of coercive forms of political association such as states. It is only 
within these kinds of political arrangements that we find legitimate claims of 
political and distributive justice between individuals.  
In using the case of global warming to try and bridge the gap between lib-
eral cosmopolitans and liberal anti-cosmopolitans I have not advanced the 
more familiar cosmopolitan claim that thick political interconnectedness 
should not be given the kind of normative significance may liberals regularly 
attribute to such relations (nor do I reject such reasoning). Instead I propose 
that we can sometimes be strongly politically interconnected even when we 
do not currently share in an existing political order. We can be politically 
interconnected in a way that is relevant for a theory of justice not only when 
we have duties to support a political order as members but also when we 
have duties to support the creation of political arrangements that ought to 
apply to us. Individuals can have what Rawls call a ‘natural duty of justice’ 
to support both existing states and new global forms of political authority. If 
we have such a duty to create a supranational form of political authority that 
could facilitate collective action to address the threat of climate change, then 
we have demanding duties of global justice under current conditions.  
In Chapter II I identified a set of necessary tasks to successfully defend 
the view that even following the political conception of justice the problem 
of global warming has expanded the scope of our demanding duties of jus-
tice.  The objective was to identify what would amount to a satisfactory jus-
tification to individuals that they have political duties among some group of 
people. Broadly such a justification must 1) show that providing or securing 
some set of essential collective goods is only achievable from within a sys-
tem of coercive political institutions, and 2) provide a justification to indi-
viduals explaining why they have obligations or duties to support some spe-
cific political arrangement of this kind. In Chapter III I addressed the first 
task and argued that there is a morally relevant parallel between the collec-
tive goods justification of the state widely adopted in liberal political thought 
and the cooperative challenges involved in any effort to mitigate global 
warming.  
Global warming is a threat to human welfare of a magnitude that at least 
makes the prospect of using coercive political institutions to address the 
problem not immediately objectionable on the grounds of individuals’ liberty 
claims. At the domestic scope the protection of the environment is one as-
pect of collective security that is widely pointed to in justifying the need for 
the state. For the case of climate change anti-cosmopolitan liberals would 
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certainly not object to the idea that states can legitimately use their political 
authority to implement public policy on this problem within their respective 
territories. They would also not object to states entering into international 
agreements with other states. However, I have argued that it is not realistic to 
expect the individual states’ domestic policies and weakly enforced interna-
tional agreements will be enough to avoid dangerous levels of global warm-
ing. This is because individuals, industries, markets, states and the current 
generation as a whole all have self-interested reasons for avoiding taking on 
the direct costs involved in drastically reducing GHG emissions and the indi-
rect costs of compelling participants in international agreements to satisfy 
commitments.  
Based on my review and interpretation of current research on the interna-
tional political economy of global warming mitigation there is good reason 
to predict that states will not achieve the levels of GHG emissions reductions 
the IPCC claims are necessary in the time frame set out by the IPCC through 
agreements like the Kyoto Protocol. This research also points to the conclu-
sion that if we are to have a genuine chance at affecting the levels of market 
and social change needed to achieve the IPCC’s emissions goals over the 
next twenty to forty years we will need to use policies that generate costs at 
the global scope for GHG emissions. In order to implement an efficient 
strategy along these lines what is required are global princes on GHG emis-
sions, and this would in turn require a globally coordinated set of political 
policies for generating such prices. Any globally coordinated, efficient, and 
credibly enforced system for putting prices on these kinds of environmental 
externalities amounts to a supranational system of political authority that 
changes the authority structures of existing states. The claim that we need a 
global form of political authority to adequately address the threat of global 
warming is then, I argue, what one of the central and most compelling per-
spectives on the international political economy of climate change amounts 
to.  
The empirical assessment above is of course controversial and it may turn 
out that states will be able to achieve significant levels of mitigation unilat-
erally and through international agreements like the Kyoto protocol. Still, it 
is important to work out the normative implications that follow from what 
existing research is indicating, and this is the way this book should be inter-
preted. Thus, if we take the empirical assessment above to be at the very 
least convincing the first necessary task identified in this work for justifying 
demanding global political duties in the case of global warming is satisfied. 
Once we make this move it must be further noted that policy proposals from 
economists and international relations theorists that do think global warming 
mitigation generates a public goods type collective action problem do not 
often argue for supranational political solutions. The reasons for this is that 
within international political economy and international relations it is often 
taken as a given that supranational arrangements that entail changes in the 
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authority structures of existing states are not politically feasible under cur-
rent conditions. This position is certainly based on an accurate account of 
current conditions, but in normative analysis the lack of political will does 
not obviously limit the kinds of prescriptions that should be investigated.  
Within the context of the global justice literature asking whether or not 
global warming generates demanding duties of justice to support a new 
global political project to address this threat is exactly the kind of question 
that is of principal interest. Furthermore, the lack of political will does not 
undermine the relevance of general normative theorising. If the implication 
of some form of global interconnectedness is that we have demanding duties 
of justice at the global scope, the lack of political will indicates a problem of 
moral failure and not an analytical failure in the normative theory. Of course 
this does not mean that question of political will is irrelevant to normative 
prescriptions.  
A lack of will may have implications for what one can reasonably expect 
from various agents when they are operating in conditions in which political 
action does not seem likely. I have chosen to leave these types of questions 
aside and to focus instead on the more basic claim that the problem global 
warming has generated clear moral reasons to support a global political solu-
tion.  This is what I take to be the most preliminary normative question with 
regards to what justice demands at the global scope in the case of global 
warming. Moreover, this limited focus does not mean that the study is only 
academically significant in relation to prescriptive arguments. As the scale of 
both the impacts of climate change and the changes need to respond to this 
problem become increasingly clear we may also see large shifts in political 
will.  
Still a justification of the kinds of global political duties I argue for cannot 
simply rest on the claim that taking decisive action to address the threat of 
global warming would require a supranational political arrangement that 
could credibly coordinate policy and compliance. What kind of normative 
justification can be offered for the proposal that we ought to support this 
kind of global political project? A commitment to the liberal presumption 
that individuals should as far as is possible be free from coercion means that 
individuals are owed a justification on the basis of moral equality for the 
demands involved in coercive political arrangements. On the political con-
ception of justice a new global project to address the threat of climate change 
could be justifiable if people through their respective states consented to 
such an arrangement. However, I advanced the stronger argument that we do 
now have a duty to support such a political project. The claim I make 
amounts to the view that we have a non-voluntary duty of justice to support 
the proposed political project. In other words, the source of the duty is not 
founded in agreements we make but in moral commitments we already have.  
The notion of non-voluntary political duties is acceptable among liberals 
that defend the moral legitimacy of minimally just states in their existing 
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forms because states as we know them are in important respects non-
voluntary arrangements from the perspective of individual subjects. Yet the 
reasoning typically advanced to defend state level political duties is not eas-
ily applied to the case of global warming. Liberal justifications of political 
duties are usually grounded in notions of fair reciprocity among those that 
benefit and depend on the state in various was. In the case of global warming 
mitigation efforts will largely benefit future generations, and this in turn 
tends to undermine a justification of global political duties based in fair re-
ciprocity for this case. On the political conception of justice it is argued that 
demanding global duties of justice will only arise if people consent to such 
demands or if we find ourselves subject to global forms or political authority 
that give rise to legitimate claims of justice on the basis of fair reciprocity. 
Because appeals to consent and fair reciprocity are generally the most com-
mon ways in which liberals have justified political obligations/duties, the 
notion that we have non-voluntary duties of global justice to support an as 
yet non-existent collective political response to climate change can seem 
implausible. 
What I have tried to highlight is that the justification of non-voluntary po-
litical duties within the state is not foundationally based in consent or fair 
reciprocity following the theories advanced by liberal anti-cosmopolitans 
like Rawls and Nagel. Instead these theorists rightly point to a duty to sup-
port the political institutions others depend on as the foundational source of 
each individual’s political duties within the state. The question then becomes 
why can there be non-voluntary and other-regarding political duties within 
the state but there could not be a non-voluntary duty to support the creation 
of an institutional arrangement that would expand the scope justice? Both 
Rawls and Nagel advance the view that individuals have domestic natural 
duties of justice while they rule out the possibility that individuals could 
under current conditions have similar global natural duties of justice (al-
though for partially different reasons).  
I have argued that following the premises adopted in the political concep-
tion of justice on cannot limit the scope of egalitarian justice to within exist-
ing political orders.  In other words, it is not the case that global demands for 
political or distributive justice can only arise if states or peoples consent to 
them or if there is an existing global political order that gives rises to de-
mands of fair reciprocity. Appeals to consent and fair reciprocity are not 
sufficient to rule out the prospect of a global natural duty of justice under 
current conditions. My defence of this argument has proceeded in two sepa-
rate chapters. 
In Chapter IV I defended the natural duty approach generally against ob-
jections from alternative theories based in consent and reciprocity. One of 
the purposes of this discussion was to weaken the plausibility of general 
liberal scepticism towards global justice that follows from such alternative 
theories on the source of political duties. To this end I strategically identified 
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what I take to be convincing contemporary consent based and fair reciprocity 
based theories, Simmons’s philosophical anarchism and Klosko’s theory of 
presumptive benefits. Here we have seen that neither of these approaches 
undercut the natural duty theory of political duties.  
Philosophical anarchism amounts to an acceptance of the liberal collec-
tive goods justification of the need for the state but a denial of the notion that 
states are necessarily non-voluntary. As we have seen, the fact that not all 
residents of a territory need to have political duties or be members within the 
state for it to fulfil its function clearly does not mean, as Simmons claims, 
that political order could be based on a set of genuinely consensual relations 
within a given territory. Simmons’ move from the former fact to the later 
conclusion is not compelling and appears to be based on a misunderstanding 
of the collective goods justification for the state. In a genuinely consensual 
state where individuals have the moral authority to dictate to the political 
community whether or not they want to support or to continue to support all 
or some aspects of the collective political project the state will not be able to 
provide collective goods in a satisfactory manor. At least this is so if one 
accepts the collective goods justification for the need of political order, 
which Simmons appears to do.  
Given that Simmons rejects theories based in the principle of fairness 
while he does accept the claim that we have moral duties not to undermine 
the political conditions others need to secure essential collective goods, he 
appears to be forced to adopt a natural duty view on political duties. At any 
rate, the choice he appears to be left with is to either reject the collective 
goods justification for political order or to accept the idea of an other-
regarding duty of justice to support political society because at the very least 
others need it. The former is an example of strict anarchism while the later is 
the natural duty theory of political duties.  
Fair reciprocity plays a central role in justifying to individuals the de-
manding political and distributive duties associated with membership in 
political society. Yet we have seen that fair reciprocity is not enough to jus-
tify to individuals the range of political duties they must accept over the 
course of their lives. Individuals will regularly not relate to the benefits of 
political society in a way that can generate a reciprocal duty. Klosko’s pre-
sumptive benefits theory is an attempt to show that even when we do not 
actively accept some set of state benefits we do have a duty of fairness to 
obey and support the state. This is thought to be the case when the state is 
providing us with benefits that from an objective perspective any person 
needs to lead a decent life, at least for long periods over the course of their 
lives. I showed how the practice of presuming benefit does not end up in the 
highly paternalistic principle that we ought to do what is in our own rational 
self-interest. Instead this approach amounts to the insistence that individual 
claims to exemptions from the demands of justice within the state must meet 
a certain burden of proof in relation to political society.  
 217
An individual must be able show that they do not benefit from society in a 
morally relevant way and that their exception from some political duty will 
not in practice or at the level of general application of such a principle un-
dermine state provision of the full range of collective goods that are thought 
to be needed by the vast majority of people. It is this type of other-regarding 
consideration that justifies to individuals that the state can presume that each 
individual benefits from political society and can legitimately expect support 
from individual residents, e.g. by paying taxes and obeying laws. The state 
must have the authority to make these kinds of presumptions and to place the 
burden of proof on individual subjects to show otherwise if it is going to be 
able to fulfil its functions. A policy of putting the burden of proof on the 
state to demonstrate that each individual in each context benefits in a mor-
ally relevant way from the state or that their support is needed for the provi-
sion of collective goods would secure the conditions that make free-riding 
likely. This in turn could undermine the ability of political society to provide 
essential collective goods in a morally satisfactory way. Thus, on a closer 
reading we can see that Klosko actually appeals to various types of other-
regarding reasons to accept the authority of the state as described above. The 
upshot is that it is natural duty and not fairness the lies at the foundation of 
Klosko’s presumptive benefits theory.  
The way I have rejected justifications of political duties based on consent 
and fairness follow the standard approach adopted by advocates of the natu-
ral duty theory of political duties. However, I have identified features of the 
natural duty theory that significantly strengthen the plausibility of this view 
in comparison to how it has traditionally been defended. On the problem of 
demandingness I have shown that caveats about natural duties being weak 
duties are based on a misunderstanding of contractualism. Contractualism as 
a theory of moral duties does not generally rule out demanding duties but 
rather rejects duties that are as demanding as those required by a strictly 
consequentialist theory of justice. This means that the liberal contractualist 
argument for the natural duty of justice is not incoherent because political 
duties are demanding. I also offered an interpretation of the natural duty of 
justice that better addresses the problem of particularity, which has typically 
been the weakest aspect of the natural duty approach.  
Conventionally the appeal to natural duty has been used to explain why 
we are strongly tied to others within our own state in a system of justice 
while we are only tied to outsiders by general moral considerations we owe 
to any individual. However, natural duties are general moral duties we owe 
to all individuals and it is unclear why we should be so tightly bound to 
those with whom we happen to share a state. This criticism is well founded, 
but I show that from a liberal perspective we do not have reason to insist that 
our natural duties of justice should tie us tightly to one state and its citizens.  
At the state level residents’ natural duties of justice arise to a significant 
degree because of the way others are dependent on the proper functioning of 
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this institutional arrangement. Yet changes in the way we are associated with 
others can also change the scope of our natural duties of justice. In the case 
of global warming they arise due to the kinds of effects we are having on 
each other at the global scope and the challenges involved in addressing 
these effects. In both cases our natural duties lead to a requirement that we 
support coercive political institutions. As such, there is now a clear way for 
the natural duty theorists to address the problem of particularity. We are only 
weakly tied to the state in which we reside and as conditions change so can 
the political implications of our natural duties to others. This view coincides 
much better with the liberal premise that individuals must be the basic unit 
of analysis in a theory of justice.  
Having highlighted how the political conception of justice is committed 
to the natural duty theory of political duties and what such an approach 
amounts to in relation to notions of consent or fair reciprocity I moved back 
to the problem of global justice in Chapter V. There I first argued that those 
that hold the political conception of justice cannot simply rule out the possi-
bility that we could have duties to support the creation of new forms of po-
litical order at the global scope. The justification offered by theorists like 
Rawls and Nagel for why individuals should accept political duties within a 
state makes it difficult for them to deny that individuals could also have du-
ties to support other forms of political authority. When the reasons for think-
ing we should have a state in the first place arise beyond the current scope of 
states our general natural duty of justice can generate a political duty to sup-
port some new political arrangement over state borders. At a normative level 
this is true if one advances an individualistic interpretation of our natural 
duties of justice.  
On such an interpretation we have a duty to support the political institu-
tions others need and we owe this duty to all others, including those outside 
of our own state. Within our own state a natural duty of justice gives us a 
reason to accept demanding political and distributive standards of justice and 
to view these standards as applying to us. On top of this, having a natural 
duty of justice to all others will entail that we not attempt to undermine the 
proper functioning of institutions in other political communities. We may 
sometimes also have a moral duty to assist a society that has failed political 
institutions. However, when we are faced with conditions at the global scope 
that threaten collective wellbeing and a supranational political arrangement 
is needed to adequately address this insecurity the natural duty of justice can 
call for more.  
On the individualistic interpretation of this duty we ought to collectively 
create the supranational political arrangements needed to secure human wel-
fare. This is an individualistic interpretation in the sense that we do not see 
those with whom we share a state as inherently more morally important than 
other individuals outside of our community. As such our natural duty to sup-
port political orders others need is not in principle stronger among some set 
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of people, although the practical implications can be more demanding for us 
within some demarcated group. However, when the practical implications of 
our general natural duty of justice call for supranational political arrange-
ments each individual ought to support such collective efforts. Even if we do 
not value such a political project ourselves the natural duty of justice in-
structs us to support it when we have determinative others-regarding reasons 
to do so.  
It is true that Rawls avoids this conclusion by adopting an international 
theory where it is peoples’ and their interests in political autonomy that de-
termines the normative content of legitimate political relations over existing 
political borders. However, as we have seen this move actually forces a shift 
in Rawls’ general theory on the sources of political duties at any scope. In 
his international theory Rawls’ justifies the moral legitimacy of all decent 
peoples’ political autonomy (i.e. both liberal and illiberal peoples) by ap-
pealing to what is acceptable in the existing political cultures of such states 
and the political culture of the Society of Peoples. Likewise, it is the primary 
concern of peoples for their political autonomy that rules out the kind of 
cosmopolitan theory I advance in this book. However, Rawls’ strategy does 
not appear to be one that liberals can use to rule out the very possibility that 
we could have a global natural duty of justice. 
 Rawls’ appeals to existing practice and the interests of peoples are unlike 
any of the standard approaches for justifying political order in liberal politi-
cal thought. They are also incompatible with Rawls’ own individualistic 
natural duty of justice theory that he offers in The Law of Peoples. It is not 
only that liberals must be sceptical to the way in which the interests of illib-
eral political cultures to autonomy seem to take priority over the standard of 
equal moral concern for individuals in Rawls defence of the moral legiti-
macy of decent peoples. Because basic liberal premises call for us to see 
individuals as the most relevant unit of concern in working out what justice 
demands, liberals do not have good reasons to always depart from the prem-
ise that it is the exiting political culture of the Society of Peoples that is the 
source of moral legitimacy for relations at the global. The interests of peo-
ples to political autonomy can of course have real normative weight in a 
liberal theory of justice at the global scope. Still, if we take individuals to be 
the basic unit of concern we must allow for the possibility that conditions 
can also arise where the interests of peoples to political autonomy lack moral 
legitimacy.  
Having shown that the liberal political conception of justice is theoreti-
cally open to the possibility that individuals could have duties to support the 
creation of political institutions that do not yet exist but ought to apply to 
them, I moved on to the specific question of what our natural duties of jus-
tice call for in the case of global warming. Do we have clear grounds to sup-
port the implementation of a credible global system for coordinating and 
enforcing mitigation policies? Do existing individuals have clear moral rea-
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sons to accept a set of political duties within such a system? Based on the 
liberal commitment to each individual’s moral worth there seems to be a 
strong case for the view that we owe it to future generations to significantly 
reduce our GHG emissions. Even if these actions are costly for us the costs 
are not excessive and it seems wrong to seriously harm the environmental 
conditions humanity depends on.  
It was noted in Chapter V that there are several difficulties in trying to 
apply notions of harm and distributive justice across generations. It also re-
mains relatively unclear how extensive our duties of justice to future genera-
tions could be from within a liberal framework. For these reasons I pro-
ceeded in a more conservative fashion and avoided basing my argument for 
a global natural duty of justice in a specific assessment of the extent of our 
duties to future generations. The alternative strategy that I employed was to 
argue that we can establish a natural duty of justice based on the minimalist 
view that we owe future generations more than no consideration whatsoever.   
The argument proceeded as follows. First, there is a normatively relevant 
empirical parallel in the climate change case to the collective goods justifica-
tion of the state. This is that we have good reason to believe that a global 
form of political authority is needed if we are to overcome the collective 
action problems that make mitigation of global warming currently so diffi-
cult to achieve. Second, there is a moral parallel to the way in which one can 
defend the idea that individuals have political duties within the state and the 
global form of political authority I have proposed; namely that we would be 
failing to treat others as moral equals if we did not support such a global 
political effort. 
It is only by supporting a global political response to the threat of global 
warming that existing agents can create the institutional conditions through 
which it would be possible to achieve significant levels of global warming 
mitigation. If the existing generation does not create the institutional condi-
tions that we expect are necessary to achieve meaningful levels of mitigation 
it is also choosing not to even make the choice to act on the interests of fu-
ture generations available. As such non-support for global political authority 
in the climate change case indirectly represents unreasonably strong partial-
ism for the interests of existing agents and a failure to be moved by the inter-
ests of future generations to any meaningful degree. 
By adopting this minimalistic strategy in relation to duties to future gen-
erations I have increased the likelihood that the argument advanced can se-
cure broad acceptance among liberals. This is because most if not all liberal 
approaches share with the political conception of justice and contractualism 
generally a rejection of strong partialism. However, some might find the 
rejection of partiality to be too weak of a moral standard to motivate the 
proposed institutional arrangements. Here we can point to a second compel-
ling other-regarding reason for action; namely treating our contemporaries as 
moral equals. 
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A global cooperative political project to develop and implement public 
policy on climate change is also necessary if existing agents want to credibly 
claim that they are treating their contemporaries as moral equals. I have 
based this claim on the argument that political legitimacy for decisions on 
how the current generation should respond to the threat of global warming 
already resides at that the global scope. In other words, because a global 
cooperative response is necessary to achieve meaningful levels of mitigation 
non-support on the part of individual political communities for such a global 
political project amounts to an attempt to dictate to the rest the world a 
course of action for the existing generation as a whole. Choices about how 
much consideration we should give future generations is not something any 
single state or group of states can legitimately make for the world as a 
whole. Respecting our contemporaries as moral equals requires that we make 
choices about the planet’s climate future with all others not just those we 
happen to share a state with. 
We have seen that at the level of general principle the political conception 
of justice cannot rule out the possibility that we could have demanding du-
ties of justice to support the creation of new political forms of a association 
that ought to apply to us. In the case of climate change this natural duty of 
justice does appear to be activated by other regarding reasons for action we 
currently have. A political community and its individual members cannot 
morally justify non-support for a global political effort by arguing that po-
litical communities in general have sovereign authority to decide what kinds 
of international cooperative efforts they want to participate in. Nor can they 
morally justify their non-support by arguing that such arrangements do not 
benefit them and that they are not bound by any duties of fair reciprocity. An 
unwillingness to address the potentially devastating effects we can collec-
tively have on the environment cannot be justified by appealing to the moral 
significance of state sovereignty or a peoples’ self-regarding interests any 
more than an individual’s unwillingness to contribute to a system of collec-
tive security in their political society can be justified simply by appealing to 
one’s own liberty claims or self-interest. We cannot simply appeal to stan-
dards of consent and reciprocity to dictate to others the scope of our duties of 
justice. 
It is worth re-emphasising the considerable difference in the interpretation 
I have presented of what our natural duties of justice are in defending the 
notion of a cosmopolitan political conception of justice. The natural duty 
theory of political duties has often been characterised as an appeal to weak 
duties so as to tie individuals tightly to states they happen to be born into. 
The arguments against this approach have been 1) that such a weak duty 
cannot justify the demanding duties of political and distributive justice we 
associated with membership in a state and 2) that because of the universal 
character of our natural duties there is not a compelling reason for why the 
scope of our demanding duties of justice should be limited to compatriots. I 
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have shown that the natural duty theory properly understood does not neces-
sarily only make weak demands on individuals nor does it tie us tightly in 
terms of justice to those we share a state with to the exclusion of outsiders.  
This brings us back to one of the original aims of this work. Despite clear 
resistance within liberal political thought to the idea of global justice, a focus 
on our global environmental interconnectedness makes it apparent that liber-
als cannot simply accept existing political boundaries as benchmarks for the 
scope of our demanding duties of justice. Liberal anti-cosmopolitans do give 
compelling arguments for why existing political borders have genuine nor-
mative significance in demarcating our duties of justice from the general 
moral duties we owe to all others. Yet, even if we go some way to accepting 
such reasoning it is still the case that we can also be bound up politically 
with others even in the absence of political institutions.  Our natural duties to 
support the political arrangements others depend on will often only have 
moral implications such as not to undermine the states people outside of our 
own political community depend on. However the same natural duty can 
become a duty of justice that has demanding political and distributive impli-
cations given certain forms of human interconnectedness. 
Before ending this work the reader should note that there are clearly many 
limitations in this study. I will identify just a few that I take to be of central 
importance. Most importantly my substantive argument in relation to global 
warming could prove to be false based on any number of empirical errors on 
what kind of a problem global warming really is. Increasingly it appears very 
unlikely that we will discovery that humans are not in fact causing global 
warming and thus cannot mitigate further warming by reducing GHG emis-
sions. A more likely development may be technological advances that drasti-
cally improve capacities for mitigation or adaptation and that fundamentally 
change the collective action problems involved in providing the good of 
stabilising existing warming trends or adaptation to them. Alternatively the 
impacts from global warming might prove not to be as serious as predicted 
or existing capacities for adaptation around the world could prove to be bet-
ter than expected. Finally, the research on the international political econ-
omy that I rely on in Chapter III could prove to be overly pessimistic on the 
prospects for cooperation to address the threat of global warming given cur-
rent conditions.  
As I have already noted this work has not attempted to offer an independ-
ent empirical analysis on these matters. Instead I depart from what I take to 
be one of the central views in economic and political research on global co-
operation over mitigation strategies. The point was then to work out the 
normative implications that follow from this research. However, the kind of 
normative questions I address would certainly benefit from looking at a 
broader range of empirical analysis. Another weakness along the same lines 
is that I have not examined in any detail the prospects for agreement over 
 223
supranational forms of political authority or the potential designs of such 
supranational political institutions.  
One would expect some focus on both and maybe more so on the later is-
sue given the kind of normative analysis I advance. Considerations of what 
such institutions must be like in terms of distributive justice and enforcement 
to be considered fair are central to reasoning about both the prospects for 
agreement and about the normative desirability of such arrangements. How-
ever, I have chosen to examine what I take to be one of the most preliminary 
questions to address in thinking about global warming and global justice. 
Namely, whether or not it makes sense at all to suggest that we have de-
manding duties of global justice in this case. Focusing on such a preliminary 
question is important because, as we have seen, many dominant liberal egali-
tarian theories of justice still deny that increasing global interconnectedness 
has given rise to demanding duties of global justice.   
Finally, I have not addressed the substantive issue of intergenerational 
justice directly except to argue that we have more than no duties whatsoever 
to future generations. More work on the problem of intergenerational justice 
would certainly have strengthened the final stage of the argument advanced 
in this book. This is especially true given the fact the there remains a clear 
dissimilarity between the justification of political duties within the state and 
the justification of global political duties in the case of global warming. In 
the domestic case I argued that the natural duty of justice was foundational, 
but also that it was part of a package of reasons for supporting the state that 
included self-interest and fair reciprocity. In the global warming case I relied 
largely on an other-regarding natural duty of justice to justify to individuals 
that they have political duties to support a global political response to this 
threat. It is the rejection of strong partialism that does much of the work in 
justifying political duties in my argument. This may be viewed as too weak 
of a justification and could be complemented by a more demanding view on 
what our obligations to future generations are.  
In closing it is also worth noting how the results from this work may be 
used in relation to other areas of normative analysis on the problem of global 
justice. In showing that we can have very demanding associative duties of 
justice independent of existing institutional arrangements and irrespective of 
the nature of current cooperation, this work is potentially relevant to more 
familiar debates over global economic justice. As we have seen, debates 
between cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans over the prospect of global 
economic justice have focused extensively on questions about the moral 
significance of the exiting global basic structure. They ask if current patterns 
of global economic relations are extensive enough to claim that we share in a 
global economic project where the demands of social justice pertain. 
The idea of a global natural duty of justice emphasises that the effects we 
do or can have on each other at the global scope are at least as important. 
What kinds of collective action problems do we face and where do we have 
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reason to locate political legitimacy (i.e. domestically, regionally or glob-
ally)?  Existing institutions, conventions and cooperation may not, on their 
own, be the kinds of conditions in which demanding duties of justice are 
owed to others. Thus principles of fair treatment and concern for the moral 
value of others may not give rise to egalitarian standards of justice in the 
relationships and institutions we find at the global scope. However, even if 
we accept that global standards of fairness and equal concern are distinct 
from the demanding duties of justice that are owed in the state it may also be 
the case that we cannot achieve even these less demanding global standards 
within the context of existing global institutions and arrangements. If this is 
the case we may have a duty to create the institutional conditions at the 
global scope through which it would be possible to treat others fairly even if 
these new institutional conditions lead to legitimate calls for distributive and 
political justice.  
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